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Abstract 
The present research work, a comparative study as to the existing systems of appointment of 
judges in Malaysia and Bangladesh which is undertaken to examine its strengths and under-
strengths and to recommend a suitable mode for appointing judges of the superior courts for 
excluding patronage appointment and ensuring the appointment of men 'of stem stuff and 
tough fibre, unbending before power' in the higher judiciary, is divided into five chapters. 
The essence of each of the chapter is as follows : 
Chapter I deals with the 'Introduction' in which role of the judiciary,_ development of the 
concept of the independence of the judiciary, traditional and modem meamngs of judicial 
independence and importance of an independent judiciary in a democr~tic state have been 
examined. Then judicial independence as enshrined in the ~onstitutions of Malaysia and 
Bangladesh has been outlined. 
Chapter II examines critically the constitutional (with reference to relevant amendments) 
and legal provisions concerning appointment of judges to the superior courts ofMalaysia. 
Chapter ill considers analytically the constitutional (with relevant amendments) and legal 
provisions relating to the appointment of judges of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh with 
special reference to the leading decisions of the apex court in this regard. 
Chapter IV makes a comparative study of the constitutional and legal provisions relating to 
appointment of judges of the superior courts in Malaysia and Bangladesh. 
Chapter V, titled 'Conclusion', summarises the discussions carried out in the preceding four 
chapters and puts forward recommendations for a) the abolition of the system of appointment 
of additional judges/judicial commissioners, b) exercising the executive power of increasing 
the number of judges of the superior courts either on the recommendation of a judicial service 
commission or upon the request of the Federal Court/the Supreme Court and c) the 
iii 
establishment of a judicial appointments comrmsswn, consisting of majority ex-officio 
members from the judges of the Supreme Court, as a recommendatory body, the 
recommendation of which shall be binding on the appointing authority. 
iv 
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Chapter 1: Introd~ction 
A. Judiciary's Role as an Organ ofthe Government 
The Government, which is one of the four1 constituent elements of the state- a politically 
organised community established as a natural, necessary and universal institution, is the 
means through which the will of the state is formulated, expressed and realised. Greek 
philosopher Aristotle (384-322 BC) identified three elements or powers in a government and 
judicial element or system of courts is the third element? Thus judiciary is the third branch of 
the government, to use the words of Alexander Hamilton, ' the weakest of the three 
departments of powers' having ' no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction 
either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution 
whatever. It may truly be said to have neither force nor will, but merely judgment; and must 
ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm for the efficacious exercise even of this 
faculty. '3 
The judiciary is an important organ of the government which primarily administers the law 
by expounding and defining its true meaning. The interpretation of the law is the proper and 
peculiar province of the judiciary. It applies the existing law to resolve disputes between 
private individuals, between large private organisations (i.e. companies), between public 
bodies (i.e. government departments, local authorities, nationalised industries etc) or between 
a private individual and a government department. The judges do not implement their 
political views; they apply facts to legal rules and interpret those as best as they can. In a free 
1 The other constituent elements of the state are: a) population, b) territory and c) sovereignty. 
2 Aristotle, The Politics (translated by Ernest Barker and RF Stailey) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995) 
at pp. 165-177. 
3 Alexander Hamilton, 'The Federalist No. 78', in Alexander Hamilton, John Madison and John Jay (eds), The 
Federalist or the New Constitution (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948) at pp. 396-397. 
1 
society, the necessity of the judiciary is keenly felt to ascertain and decide both public and 
private rights, to administer justice, to punish crimes and to protect the innocent from injury 
and usurpation: The judges may by their rulings, their dicta, powerfully and usefully 
contribute to adapt the law to the needs' of a rapidly changing society. In countries where 
there is a written constitution, which cannot be overridden by ordinary legislation, the judges 
are guardians of the constitution and may declare a statute to be unconstitutional and invalid 
and thereby ensure the observance of the rule of law. As Alexander Harp.ilton ·says: ' ... No . 
legislative act ... contrary to the constitution, can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm 
that the deputy is greater than his principal .... It [constitution] therefore belongs to them [the 
judges] to ascertain its meaning as well as the meaning of any particular act proceeding from 
. the legislative body .... the constitution ought to be preferred to the statute, the intention of 
the people to the intention oftheir agents.'4 In the same vein, James Bryce says: 
When questions arise as to the limits of the powers of the Executive or of the Legislature, or-
in a Federation- as to the limits of the respective powers of the Central or National and those 
of the State Government, it is by a Court of Law that the true meaning of the Constitution, as 
the fundamental and supreme law, ought to be determined, because it is the rightful and 
authorised interpreter of what the people intended to declare when they were enacting a 
fundamental instrument. 5 
The judiciary seeks to evolve from the competing social interests, which appear before them, 
a solution that maximises the public advantage. It makes from a given and particular instance 
a universal rule by which the conduct of other men will be shaped and determined. Thus the 
judiciary plays a vital role to shape the life of the community and to secure the observance of 
the rule oflaw. 
4 Ibid. 
5 James Bryce, Modern Democracies, vol. II (New York: Macmillan, 1921) at pp. 384-38'5. 
2 
The judiciary can perform its functions properly only in a democratic country and, as such, a 
democratic government is, a prerequisite for the existence of an independent and courageous 
judiciary. For, in a totalitarian state, thejudiciary is expected to act in accordance with the 
policies of the central authority and, as such, political absolutism is to have free reign.6 'If the 
executive could shape judicial decision', rightly says Harold Laski, 'in accordance with its 
own desires, it would be the unlimited master of the State.' 7 In the words of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, who in his Report of 2004, said: 
'The rule of law and separation of powers not only constitute the pillars of the system of 
democracy but also open the way to an administration of justice that provides guarantees of 
independence, impartiality and transparency. These guarantees are ... universal in scope ... ' 8 
. The judiciary' s interpretation of the law must not be bou~d by the will of the executive, 
rather it must be able to call the executive to account and protect the life as well as liberty of 
the governed. Thus it is evident that the more independent the position of the judiciary, the 
more likely it will be able to realise the purpose of the institution. Therefore, the 
independence of the judiciary is the central principle underlying the administration of justice. 
B. Judicial Independence as a Result of the Application of Doctrine of the Separation of 
Powers 
At modern times, it is contended that the independence of the judiciary is principally a result 
of the application of the doctrine of separation powers, the doctrine which generally means 
the distribution of the governmental powers among its three organs- executive, legislative and 
judiciary. French Jurist Montesquieu, who developed the modern formulation of the doctrine 
of separation of powers in 1748 after the English Philosopher John Locke (who had 
6 For example, in the Nazi era in Germany, there was no independent judiciary as the judges were expected to 
follow the wishes and orders of the Fuehrer. In the Third Reich (the Federation), judges were under a duty to 
consider 'the will of the Fuehrer' as the supreme role. 
7 Harold Laski, A Grammar of Politics (London: Harper Collins Publishers Ltd, 1967) at p. 542. 
8 Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, 2004, E/CN.4/2004/60, at 
para. 28. 
3 
propounded his theory in 1690), was concerned with the preservation of political liberty, by 
separating, in particular, the judicial power from the executive and legislative organs of the 
government. As he said: 
Political liberty is to be found only when there is no abuse of power .... To prevent 
this abuse, it is necessary from .the nature of things that one power should be a check 
on another ... . When legislative power is united with executive power in a single 
person or in a single ·body ~f the magistracy, there is no liberty .... Nor is there liberty 
if the power of judging is not separated from legislative power and from executive 
power. If it were joined to legislative power, the life and liberty of the subject would 
be exposed to arbitrary control; for the judge would then be the legislator. If it were 
joined to executive power, the judge might behave with violence and oppression. 
Thus would be an end of everything if the same person or the same body, whether of 
the nobles or of the people, were to exercise these three powers: that of enacting laws, 
that of executing public resolutions, and that of judging the crimes or the disputes of 
individuals. ' 9 
Blackstone also held the same view: 'In all tyrannical Governments ... the right of making 
and of enforcing the laws is vested in one and the same man, or the same body of men; and 
wheresoever these two powers are united together there can be no liberty.' 10 
However, it can safely be said that the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary is a 
'part of the Montesquian theory of division of power. The tri-partition of the public decision-
makers into the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary is based on the idea that each of 
9 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, vol. 1, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) at p. 157. 
10 0. Hood Phillips and Paul Jackson, Constitutional and Administrative Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 
1978) at 45-46. 
4 
these three acting parts should have a certain independence in relation to each other.' 11 
Although the doctrine of separation of power has inf1uenced constitutions of the democratic 
countries of the modern world, it has no! been strictly implemented in any single democratic 
country particularly in countries where the Westminster system of government is in existence 
such as the UK, Australia, India, Pakistan, Malaysia and Bangladesh. For, the separation of 
powers between the executive and the legislative in this form of government does not in 
practice exist; the ministers- head of the ministries- are members ofthe parliament and are 
directly answerable to it. However, the doctrine may now be said to have received its 
application in democratic countries by securing the independence of the courts from the 
control ofthe executive.12 The independence of judiciary is presently a fundamental aspect of 
. the separation of powers in a state governed by the rule of law. 
C. Traditional and New Conceptual Dimensions (Four Meanings) of Judicial 
Independence 
i) Traditional Meaning of Judicial Independence 
The most traditional and central meaning of the independence of the judiciary is that the 
judges are in a position to arrive at their decisions free from interference of the political 
branches, especially the executive and apprehension for suffering personally as a result of 
exercising their judicial powers. The Congress of the International Commission of Jurists 
held in New Delhi in January 1959 accepted this approach when it said: Judicial 
independence ' ... implies freedom from interference by the executive or legislative with the 
exercise of the judicial function.' 13 Sir Harry Gibbs, the former Chief Justice of Australia, 
also refers to the traditional meaning of judicial independence when he says: ' ... no judge 
11 Quoted in Gustaf Patren, ' The Independence of the Judiciary' , in Report of the Symposium on the 
Independence of Judges and Lawyers (Helsinki, Nov. 1980) at p. 95 . 
12 0 . Hood Phillips and Paul Jackson, supra note 10 at 15. 
13 Article 1, Report of Committee TV, International Congress of Jurists, (New Delhi , 1959). 
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should have anything to hope or fear in respect of anything which he or she may have done 
properly in the course of performing judicial functjons. So neither the parliament nor the 
executive, nor anyone else, should be able to bring pressure of any kind to bear upon a judge 
in the performance of judicial duties.' 14 
Thus the traditional meaning of the independence of the judiciary, in fact, refers to the 
personal independence of the judges. 
ii) Four Meanings of Judicial Independence 
The norms developed specially at the international level since 1950s have thickened . and 
broadened the concept of judicial independence. It has now four facets including the 
. traditional one: 
a) substantive independence; 
b) personal independence; 
c) collective independence; and 
d) internal independence. 
It should be pointed out that apart from the traditional concept of personal independence, the 
concept of substantive independence of the judges is also universally recognised by law and 
legal scholars. These two- personal independence and substantive independence- comprise 
the independence of an individual judge. The independence of an individual judge carries two 
opposite connotations: negative and positive. In the negative sense, the concept of judicial 
independence implies freedom from influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference 
from any quarter including executive, legislative or private individual. In the positive sense, 
14 Garry Sturgess and Philip Chubb, Judging the World: Law and Politics in the World's Leading Courts 
(Sydney: Butterworths, 1988) at p. 149. 
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judicial independence means the freedom of judges in performing their judicial functions 
impartially in accordance with their own understandii:tg oflaw and fact. 15 
On the other hand, the concepts of collective independence and internal independence 
constitute the independence of the judiciary as a whole and have developed in the 1980s. 
They were recognised first by the International Bar Association's Minimum Standards of 
Judicial Independence adopted in New Delhi in October 1982, then followed by the Montreal 
Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, 1983, the Beijing Statement of 
Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAW ASIA Region, 1995 and the 
Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, 2002. This inclusion of the two concepts of 
collective independence and internal independence in the expression 'independence of 
· judiciary' as the component parts is considered as an important milestone in recent legal 
history. For, impartiality and freedom of individual judges is meaningless without the 
institutional independence of the judiciary including the powers and facilities' that are 
required to perform judicial independence functions. 16 
a) Substantive Independence 
Substantive independence, which is also described as functional or decisional independence, 
means the independence of judges to arrive at their decisions in accordance with their oath of 
office without submitting to any kind of pressures- internal and external- but only to their 
own sense of justice and the dictates of law. As Erkki Juhani Taipale, an European Jurist, 
says that the judges in 'admin istering justice can only be subordinate to the law, and that only 
the law can influence the contents of the decisions made by [them] .... No other state 
authority, not even the highest, is allowed to influence the decisions made by the judicial 
15 Pamela S Karlan, 'Two Concepts of Judicial Independence' , (1999) 72 Southern California Law Review 535, 
at pp. 536, 558. 
16 Guy Green, 'The Rationale and Some Aspects of Judicial Independence', (1985) 59 Australian Law Journal 
135, at p. I 35. 
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organ.' 17 Thus a substantive independent judge is one who ' dispenses justice according to law 
without regard to the policies and inclinations ofth~ government of the day.' 18 (Sir Ninian 
Stephens). The International Bar Association's Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence 
defines substantive independence to mean that 'in the discharge of his judicial function, a 
judge is subject to nothing but the law and the commands of his conscience.' 19 The concept 
has been elaborated in the 1983 Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice thus: 
'.Judges individually shall be free, and it shall be their duty, to decide ~atters before ·them 
impartially, in accordance with their assessment of the facts and their understanding of the 
law without any restrictions, influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, 
direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason. ' 20 This elaboration has been echoed in 
. the 1985 UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Ju"diciary thus: 'The Judiciary shall 
decide matters before them impartially, on the basis of facts and in accordance with the law, 
without any restrictions, improper influence, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, 
direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason. ' 21 The Beijing Statement of Principles 
of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAW ASIA Region, 1995, also followed the 1983 
Universal Declaration on the Independence of the Judiciary: 'The judiciary shall decide 
matters before it in accordance with its impartial assessment ofthe facts and its understanding 
ofthe law without improper influences, direct or indirect, from any source.'22 
The notion of substantive independence, which is considered as the kernel of judicial 
independence, had also received due recognition in the Constitutions of some of the countries 
of the world prior to the development of international norms in this regard. For example, the 
17 
Erkki- Juhani Taipale, 'Judicial Independence from the Lawyer' s Point of View', in Report of the Symposium 
on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers (Helsinki , Nov. 1980) at p. 118. 
18 
Ninian Stephen, ' Judicial Independence- A Fragile Baston' , in Shimon Shetreet and Jules Deschenes (eds), 
Judicial independence: the Contemporary Debate (Dordrecht: Martin us Nijhoff, 1985) at p. 531. 
19 Article l(c), International Bar Association ' s Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence, 1982. 
20 Article 2.02, the Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, 1983. 
2 1 Article 2, UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, 1985. 
22 Article 3(a), the Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LA WASlA 
Region, 1995. 
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Constitution of Japan, which was adopted in 1946, provides that 'All Judges shall be 
independent in the exercise of their conscience and ~hall be bound only by this Constitution 
and the laws.'23 Later, the Constitution o.fthe Republic of Korea, 1981, provides that 'Judges 
shall rule independently . according to' their conscience and in conformity with the 
Constitution and law. ' 24 
Thus substantive independence means the independence of individual judges to perform 
actual decision-making task merely ·on the basis of their assessment of the' facts- merit of the 
cases, and understanding of law in accordance with their oath of office without taking into 
account whatsoever any kind of inducement, pressure or threat from any quarter and without 
taking into account the policies and inclinations of the government of the day. Such a frame 
· of mind can be demonstrated only by those judges, to use the words of Justice Bhagwati of 
the Indian Supreme Court, who are 'stern, stuff and tough :fibre, unbending before power ... .' 
and who can alone ' uphold the core principle of the rule of law which says 'Be you ever so 
high, the law is above you. ' 25 
b) Personal Independence 
Personal independence, as mentioned earlier, corresponds to the traditional and central 
meaning of the independence of the judiciary. It 'means that judges are not dependent on 
Government in any way which might influence them in coming to decisions in individual 
cases.'
26 It has been defined by the 1982 International Bar Association's Minimum Standards 
of Judicial Independence as meaning ' that the terms and conditions of judicial service are 
adequately secured so as to ensure that individual judges are not subject to executive 
23 Article 76(3), the Constitution of Japan, 1946. 
24 Article 103 the Constitution of the Republic of Korea, 1981. 
25 S. P. Gupta and others v President of Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149 at p. 672. 
26 J.A.G Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (London: Fontana, 1977) at p. 29. 
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control. ' 27 Thus personal independence implies that the individual judges shall be 
independent of the political branches of the governm~nt, especially the executive in respect of 
the terms of judicial service including ~ransfer, remuneration, pension and the security of 
tenure until or marrdatory. retiring age and should be ' placed in a position where he has 
nothing to lose by doing what is right and little to gain by doing what is wrong. ' 28 
c) Collective Independence or Financial and Administrative Independence 
Collective independ-ence means the institutional, administrative and financial independence 
of the judiciary as a whole vis-a-vis other branches of the government, namely the executive 
and the legislative. It aims at virtually the abolition of the dominant role that the executive 
plays in the administrative and financial ~atters of the court at the central level. In other 
words, collective independence demands a much greater effective judicial participation in the 
administration of the courts including control over administrative personnel, maintenance of 
court buildings, preparation and formulation of its budget and allocation of resources. For, 
interference in the management of the judiciary as a whole by the executive has adverse 
impact on individual judges in performing their judicial functions. The collective 
independence of the judiciary is considered as an important means to protect and buttress the 
freedom of an individual judge in his decision-making from executive interference by way of 
administrative control. 'The protections enjoyed by judges, including financial independence 
.... ' claimed by the Commonwealth Law Ministers in their meeting held in Kuala Lumpur, 
Malaysia in 1996, ' are an important defence against improper interference and free the 
judiciary to discharge the particular responsibil ities given to it within national constitutional 
frameworks.' The Montreal Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice has given 
emphasis on this important conceptual aspect of the judicial independence thus: ' It shall be a 
27 Article 1(b), International Bar Association's Minimum Standards ofJudiciallndependence, 1982. 
28 R.M. Dawson, The Government of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954) at p. 486. 
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priority of the highest order, for the state to provide adequate resource to allow for the due 
administration of justice, . including physical facilit~es appropriate for the maintenance of 
judicial independence, dignity and efficiency, judicial and administrative personnel, and 
operating budgets. '29 ·The Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the 
Judiciary in the LAW ASIA Region, 1995, stresses that .'The principal responsibility for court 
administration, i.ncluding appointment, supervision and disciplinary control of administrative 
personnel and support staff must vest in the Judiciary, or in a body in wh~ch the· Judiciary is 
represented and has an effective role. ' 30 In this context, it is worthy of note that in 1993 the 
Courts Administration Act was passed in South Australia providing for the establishment of 
the State Courts Administration · Council, independent of the control of the executive, 
. consisting of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Chief Judge of the District Court 
and the Chief Magistrate of the Magistrate Court and associate members nominated by 
them31 with the responsibility of 'providing or arranging for the provision of the 
administrative facilities and services for participating courts that are necessary to enable those 
courts and their staff properly to carry out their judicial and administrative functions. ' 32 The 
Council's Chief Executive Officer, known as the State Courts Administrator, has been given 
the responsibility of the 'control and management of the Council's sta:tr and the 
'management of property that is under the Council's care and management' 33, subject to the 
control and discretion of the State Courts Administration Council. This can serve as an 
important model for other democratic countries to follow in order to ensure the collective 
independence of the judiciary. 
29 Article 2.41 , Montreal Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, 1983. 
30 Article 36, the Beijing Statement of the Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LA WASIA 
Region, 1995. 
31 Section 7, the Courts Administration Act, 1993. 
32 Section 1 0(1 ), ibid. 
33 Section 15, ibid. 
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d) Internal Independence 
Internal Independence of the judiciary means the independence of a judge from any kind of 
order, indication or pressure from his judicial superiors and colleagues in coming to decisions 
in individual cases. This means that the threat to judicial independence may not only come 
from outside, it may also come from in~ide- colle~gues and senior judges. Thus a judge 
should not only be independent from the interference ofthe executive and legislative but also 
from. his judicial colleagues and superiors, having administrative power and control, in 
deciding a case. Although the International Bar Association's Minimum Standards and 
Montreal Declaration expressly recognise the importance of the concept of internal judicial 
independence, the notion has received more elaboration and featured prominently in the text 
· of the Montreal Declaration. While the International Bar Association's Standards of Judicial 
Independence merely says that ' In the decision-making process, a judge must be independent 
vis-a-vis his judicial colleagues and superiors'34, the Montreal Universal Declaration on the 
Independence of Justice provides that ' In the decision-making process, judges shall be 
independent vis-a-vis their judicial colleagues and superiors. Any hierarchical organisation of 
the judiciary and any difference in grade or rank shall in no way interfere with the right of the 
judge to pronounce his judgment freely. ' 35 In the same vein, the Beijing Statement of the 
Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary, 1995, provides: ' In the decision-making 
process any hierarchical organisation of the Judiciary and any difference in grade or rank 
shall in no way interfere with the duty of the judge exercising jurisdiction individually or 
judges acting collectively to pronounce judgment. ' 36 On the other hand, the UN Basic 
34 Article 46, International Bar Association's Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence, 1982. 
35 Article 2.03, Montreal Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, 1983. 
36 Article 6, the Beijing Statement of the Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LA WASIA 
Region , 1995. 
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Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, 1985 merely states that 'There shall not be 
any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with th.e judicial process. ' 37 
Thus, it is evident that only the International Bar Association's Minimum Standards 
recognise the four types ·of judicial independence- substantive, personal, collective and 
internaL Although the Montreal Universal Declaration in the Independence of .Justice 
contains express provision concerning substantive and internal independence of the judges, it 
does not provide for personal independence of the judges and has implied reference to the 
collective independence of the judiciary. On the other hand, the UN Basic Principles of the 
lndep~ndence of the Judiciary recognise expressly only the substantive independence. of the 
judges and contain merely implied reference to the internal independence of the judges. 
· Although the Beijing Statement of the Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the 
LAW ASIA Region, 1995 embodies explicit provision concerning substantive, internal, and 
collective independence of the judges, it does not contain any reference whatsoever to their 
personal independence. Thus, it is clear that all these international norms have uniform 
approach only in one aspect of the judicial independence, namely the substantive 
independence of the judges. 
D. Importance of an Independent and Impartial Judiciary in a Democratic State 
Although the concepts of ' independence' and of 'impartiality' are obviously related, they are 
separate distinct values. For, ' impartiality' refers to a state of mind or attitude of the tribunal 
in relation to the issues and the parties in a particular case, 'Independence' reflects or 
embodies the traditional constitutional value of judicial independence and connotes not only a 
state of mind but also a status or relationship to others ... particularly to the executive branch 
37 Article 4, the UN Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, 1985. 
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of government. ' 38 The importance of an independent judiciary can be gathered from the facts 
that as back as in 1776, the American revoluti9naries listed the absence of judicial 
independence in the Declaration of Independence as one of the causes of their Revolution 
thus_: 'The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and 
usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over-these 
States .. . ?e has made judges dependent upon his will alone, for the tenure of their offices 
and the amount of their salaries. ' However, the realities that the judiciary.' which is charged 
with the ultimate decision over life, liberty, freedom, rights, duties and properties of citizens, 
is the weakest arm of the government and hold ' ... neither the sword nor the purse' press the 
compelling necessity for the establishment of a competent, independent and impartial 
. judi~iary to i) uphold the rule of law, ii) ensure fair justice, iii) defend constitutional 
guarantees of fundamental rights and iv) to maintain and enhance public confidence in 
judicial impartiality, so that the legitimate aspirations ofthe citizens of a state are fulfilled. 
i) Rule of Law 
An independent judiciary is the essential- indeed indispensible- component of a free and 
democratic society39 and the essence of a modem democracy is the observance of the rule of 
law; in other words, the maintenance of the rule of law is the hallmark of any democratic 
society. An enlightened, independent and courageous judiciary is, therefore, a fundamental 
requisite, a basic element for the very existence of any society that respects the rule of law as 
a subservient judiciary cannot be relied upon to accomplish the task of maintaining rule of 
law. If judicial independence exists in a democratic society, absolutism in government cannot 
38 The Supreme Court of Canada in Walter Valente v Her Majesty the Queen, (1985) 2 RCS 673. 
39 Francis J Larkin, 'The Variousness, Virulence, and Variety of Threats to Judicial Independence', (1997) 36 
Judges' Journal] , at p. 7. 
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establish there; and where it is absent, absolutism is likely to have free rein.4° For, it is the 
independent judiciary which ' stands between the subj~ct and any attempted encroachments of 
his liberty by the executive, alert to see that any coercive action is justified in Jaw. '41 
Independent courts constitute the · last bulwark of the citizen against the arbitrary 
encroachments of the state. Therefore, in ' all countries cases, sometimes civil, but more 
frequently criminal, arise which involve political issues and excite party feeling. It is then that 
the courage and. uprightness of the judges become supremely valua?Ie to the nation 
commanding respect for the exposition of the Jaw which they have to deliver. ' 42 
The roots of the rule of law can only go deep into the society if the judiciary applies the law 
neutrally against the government and is not afraid of making unpopular decisions against 
· powerful interests. To ensure the supremacy of Jaw over the arbitrary exercise of power, to 
guarantee equal protection of Jaw to all people without exception, and to maintain that legal 
decisions are based upon legal and factual merits rather than political interests or popular 
clamour, an enlightened, independent and courageous judiciary is indispensible so that a true 
civilised society proclaiming rule of Jaw can be established and flourished. As Madison says: 
' Independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves .... an impenetrable bulwark 
against every assumption of power in the Legislature or Executive. ' 43 'The importance of an 
independent judiciary' says Lord Halisham, ' is not Jess but all the greater when judges have 
to serve under an all-powerful parliament dominated by a party cabinet, and concentrating all 
the powers, and more than all powers, of the executive and legislature combined in one 
coherent complex. ' 44 In his oft-quoted judgment in the celebrated case of Sharaf Faridi v the 
40 
M. Ershadul Bari, ' Importance of An Independent Judiciary', (1 993) 4 Dhaka University Studies Part-F l , at 
p. 10. 
41 Lord Atkin in his memorable war-time dissent in Liversidge v Anderson, [1942] AC 206, at p. 244. 
42 James Bryce, supra note 5, at 384. 
43 Quoted in John Agresto, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy (lthaca: Cornell Uni versity Press, 
1984) at p. 25. 
44 Lord Hailsham, The Door Wherein 1 Went (London: Collins, 1975) at 245. 
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Federation of Islamic Republic of Pakistan45, Saleem Akhter J. (then a Judge of the Sindh 
High Court) observed: 
In a set-up where the Constitution is based on trichotomy of powers, the judiciary enjoys a 
unique and supreme ·pos.ition within 'the framework of the Constitution as it creates balance 
amongst the various organs of the State and also checks the excessive and arbitrary exercise 
of power by the Executive or the Legislature · ... The jurisdiction and the parameters for 
exercise .of powers by all three organs have been mentioned in definite terms ·in the 
' 
Constitution. No organ is ·permitted to encroach upon the authority of the other and the 
Judiciary by its power to interpret the Constitution keeps the Legislature and the Executive 
within the spheres and bounds of the Constitution.46 
. Modern governments necessarily pose a greater threat to individual liberties as they intervene 
in areas previously little regulated. The citizen must look primarily to the judiciary for redress 
ifthere is a denial of benefits to which a citizen is entitled or of unlawful interference with his 
freedom of action according to law. An independent and impartial judiciary can only 
determine whether the executive actions challenged were exercised outside the provisions of 
the constitution and other Jaws of the country. In addition to reviewing executive actions, 
such a judiciary can also determine, by reference to the constitution, the validity of 
challenged legislation remaining unaffected either by the policy or the wishes of the 
government ofthe day. With regard to the practice as well as wide scope of judicial review of 
executive action and of legislation in the USA, where the Supreme Court in 1803 assumed 
power of judicial review in the case of Marbury v Madison47, Erwin N. Griswold commented, 
'in the United States there is scarcely any sort of government action, or threatened 
45 PLD 1989 Karachi 404. 
46 Ibid., at 444. 
47 [1803] 5 us 137. 
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government action, which is not subject to judicial review. America has indeed moved a long 
way in the direction of government by the judiciary. ' 48 
ii) Fair Justice 
It is aptly said that 'Ideas, ideals and great conception are vital to a system of justice, but it 
must have more than that- there must be delivery and execution. Concepts of justice must 
have hands and feet or they remain sterile abstractions. ' 49 Without a free and independent 
' . . . . . ' 
judiciary, ready to adjudicate between individuals and between the state and individual in an 
impartial manner, justice, indeed, is a meaningless word. 'There is no better test of the 
excellence of a government' , rightly says James Bryce, ' than the efficiency of its judicial 
system, for nothing more nearly touches the welfare and se~urity of the average citizen than 
his sense that he can rely on the certain and prompt administration of justice .... if the Law be 
dishonestly administered, the salt has lost its savour; if it be weakly or fitfully ·enforced, the 
guarantees or order fail, for it is more by the certainty than by the severity of punishment that 
offences are repressed. If the lamp of justice goes out in darkness, how great is that 
darkness!' 50 Referring to the importance of an independent judiciary in ensuring fair justice, 
Henry Sidgwick, has gone so far as to say that ' in determining a nation's rank in political 
civilization, no test is more decisive than the degree in which justice as defined by the law is 
actually realized in its judicial administration; both as between one private citizen and 
48 
Erwin N. Griswold, 'The Judiciary and the Government', a paper presented at the Second International 
Conference of Appellate Judges, Australia, 20 May 1980, at p. 28. 
49 Chief Justice Warren Burger, 'Address to the American Bar Association ', San Francisco, Reported in Vital 
Speeches, I October1972; cited in Justice Michael Kirby, Independence Of The Legal Profession: Global And 
Regional Challenges, a paper presented at the Presidents of Law Association In Asia Conference, Law Council 
of Australia, Queensland, Australia, 20 MARCH 2005 < 
http://wv.·w. hcourt.gov.au/speeches/k irbyj /k irbyj_20mar05 .html> (accessed on 10 August 2009). 
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fundamental freedoms without any discrimination. Since the adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights in December 1948, the international community has made 
considerable progress towards the incorporation, promotion, and development of 
. . 
transnational jurisprudenc~ of substantive human rights along with the principle of judicial 
independence embodied in a good number of global .and regional conventions on human 
rights. Effectiv~· mechanis~s for the enforcement of human rights in the national, regional 
and international systems of justices are a fundamental requisite as withou~ such mechanisms 
human rights ~ill remai~ unfulfilled injunctions in the ' constitutions or in the regional and 
international convention-s. 'An impartial judiciary composed of competent judges is the best 
guarantee of proper administration of justice, and in the final analysis, of defense of human 
rights. ' 54 Thus, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, with which began the real 
history of human rights at the level of international law, provides that: 'Everyone has the 
right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunal for acts violating the 
Fundamental Rights granted to him by Constitution or by law'55 and enshrines the principle 
of the independence of the judiciary thus: 'Everyone is entitled in full equality to a fair and 
public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal, in the determination of his rights and 
obligations and of any criminal charge against him. ' 56 Similarly, the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950 provides that 'In the 
determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal established by Jaw.' 57 Later in 1966, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights guarantees that all person shall be equal before the courts, and that 
in the determination of any criminal charge or of rights and obligations in a suit at Jaw, 
54 Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, 1985, at p. 182. 
55 Article 8, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), 10 December 1948, N81 0. 
56 Article 10, ibid. 
57 Article 6(1), the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1950, 
CETS 005. 
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everyone shall be entitled, without undue delay, to a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal established by . law.58 The American Convention on 
Human Rights, 1969, also invest every person with ' the right to a hearing, with due 
guarantees and within a reasonable time, by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, 
.... in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminaJ nature made against him, or for the 
determination of his rights and obligations of a civi I or any other nature. ' 59 The latest regional 
convention on human rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 1981 , in a 
' 
simi lar manner states that 'Every individual shall have the right to have his cause heard. This 
comprises: a) the right to an appeal to competent national organs against the acts-of violating 
his fundamental rights as recognised and guaranteed by conventions [and] laws .... d) the 
. right to be tried within a reasonable time by an impartial coutt or tribunal. ' 60 
Thus the incorporation of the principle of judicial independence into the global and regional 
human rights law jurisprudence demonstrates the realisation of the international community 
to the effect that the independence and impartiality of courts is essential to the effective 
upholding of constitutional guarantees of human rights. Various international organisations 
such as the International Commission of Jurists ' Standards on Judicial Independence adopted 
in Athens (Greece) in 1955, in New Delhi in 1959, in Lagos (Nigeria) in 1961, in Rio de 
Janeiro (Brazil) in 1962, in Bangkok (Thailand) in 1965, and in Caracas (Venezuela) in 1989, 
International Bar Association's Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence (adopted in 
New Delhi), 1982, the Montreal Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, 
adopted in Montreal by the First World Conference on the Independence of Justice, 1983, the 
United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, 1985, the Law 
Association of Asia and the Western Pacific's (LAW ASIA) Tokyo Principles on the 
58 Article 14(1 ), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, 999 UNTS 171. 
59 Article 8(1 ), the American Convention on Human Rights 1969 1144 UNTS 123. 
60 Article 7, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 27 June 1981 , OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 21. 
20 
Independence of the Judiciary in the LAW ASIA Region, 1982 and the Beijing Statement on 
the Principles of the Independence of Justice, ~ 995, the Harare Declaration of the 
Commonwealth, the Bangalore Principle' s of Judicial Conduct, the Latimer . House 
Guidelines and the Suva (Fiji) Statement on the Principles of Judicial Independence and 
Access .to Justice, 2004 have also given emphasis .on the truth that the constitutional 
guarantees concerning fundamental rights can only be upheld and protected through a 
competent; independent and impartial judiciary.61 The establishment of the Office of the 
United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers in 1994 is a 
glaring testimony/example of international community's recognition of the need to protect 
and strengthen the independence of the judiciary as a central tenet of the .international human 
rights law of great practical importance. 
iv) Public Confidence in Judicial Impartiality 
The Judiciary, which is the last hope of the citizen, contributes vitally to the preservation of 
the social peace and order by settling legal disputes and thus promotes a harmonious and 
integrated society. The quantum of its contribution, however, largely depends upon the 
willingness of the people to present their problems before it. What matters most, therefore, is 
the extent to which people have confidence in judicial impartiality.62 Credibility in the 
functioning of the justice delivery system and the perception of the aggrieved parties that the 
judicial power is exercised impartially in the right perspective are relevant considerations to 
ensure the continuance of public confidence in the independence of the judiciary. Justice 
Pathak has portrayed this dimension beautifully in his observation in S. P. Gupta v Union of 
India63thus: 
61 M. Ershadul Bari, Judicia/Independence: National and International Perspectives (Unpubli shed Book). 
62 M. Ershadul Bari, supra note 40, at p. 8. 
63 (1981) Supp sec 87; AIR 1982 sc 149. 
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Public confidence in the administration of justice is imperative to its effectiveness, because 
ultimately the ready acceptance of a judicial verdict alone gives relevance to the judicial 
system. While the ,administration of justice draws its legal sanction from the Constitution, its 
credibility rests in the faith of the people. Indispensible to that faith is the independence of the 
. ' 
judiciary. An independent and impartial judiciary supplies the reason for the judicial 
institution, it also gives character and content to the constitutional milieu.64 
Thus judicial independence encourages tranquillity and harmony in society by .ensuring · .. 
litigants that their claims. are determined fairly by the courts. As it was commented that: 'The 
value of the courts as an important impartial forum for the resolution of disputes depends 
upon the public perception of the independence of.the courts from the parties and particularly 
their independence from the government. ' 65 Thus without .public confidence, the effective 
functioning of the judiciary is almost impossible. 'The confidence of the people is the 
ultimate reliance of the Court as an institution. ' 66 It is the most important element to retain 
the authority of the judiciary. In fact, the 'independence of the judiciary lends prestige to the 
office of a judge and inspires confidence in the general public. '67 'Nothing does' says James 
Bryce, 'more for the welfare of the private citizen, and nothing more conduces to the smooth 
working of free government than a general confidence in the pure and efficient administration 
of justice between the individual and the State as well as between man and man.' 68 In the 
words of a distinguished Justice of the US Supreme Court: 'The strength of the judiciary is in 
the command it has over the hearts and minds of men. That respect and prestige are the 
product of innumerable judgments and decrees, a mosaic built from the multitude of cases 
decided. Respect and prestige do not grow suddenly; they are the products of time and 
64 Ibid. , at 705. 
65 Ontario Ministry of Attorney General, ' White Paper on Courts Administration' , I 976, at p. 13. 
66 Felix Frankfurter, 'The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justice' . (1957) 105 University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review 781 , at p. 796. 
67 W.A. Robson, Justice and Administrative Law (London: Stevens, 1951) at p. 47. 
68 James Bryce, supra note 5, at p. 389. 
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experience. But they flourish when judges are independent and courageous. ' 69 Misconduct by 
any judge undermines public confidence in the admi.nistration and purity of justice and also 
damage public respect for the rule of law and, as ~uch, a 'judge shall exhibit and promote 
high standards of judicial . conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary 
which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.'70 Ifthejudiciary fails to 
retain public confidence, its legitimacy would ultimately be threatened. In fact, the 
significance of public ,perception in the judiciary is well reflected in . the oft quoted maxim 
' 
that ' Justice must not only be done, but must also be seen to be done. ' It implies that ' A judge 
shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come before, the judge, make any 
comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of -such proceeding or 
. impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall the judge make any comment in public 
or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person· or issue.' 71 This point has further 
been elaborated by the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, 2002, thus: 
A judge shall not allow the judge's family, social or other relationshjps improperly to 
influence the judge's judicial conduct and judgment as a judge. 72 
A judge shalJ not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance the private interests 
of the judge, a member of the judge's family or of anyone else, nor shalJ a judge convey or 
permit others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to 
influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties. 73 
The two basic principles of natural justice-impartially and fairness of the proceedings- apply 
for self-disqualification for bias. The rule does not require that bias has actually influenced 
the judge, but rather that it is likely that it will influence the judges. Thus public perception is 
69 William 0 Douglas, ' From Marshal to Mukharj ee: Studies in American and Indian Constitutional Law' 
(Tagore Law Lectures, 1956) at p. 345. 
70 Article 1.6, the Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, 2002. 
71 Article 2.4, ibid. 
72 Article 4.8, ibid. 
73 Article 4.9, ibid. 
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one of the fundamental values of the administration of justice.74 Thus public confidence in 
the judicial system and in the moral authority and integrity of the judiciary is of the utmost 
importance in a modern democratic society.75 Judiciary 's very existence, authority, strength 
and prestige, indeed, depend entirely upon the confidence reposed in it by the public. 
It should be kept in mind that judicial independence is something which must never be taken 
for granted, and like freedom, exacts the price of eternal vigilance.76 The tyranny of an 
autocratic regime may not be as dangerous and harmful to the public welfare as the 
independence of citizens in a democratic state. Public opinion is a better safeguard for the 
independence of judges than laws and constitutional guarantees. In the long run, the manner 
in which judges perform their duties can build up public opinion for the courts. The public, 
· particularly the lawyers and all sections of civil society, will support the courts if they are 
seen as an effective impartial forum for dispensation of justice.77 Henry Cecil says ' Justice is 
such a precious commodity that everything reasonable [on the part of the public] should be 
done to attain the highest standard' as judges do not live in ' ivory tower protected against 
tides in the affairs of men' (Benjamin Cardozo). He (Henry Cecil J) also added a rider that ' if 
the public does not want to pay for more expensive articles, it can have the cheaper. ' 78 An 
impartial administration of justice ' is like oxygen in the air, they [the people] know and care 
nothing about it until it is withdrawn. ' (Lord Atkin). 
E. The Constitution of Malaysia and the Independence of Superior Courts 
Malaysia, li terally means land of the Malay people who constitute 50% of the total 
population (about 28 million), is a country in Southeast Asia with a total land area of 329, 
748,000 km (66th largest country) separated by the South China Sea into two regions, 
74 M. Ershadul Bari, supra note 40, at p. I 0. 
75 The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct, 2002 at preambular para 6. 
76 M. Ershadul Bari , supra note 40, at p. 10. 
77 Ibid., at p. 11. 
78 Cecil Henry, The English Judge (London : Stevens and Sons, 1970) at p.ll3 . 
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Peninsular Malaysia and Malaysian Borneo (also known as East Malaysia consisting of two 
states of Sabah and Sarawak). The 11 territories of, peninsular Malaysia joined together to 
form the Federation of Malaya in 1948 and eventually gained independence from the British 
on ·31 August 1957. The decolonised Singapore, Sarawak and British North Borneo (now 
known as Sabah) joined the Federation of Malaya 011 16 September 1963 and the newly 
formed 14- State Federation was named as Malaysia. Malaysia has subsequently been 
comprised of 13 States since 1965, when Singapore left the Federation of Malaysia, and of 
' 
three Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur (capital city), Putrajaya (the new government 
administrative centre) and the island of Labuan (situated near Sabah). Malaysia borders 
Thailand, Indonesia and Brunei.79 
· The Constitution of the Federation of Malaya, which was drafted by the Independent 
Constitutional Commission chaired by Lord Reid of the United Kingdom 80, came into force 
on the Merdeka Day, 31 August 1957, and subsequently after passing the Malaysia Act, 
1963, to amend Article 1(1) and 1(2) of the 1957 Constitution to provide for, inter alia, the 
admission of the three new States and the renaming of the Federation as Malaysia, the 
.Constitution was introduced as the Constitution of Malaysia on 16 September 1963, the 
Malaysia Day.81 
The first Prime Minister of the Federation of Malaya, and Malaysian Bapa Kemerdekaan 
(Father of Independence), Tunku Abdul Rahman, in his 'Proclamation of Independence' on 
31 August 1957 at Merdeka Stadium (Kuala Lumpur) declared that the new Federation 'shall 
79 US Department of State, Background Note: Malaysia http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2777.htm (accessed on 
21 June 2010); Wikipedia, Malaysia < http ://en.wikipedi a.org/wiki/Malaysia> (accessed on 21 June 2010). 
80 
The other members of the Independent Constitutional Commission were Sir lvor Jennings (United Kingdom), 
Sir William Mckell (Australia), B. Malik (India) and Justice Abdul Hamid (Pakistan) . At the last moment, the 
Canadian nominee withdrew. 
81 Tunku Sofiah Jewa, Salleh Buang and Yaacob Hussain Merican (eds), Tun Mohammed Suffian 's An 
Introduction to the Constitutional of Malaysia, 3'd edn (Petaling Jaya, Selangor: Pacifica Publications, 2007) at 
pp, 11-14. 
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be forever a sovereign democratic and independent State founded upon the principles of 
liberty and justice. ' 82 But the basic objectives and principles- democratic way of life and 
upholding the Constitution and Rule of Law- constituting the Rukunegara (result of lengthy 
deliberations in the representatives of political parties and other interests83) have not been 
incorporated into the Constitution of Malaysia as Directive Principles of Policy, as have been 
done in the 1949 Indian Constitution or as the. Fundamental Principles of State Policy 
included in the · 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh. · 
The Malaysian Constitution does not even contain a preamble, which contains in essence the 
basic philosophy ofthe constitution (i.e. ideals and aspirations of the people) and is the key to 
open the mind of the framers to find out the general purpose for which they made the several 
· pro is ions of the Constitution84, as it is to be found in the Constitution of Bangladesh. The 
Preamble to the Constitution of Bangladesh provides, inter alia, that: 'it shall be a 
fundamental aim of the State to realise through the democratic process a socialist society, free 
from exploitation- a society in which the rule of law, fundamental human rights andfreedom, 
equality and justice85 •••. will be secured for all citizens. ,s6 
Judiciary is, among the trinity of the government, to use the language of Montesquieu ' next 
to nothjng' 87 and its importance is 'rather profound than prominent' 88 having the judicial 
power under the Constitution to decide controversies between citizens, or between citizens 
and state, and ' declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the Constitution void.'89 
Hence, judicial power of the Federation of Malaya was vested in a Supreme Court (consisting 
82 
H P Lee, ' Constitutional Heads and Judicial Intervention' , in Wu Min Aun (ed), Public Lm-v in Contempormy 
Malaysia (Selangor: Addison Wesley Longman Malaysia Sdn. Bhd., 1999) at p. 5. 
83 1bid., at pp. 5-6. 
84 The Supreme Court oflndia in Re Berubari 's Case, AIR 1960 SC 845. 
85 Ita! ics added. 
86 The Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972, at preambular para 3. 
87 Montesquieu, supra note 9, at p. 186. 
88 Henry Sidgwick, supra note 51, at p. 481. 
89 Alexander Hamilton, supra note 3, at p. 465. 
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of a High court and a Court of Appeal) and the inferior courts90 (established under the federal 
law) by the original Federal Constitution, 1957 in th~ same manner as legislative power was 
vested in Parliament91 and executive power of the federation was vested in the Yang di -
Pertuan Agong (King)92 in line with the doctrine of separation of powers. When the 
Federation of Malaysia was formed on 16 September J 963, the Part IX of the Constitution 
was amended to restructure the superior courts and under the amended Article 121 (1) the 
judicial power of the Federation was vested in the three High Courts (as a result of the 
breaking away of Singapore from the Federation of Malaysia on 9 August 1965, the number 
or Hi6h court ~rands at two) of coordinate Jurisdiction nnd ~mtu~. nnmcly the liigh court in 
Malaya, the High Court in Borneo and the High Court in Singapore. Amended Article 121(2) 
provided for the establishment of the Federal Court as the apex comt replacing the existing 
'Supreme Court giving exclusive jurisdiction to determine appeals from the decisions of a 
High Court and such original or consultative jurisdiction. Thus the newly established Federal 
Court in reality took the place of the Court of Appeal of the abolished Supreme Court. But 
the Constitutional (Amendment) Act, 1983, which provided for the abolition of all appeals in 
civil matters (appeals in criminal and constitutional matters were abolished in January 1978) 
from Malaysian Federal Court to the Privy Council in London by repealing Article 131 of the 
Constitution with effect from 1 January 1985, contained provision to establish on the same 
day the Supreme Court of Malaysia in place of the Federal Court as the final court of appeal 
and the highest court of the land.93 Two years later in 1987 the Supreme Court observed in 
Public Prosecutor v Dato' Yap Penl4 that 'judicial power to transfer cases from a 
subordinate court of competent jurisdiction as presently provided by S. 418A cannot be 
90 
Art ide 121 (1). the Original Federal Constitution of Malaya. 
91 Article 44, ibid. 
92 Article 39, ibid. 
93 
Tun Dato Seri Abdul Hamid Omar, The Judiciary in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Asia Pacific Publications Sdn. 
Bhd., 1994) at pp. 18-21. 
94 [1987) 2 MU 311 SC. 
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conferred on any organ of government other than the judiciary.' The Supreme Court held that 
121 (I) of the Constitution,. which then provided, as mentioned earlier that the judicial power 
of the Federation was vested in the .two High Courts and such inferior courts as might be 
provided by federal law: It seems that the decision incurred the displeasure of the 
Government; an amendment to Article 12l of the Constitution was passed in 1988 to remove 
the reference to vesting of the judicial power of the Federation in two High Courts of 
coordinate jurisdiction and status; the amended Article merely provided: 'There shall be two 
High Courts of coordinate jurisdiction and status .. :.' 
The abolishing of any reference to the vesting of the judicial power of the Federation of 
Malaysia in the Constitution in 1 988 reminds us that the framers of ·the Constitution of 
· Bangladesh in 1972 had not even vested the judicial power in the Supreme Court and 
subordinate courts in any of the Articles, from 94 to 1 17, of Part VI titled the Judiciary 
although they conferred the executive power of the Republic on the Prime Minister95 (not the 
Head of the State- President) and entrusted the legislative powers of the Republic in the 
Parliament- the House of the Nation.96 Since judicial power has not been vested in any other 
authority, the judiciary of Bangladesh exercises its exclusive and inherent jurisdiction of 
judicial power including reviewing executive acts and Acts of Parliament. For example, in 
Anwar Hossain Chowdhwy and others v Bangladesh97, the Appellate Division of the 
Bangladesh Supreme Court declared the establishment of six permanent Branches of the High 
Court Division by amending Article 100 of the Constitution under the Constitution (Eight 
Amendment) Act, 1988, ultravires and invalid. 
It seems inconsistent that although the reference to vesting of judicial power of the Federation 
in the two High Courts and the inferior courts was abolished in 1988 by an amendment to the 
95 Article 55(2), the Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972. 
96 Article 65(1), ibid. 
97 41 DLR (AD) (1989) 165. 
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Constitution, amended Article 121 of Part IX still contains the heading 'Judicial Power of the 
Federation ' and there is no explicit reference of inve~ting the judicial power in the two High 
Courts and inferior courts mentioned in that Article. It appears that amended Article 121 
makes the jurisdiction and powers of the . High Court dependent upon in fine on federal law 
that may be passed by Parliament from time to· tir:pe. In other words, under the new 
arrangement the High Court has been deprived of the constitutionally entrenched original 
jurisdiction and its original source of power- the· constitution- has been replaced with the 
Federal Legislature in contrary to the commencing constitutional scheme and the doctrine of 
separation of powers. Thus the equal status of judiciary with the legislative and executive has 
been eroded by the amended Article. Still it can safely be said that the doctrine of separation 
is a basic pillar of the Constitution of Malaysia although the reference to vesting of judicial 
power of the Federation in the two High Courts was abolished in 1988 by an amendment to 
the Constitution. The judicial power including the protection of the fundamental liberties and 
interpretation of, as well as maintaining the supremacy of the Constitution of Malaysia are 
b . . 98 emg exerctsed by the superior courts of the country. 
However, in 1994 the Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia was amended to set up from 
24 June 1994 the Court of Appeal as an intermediary court (between the Federal Court and 
the High Courts) and to rename the Supreme Court as the Federal Court- the final court of 
appeal for Malaysia. Thus the present structure of the superior courts of Malaysia under the 
Federal Constitution is as follows: 
98 
For example, in connection with the liberty of the person, Article 5(2) of the Malaysian Constitution provides 
that 'where complain is made to a High Court or any judge thereof that a person is being unlawfully detained, 
the court sha ll inquire into the complaint and, unless satisfied that the detention is lawful, shall order him to 
be produced before the court and release him.' On the other hand, as regards the interpretation of the 
Constitution, Article 128(1) provides that 'The Federal Court shall, to the exclusion of any other court have 
jurisdiction to determine- a) any question whether a law made by Parliament or by the Legislature of a State is 
invalid on the ground that it makes provision with respect to a matter with respect to which Parliament or, as 
the case, the Legislature of the State has no power to make laws.' See Sugumar Balakrishnan v Pengarah 
lmigresen Negeri Sa bah & Anor, [1998] 3 MU 289(CA). 
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I. the Federal Court (the highest court of the land) 
2. the Court of Appeal (as an intermediary court .between the Federal Court and the High 
Courts), and 
-3. the·High·Court ofMalaya and the High Court ofSabah and Sarawak. 
Prior to the name chang~ in 1994, the head of the Supn~~e Court was titled 'Lord President' 
and the title of 'Chief Justice' was held by the head of the High Court in Malaya and the High 
Court in Borneo respectively. But after the amendm~nt of 1994, when the Supreme Court was 
renamed the Federal Court, the office of Lord President of the Supreme Court was replaced 
by that of 'Chief Justice of Malaysia', while the Chief Justices of Malaya and Borneo were · 
retitled 'Chief Judge of Malaya' and 'Chief Judge of Sabah and Sarawak.' These name 
· changes appear to be a deliberate attempt to downgrade the position, prestige and image of 
the Malaysian Judiciary. 
However, it is true that unlike the Constitution of Bangladesh (the Constitution of the USA 
and the Constitution of India), the Constitution of Malaysia, as mentioned earlier, does not 
contain a preamble to incorporate into it the aspirations of justice and liberty, neither does it 
contain a Part titled the Fundamental Principles of State Policy like the Constitution of 
Bangladesh, Directive Principles of State Policy like the Constitution of India incorporating 
into it an Article (as it has been done in Article 22 of the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh 
and Article 50 in the Indian Constitution) providing that the 'State shall ensure the separation 
of the judiciary from the executive organs of the State' to demonstrate clearly the intent of the 
constitution makers to safeguard the judiciary from any form of executive control or 
interference. Furthermore, unlike the Constitution of Bangladesh, which in Article 94(4) 
categorically provides for the independence of the Chief Justice and other Judges of the 
Supreme Court, consisting of the High Court Division and the Appellate Division, in the 
exercise of their judicial functions and in Article I 16A speaks of the independence of the 
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Subordinate Judicial Officers and Magistrates exercising functions in discharging their 
judicial duties, there are no Articles in the Constitu~ion of Malaysia dealing with expressly 
the principle of the independence of the judiciary to show that it is very much a basic pillar or 
bas-ic structure in the scheme of the Constitution. Even the oath to be taken by the judges of 
superior courts, as mentioned in Sixth Schedule, does n9t contain a promise ' to do right to all 
manner of people according to law, without fear or favour, affection or ill-will'- the core 
principle of the .independence of the judiciary- as is to be found in Third Schedule of the 
Constitution of Bangladesh. 
However, a judge ofthe superior court is required to take an oath or make an affirmation that 
he will ' faithfully discharge' his 'judicial duties in that office' to the best of .. . [his] ability, 
· that he 'will bear true faith and allegiance to Malaysia, in connection with the liberty of the 
person, and will preserve, protect and defend its constitution. ' 99 Since the oath speaks of 
discharging judicial duties 'faithfully' , it may be strongly argued that this has the reference to 
performing judicial functions with loyalty, trustworthiness and unwaveringly, to use the 
words of Sir Gerard Brennan, who in 1995 in his swearing-in speech as Chief Justice of the 
High Court of Australia commented on the judicial oath, ' it commands independence from 
any influence that might improperly tilt the scale of justice. When the case is heard, the judge 
must decide in the lonely room of his or her own conscience but in accordance with law.' 100 
In the words of Raja Azlan Shah, who had a distinguished career in Government service 
before becoming a judge and rising to be Lord President of the Federal Court and sometime 
after his retirement first became the Sultan of Perak and then the Yang di-Pertuan Agong of 
Malaysia, judges 'are lions under the throne' but that seat is occupied in their eyes not by 
Kings, Presidents or Prime Minister but by the law and their conception of the public interest. 
99 
'Sixth Schedule. Forms of Oaths and Affirmation', The Federal Constitution of Malaysia. 
100 (1995) 183 CLR IX at X; cited in HP Lee, 'The Malaysian Constitution after SO years- Retrospective, 
Prospective and Comparative Perspectives', (2007) 9 Australian Journal of Asian taw 307 at p. 311 . 
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It is to that law and to that conception that they owe their allegiance. In that lies their 
strength. ' 101 Furthermore, oath of judges also states that he will 'bear true faith and allegiance 
to Malaysia' which implies that their allegiance are not to the Head of the State, Head of the 
Ga.vernment, ministers or the Parliamentand, as such, unlike the civil servants, do not take 
any orders particularly from the executive. As Article_ 1 32(3)(c) of the Constitution of the 
Federation of Malaysia states that: '3. The public service shall not be taken to comprise- .... c) 
the office of judges of the Federal Court, the Court of Appeal or a High Court; ' 
However, although the Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia does not contain the 
expression 'independence of the judiciary' or words performing the judicial functions 
independently, as· mentioned earlier, there are several provisions in the Constitution designed 
. to secure the independence of the judges of superior courts- the Federal Court, the Court of 
Appeal and the High Court..: under the Federal Constitution of Malaysia so that they can 
discharge their duties without fear or favour. 
Since the substantive independence of the judges of the Malaysian Superior Courts, 
with which the present comparative study is concerned, is inextricably linked with the 
method of appointment, the constitutional provisions relating to it will be discussed in the 
second. In this chapter, only those provisions of the Constitutions of Malaysia and 
Bangladesh would be discussed which are aimed at to further enhance the independence of 
judges of superior courts of Malaysia and Bangladesh. 
In the first place, a very significant provision concerning the discussion of the conduct of 
judges in the Parliament has been contained in Article 127 of the Constitution which provides 
that: 
101 
These comments were made in a public lecture in 1986 at the University Sains Malaysia in Penang which 
have been quoted in HRH Sultan Azlan Shah, Constitutional Monarchy, Rule of Law and Good Governance 
(Kuala Lumpur: Professional Law Books & Sweet Maxwell Asia, 2004) at p. 59. 
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The conduct of a judge of the Federal Court, Court of Appeal or High Court shall not be 
discussed in either House of Parliament except on a substantive motion of which notice has 
been given by not less than one quarter of the total number of members of that House, and 
' ' 
. 
shall not be discussed in the Legislative Assembly of any State. 
It seems that-the provision of serving notic.e of a substaotive motion to discuss the conduct of 
judges of superior courts only in the Federal Parliament, not in any State Legislative 
Assembly, by at least ·one quarter ofthe number. of members ofthe House concerned .is aimed 
at to prevent raising sudden and indiscriminate questions about them in Parliament which 
may cause embarrassment to the judges concerned or affect the public confidence in the 
judiciary. 
· Secondly, in order to ensure the dignity and honour of the Judges of the Federal Court, the 
Court of Appeal and the High Court, the Federal Constitution has given them the ' power to 
punish any contempt of itself.' 102 In this context, in Attorney- General and Others v Arthur 
Lee Meng Kuang103, the then Supreme Court in 1987 aptly observed: 
In this country the need to protect the dignity and integrity of the Supreme Court and the High 
Court is recognised by Article 126 of the Federal Constitution and also by Section 13 of the 
Courts of Judicature Act, 1964. A proper balance must therefore be struck between the right 
of speech and expression as provided for in Article I 0 of the Federal Constitution and the 
need to protect the dignity and integrity of the superior courts in the interest of maintaining 
public confidence in the Judiciary. 
Third and finally, since the power to reduce salaries and privileges of judges is by its nature 
a threat to attack on the judicial independence, like many states of the world 104 Malaysia 
102 Article 126, the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. 
103 [1987]1 MU 206. 
104 For example, Article IllS. 1, the Constitution of the USA, 1787, Article 147(2) & (4e), the Constitution of 
Bangladesh, 1972, Article 125, the Indian Constitution, 1949. 
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stipulates prohibition on reduction of judicial salaries entranced first in its Constitution and 
then in Judges (Remuneration) Act, 1971. The Constitution of Malaysia provides that 'The 
remuneration and other terms of office (including pension rights) of a judge of the Federal 
Cowrt shall not be altered to his disadvantage after his appointment.' 105 It should be stressed 
here that the remuneration of judges as provided by t~e Judges (Remuneration) Act, 1971, 
enacted in pursuance of this Constitutional provision, is charged on the Fund, and, as such, is 
not subject to aimual Parliamentary debate as · it does not require . annual Parliamentary 
approval for the allocation of fund . However, it should be mentioned here that the traditional 
or statutory guarantee regarding the remuneration of judges is no longer effective if there is 
no timely or automatic adjustment ofjudicial salaries in the face ofrapid inflation. 106 
· F. The Constitution of Bangladesh and the Independence of Superior Judiciary 
Bangladesh, which is a low-lying riparian country located in South Asia having a totai iand 
area of 147, 570 square kilometres and a population of 150 million (July 2007 CIA 
estimation), emerged as an independent State on 16 December 1971 following a nine-month 
bloody liberation war which began after Pakistan Army's crackdown on the inhabitants of 
erstwhile East Pakistan on the night of 25 March 1971. 107 lt is the world's third largest 
Muslim majority and seventh most populous country having 88.3% Muslim population and 
1os Art. I . 1c e 125(7), the Federal Constitution of Malays1a. 
106 Supra note 61. 
107 
During twenty-five year union with former Pakistan, which became an independent Dominion after 
partitioning of the British India on 14 August 1947, Bangladesh (first as East Bengal from 1947 to 1956, and 
then as East Pakistan from 1956 to 1971) witnessed the move to declare Urdu as the sole State language of 
Pakistan bypassing Bengali (since 1988 called Bangia) the language of the majority population, dismissal of the 
1954 democratically elected provisional government, greater discrimination in the recruitment and 
promotions in the civil services and armed forces, massive economic disparity between East and West Pakistan 
and increased suppression on the political parties. 
98% Bangali (i.e. who speak Bangia) population. Bangladesh borders with India on three 
sides- north, east and west- and with Burma and the Bay of Bengal on the south side. 108 
It should be mentioned here that the independence of Bangladesh was declared officially on 
. . 
10 Aprill971 by issuing the 'Proclamation oflndependence' which had been deemed to have 
come into effect from 26 March 1971. AlthougH the instrument 'Proclamation of 
Independence' confirmed the declaration of independence already made on 26 March 1971, it 
contained ' provision.al arrangements' for the gove~n.ance of the People ' s Republic of 
Bangladesh. It provided that 'till such time as a Constitution is framed,' the President would 
' exercise all the Executive and Legislative powers of the Republic including the power to 
grant pardon. ' This vesting of legislative power in the hands of the President instead of the 
· Constituent Assembly (consisting of people ' s representatives elected from 7 December 1970 
to 17 January 1971) empowered ' to frame' the Constitution of the country, was indeed 
contrary to the doctrine of separation of powers. Furthermore, the previous example set by 
the British in the Subcontinent under the Indian Independence Act, 194 7 to allow the 
Constituent Assemblies of Pakistan and India to act as the central legislatures for both the 
Dominions until new constitutions were framed, was not adhered to. However, the 
Proclamation of Independence, which is considered as the first interim Constitution of 
Bangladesh, was not only silent as to the exercise of judicial powers but also did not provide 
for the creation of a superior court for Bangladesh. About a month after the independence of 
Bangladesh, on II January 1972, the Provisional Constitution of Bangladesh Order, I972 
was issued in pursuance of the Proclamation of Independence which provided for the 
establishment of a High Court, not Supreme Court, as the highest court of Bangladesh. The 
Provisional Constitution merely provided that the High Court would consist of ' a Chief 
108 US Department of State, Background Note: Bangladesh http://www.stat e.gov/r/pa/ ei/bgn/3452.ht m 
(accessed on 3 March 2010). Jalal Alamgir, 'Bangladesh's Fresh Start', (2009} 20 Journal of Democracy 41 at p. 
41. 
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Justice and so many other Judges as may be appointed from time to time.' 109 It was silent as 
to the authority who would appoint the Judges of the High Court and on what terms and 
conditions they should hold the office. This lacuna was removed by the High Court of 
BaJ:Jgladesh Order (President's Order No. 5 of 1972) issued on 17 January 1972, only six 
days after the issuance of the Provisional Constitution 9f Bangladesh Order. It provided that 
the President would appoint the Chief Justice and other Judges of the High Court from time 
to time 'who shall hold. office on such terms and conditions as the President may 
determine. ' 110 Thus the President was not only given the power to appoint Chief Justice and 
other Judges of the High Court, he was also given the authority to determine terms and 
conditions of their service in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. This left the 
door too wide open in appointing the judges of the High Court for measuring their fitness in 
terms of political eminence and closeness to the ruling party rather than judicial qualities and 
if such persons were appointed as judges, they could hardly be expected to administer justice 
without fear or favour especially when the executive itself was a litigant. As a result of the 
aforesaid provision, the Chief Justice of the erstwhile 'Dacca' High Court111 and another four 
senior judges11 2 were not reappointed in the newly established High Court of Bangladesh 
without assigning any reason whatsoever which is contrary to the international norms 
developed in this regard thus: ' .... Where a court is abolished or restructured, all existing 
members of the court must be reappointed to its replacement or appointment to another 
judicial office of equivalent status and tenure .... ' 113 It seems that the President did not 
consider these five judges as persons who shared their philosophy or ideology and, as such, 
dropped them unceremoniously ignoring their competence, integrity, seniority and 
109 Article 9, the Provisional Constitution of Bangladesh Order, 1972. 
110 Article 3, the High Court of Bangladesh Order, 1972. 
111 Justice B. A. Siddiqui was the Chief Justice of erstwhile Dhaka High Court. 
112 
The other four judges who were dropped are Maksumul Hakim, Abdul Hakim, Nurullslam and T. H. Khan. 
113 
Article 29, Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAW ASIA Region, 
1995. 
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experience. However, the High Court of Bangladesh was given 'all such original, appellate, 
special, revi sional, review, procedural and all other power as were exercisable in respect of 
the ... territories [of Bangladesh] by the High Court at 'Dacca' under any law in force before 
the. 26th day of March, 1971.' About seven months after the issuance ofthe High Court of the 
Bangladesh Order, necessity was felt to provide for an !-ppellate Division of the High Court 
to deal with all ' appeals and petitions, which immediately before the commencement of the 
Provisional Constitution of Bangladesh Order, 1972, were pending before the erstwhile 
Supreme Court of Pakistan arising out of matters within the territories of Bangladesh.' 114 
Accordingly the High Court of Bangladesh (Amendment) Order (President Order No. 91 of 
1972) was issued on 2 August 1972, which provided that 'There shall be an Appellate 
Division of High Court of Bangladesh which shall consist of the Chief Justice and two other 
Judges to be appointed by the President after consultation with the Chief Justice. ' 115 Thus the 
President's, who could not reasonably be expected to know the members of the bar properly 
as to assess their qualities, power of appointment was safeguarded by the mandatory 
consultation with Chief Justice who were in the best possible position to assess the probable 
fitness of the men likely to prove successful on the bench. However, the High Court of 
Bangladesh with its Appellate Division remained in force until the Supreme Court was 
established under the Constitution of Bangladesh which was adopted, enacted and given to 
the citizens of Bangladesh by the Constituent Assembly on 4 November 1972, only 325 days 
after the liberation, and was given effect from 16 December 1972 to commemorate the First 
Anniversary of the Victory Day of Bangladesh (marking the defeat of the Pakistan Army in 
the Bangladesh Liberation War). 
114 Article 4, the High Court of Bangladesh (Amendment) Order, 1972. 
115 Ibid. 
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The framers of the Constitution of Bangladesh, as mentioned earlier, vest the 'executive 
power of the Republic' in the Prime Minister 1 16(not in the Head of the State), and conferred 
the 'legislative powers of the Republic' on the Parliament' 17 but they did not invest the 
judiciary with the judicial power of the Re public for reasons best known to them. Thus they 
embrace the spirit of separation of power$ only in cas~ of the executive and legislative, but 
they preferred to maintain silence as to the vesting of the judicial powers on the judiciary 
whrch is ·placed in Part VI of the Constitution .. This is a clear-cut departure from the general· 
practices of the written constitutions to vest the· judicial power in the judicial arm of the 
government. But unlike the Constitution of Malaysia as amended in 1988, which took away 
judicial power from the High Courts and made them dependant on federal law for their 
powers and jurisdiction, the superior court of Bangladesh- the Supreme Court comprising of 
the Appellate Division and the High Court Division 11 8- exercises judicial power of the 
Republic deriving from the Constitution itself. In the Mujibur Rahman v Bangladesh119, the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh observed that although the 
Constitution is silent about the vesting of the judicial power in the Supreme Court, there 
cannot be any doubt that the judicial power of the Republic is vested in the courts with the 
Supreme Court at the apex. 120 It should be mentioned here that, after the proclamation of 
Martial Law on 15 August 1975 which was withdrawn on 6 April 1979, the Martial Law 
Ad ninistration in May 1976 established two independent superior courts- the Supreme Court 
and the High Court- in place of one superior court under the Second Proclamation (Seventh 
Amendment) Order No. IV of 1976. Next year, on 27 November 1977, the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh was restored as it was originally in the Constitution by issuing the Second 
Proclamation (Tenth Amendment) Order (No. 1 of 1977). 
116 Article 55(2), the Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972. 
117 Article 65(1}, ibid. 
118 Article 94(1), ibid. 
119 44 DLR (AD) (1992) 111. 
120 Ibid. 
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The Independence of the Judiciary, which is the central principle underlying the 
administration of justice, succeeded to acquire the place of a cornerstone in the scheme of the 
1972 Constitution of Bangladesh; it is indeed a fundamental feature of the Constitution and 
one of the central values on which the Constitution is based. Although the Constitution does 
not explicitly speak of vesting the judicial power in the Judiciary of Bangladesh, it provides, 
' . 
inter alia, that 'the State shall ensure the separation ofthejudiciary from the executive organ 
of the State' 121 , perhaps taking into account the famous words of French Jurist Montesquieu, 
as mentioned earlier,: 'There is no liberty if the judicial power be not separated from the 
legislative and the executive.' This constitutional provision emphasises the importance of 
protecting the judiciary from ·executive interference as an independent judiciary is a backbone 
of rule of law and rule of law is a fundamental requirement for the existence of a true 
democracy. Thus the well-chosen words of democracy, rule of law, fundamental rights and 
freedom, equality and justice have been articulated in the Preamble to the Constitution, 
pointed out earlier, as the fundamental aim of the State. However, the Constitution explicitly 
embraces the principle of judicial independence, by providing that 'Subject to the provisions 
of this Constitution, the Chief Justice and the other Judges shall be independent in the 
exercise of their judicial functions.' 122 It is interesting to note that the Constitution (Fourth 
Amendment) Act, passed on 25 January 1975, added Article 116A to the Constitution of 
Bangladesh, 1972 using similar expression of the independence of judicial officers of the 
subordinate courts in the exercise of their functions thus: 'Subject to the provisions of the 
Constitution, all persons employed in the judicial service and all magistrates shall be 
independent in the exercise of their judicial functions.' Furthermore, Article 35(3) of the 
Constitution of Bangladesh provides that 'Every person accused of a criminal offence shall 
have a right to a speedy and public trial by an independent and impartial court or tribunal 
121 Article 22, the Constitution of Bangladesh. 
122 Article 94(4), the Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972. 
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established by law. ' In other words, the Article guarantees a fundamental right to every 
accused person in Bangladesh (whether citizen or not) to have a ' speedy and public trial' (as 
~ publicity' is the authentic hallmark of judicial .... procedure) by not only an ' independent 
judjciary' but also by an ' impartial judiciary' meaning members of the judiciary having 
neutrality of 'mind or attitude in relation . to the issue~ and the parties in a particular case. 
Under the Constitution, the Chief Justice of Bangladesh, the Judges of the Appellate Division 
and the High Court Division ofthe Supreme Court are not only required to solemnly swear 
(or affirm) to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution and the laws of Bangladesh' but 
also to swear to ' faithfully discharge the duties of ... [their] office according to law' and to 
'do right to all manner of people according to law, without fear or favour, affection or ill-
will.' 123 This pattern of oath for the Chief Justice or Judges of the Supreme Court emphasises 
that they are expected to hold the scales of justice even between the humblest citizen and an 
all powerful executive, without fear or favour- regardless of the consequences to themselves. 
In order to maintain the independence of the judges of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, like 
the framers of the Constitution of Malaysia, as mentioned earlier, the framers of the 
Constitution of Bangladesh also provide that the remuneration, privileges and other terms and 
conditions of service of a judge of the Supreme Court ' shall not be varied to ... [his] 
disadvantage ... during his term of office.' 124 The present laws which govern these matters are 
the Supreme Court Judges (Remuneration and Privileges) Ordinance, 1978 and the Supreme 
Court Judges (Leave, Pension and Privileges) Ordinance, 1982, as amended from time to time 
to the advantages, not disadvantage, of the Judges ofthe Supreme Court. Taking into account 
the above constitutional guarantee of the remuneration and privileges of judges, the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh observed in Commissioner ofTaxes v JusticeS. 
123 
Third Schedule, Oaths and Affirmations, Chief Justice or Judges, the Constitution of Bangladesh of 1972. 
124 Article 147(2) and (4)(e), the Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972. 
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Ahmed125 that salary of the Supreme Court judge is exempted from income tax and this 
position cannot be affected by notification issued under the Income Tax Act. 126 Like the 
Constitution of Malaysia, which empowers the superior courts to ' punish any contempt' for 
majntaining their dignity and authority, tpe Constitution of Bangladesh also gives the High 
Court Division and the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court ' .... the power subject to law 
' . 
to make an order for. the investigation of or punishment for any contempt of itself 127 i.e. for 
scandalising the court to bring its authority into disrespect or disregard, disobeying its orders 
and interfering· with the due course of justice. In Moazzem Hossain v State 128, the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh rightly observed that the power to punish for 
the contempt has been given not for the protection of the individual judg~s from imputations, 
but for the protection of the public themselves from the .mischief they will incur if the 
authority of the Supreme Court is impaired. 129 Thus it is evident that the independence of the 
judiciary has been incorporated into the Constitution of Bangladesh as an integral and 
inseparable pillar of the Constitution. With regard to ascertaining the basic pillars of the 
Constitution, the observations made by Justice Shahabuddin Ahmad of the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh (as he then was) in Anwar Hossain Chowdhwy 
and Others v Bangladesh130are worthy of note: 
There is no dispute that the Constitution stands on certain fundamental principles which are 
its structural pillars and if these pillars are demolished or damaged the whole Constitutional 
125 42 DLR {AD) {1990) 162 < 
http:/ /clcbd .org/index.php ?option=com_content&task=view&id=2175&1temid=82> (accessed on 20 July 
2010). 
126 Ibid. 
127 Article 108, the Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972. 
128 35 DLR (AD) {1983) 290. 
129 Ibid. 
130 41 DLR {AD) {1989) 165. 
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edifice will fall down. It is by construing the Constitutional provisions that these pillars are to 
be identified.131 
He, after referring to the provisions of certain Articles of the Constitution including 94( 4) 
which speaks of the indep~ndence of the judges of the Supreme Court in the exercise of their 
judicial functions, also observed 'Independence of the Jud iciary [is] a basic structure of the 
Constitution .... ' 132 Later on in 2000, the then Chief Justice of Bangladesh, Justice Mustafa 
Kamal, 'referring to the provisions of Article 94(4) and 116A, held in. Secretary, Mini'st1y of 
' 
Finance v Md. Masder Hossain and Other/33 that: 
The independence of the judiciary, as affirmed and declared by Articles 94(4) and 116A, is 
one of the basic pillars of the Constitution and cannot be demolished, whittled down, curtailed 
or diminished in any manner whatsoever, except under the existing provisions ot the 
Constitution. It is true that this independence .... is subject to the provisions of the 
Constitution, but we find no provision in the Constitution which curtails, diminishes or 
otherwise abridges this independence. 134 
However, unlike the Constitution of Malaysia, which contains procedural safeguards in 
Artic le 127 as to the unexpected discussion of the conduct of judges in the Federa l 
Parliament, the Constitution of Bangladesh does not contain any provision whatsoever aiming 
at to prevent raising abrupt and indiscriminate questions about the conduct of a judge of the 
Supreme Court in the Parliament which may cause distress and discomfit to the judge 
concerned. But the rules of procedure of the Parliament contain provision in this regard: no 
question, motion or resolution which contains reflection on the conduct of any judge of the 
131 Ibid., at 262. 
132 Ibid., at 259. 
133 52 DLR (AD) (2000) 82. 
134 Ibid., at 103. 
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Supreme Court shall be admissible. 135 But the enforcement of the provision of the Rules of 
Procedure in this regard depends generally on the neutrality, boldness and uprightness of the 
Speaker of the Parliament. 136 
Sin"ce the present study is concerned with the substantive independence of the judges of 
superior courts of Malaysia and Bangladesh, the provisions of the Constitutions of Malaysia 
135 
Rules 53, 63 and 133 Rules of Procedure ofthe Parliament, 1973. Rule 53 (2) provides that ' In order to be 
admissible a question must ... ', inter ali a, '(xviii) .. . . not ask for information on a matter which is under 
adjudication by a Court of Law having jurisdiction in any part of Bangladesh;' '(xx) . .. . (a) contain any 
reflection on the conduct . .. . of the Judges of the Supreme Court.' Rule 63 , which deals with restrictions on the 
right to make adjournment motions, provides: 'The right to make an adjournment motion under rule 61 shall be 
subject to the following restrictions, namely: .... xi) the motion shall not deal with any matter wh ich is under 
adjudication by a Court of Law having jurisdiction in any part of Bangladesh; and xii) the motion shall not 
contain a reflection on the conduct .... of a Judge of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. Rule 133 provides that 
'No resolution shall be admissible which .. . : inter alia, ' ivr do ·not relate to any matter which is under 
adjudication by a court of law having jurisdiction in any part of Bangladesh'; v) do ' not contain a reflection on 
.... a Judge of the Supreme Court.' 
136 
In the past, following the pronouncement of the judgment of the Anwar Hossain Case in 1989 by the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, the then Leader of the Opposition strongly protested 
and questioned the rational and justification of the decisions given by the Supreme Court. Following a remark of 
the then Chief Justice of Bangladesh made in 1999, the then Home Minister made some unkind remarks about 
the judiciary in the Parliament and contradicted the Chief Justice by saying that the judges of the Supreme Court 
were also respons ible for increased violence and terrorism in the country for releasing the notorious criminals on 
bail. But in neither occasions, the Speaker did stop them from making indecent remarks or attacks on the Chief 
Justice of Bangladesh and other Judges of the Supreme Court nor their remarks were expunged from the 
proceedings of the Parliament. The then Prime Minister on 2 August 2000 in an interview with the BBC 
attacked the judiciary in line with its Home Minister. Furthermore, in a meeting held in Dhaka on 18 April 2000 
the speakers, including half a dozen of ministers and state ministers of the Party in power, made outrageous and 
audacious remarks about certain judges of the Supreme Court, for, they fe lt embarrassed in hearing the Murder 
Case (death reference) of Sheik Mujibur Rahman. They went so far as to bring out a procession after the 
meeting brandishing lethal sticks and warned by saying that they had simply exhibited sticks this time, but these 
would be applied in future (meaning the Judges of the Supreme Court concerned).( MM Rezaul Karim, 
' Resorting to Rule of Law: By Stick and Terror!', The Daily Star, 4 May 2000; Staff Correspondent ' What I 
[Prime Minister] said is the truth and I' ll continue to say it', The Daily Star, 5 August 2000 and Staff 
Correspondent, 'AL blows hot against higher judiciary' , The Daily Star, 18 April 2000.) 
Ultimately three petitions were filed seeking the drawing up of contempt of court proceedings against the Prime 
Minister The common allegations in these applications were that on 26 Jul y, 2000, Sheikh Hasina, in an 
interview with BBC, made objectionable and contemptuous statements that both the lower courts and the High 
Court Division are the sanctuary of corrupt and accused persons; that whenever they approach the Court, they 
are released on bail after which they again commit murders; that both, the lawyers seeking bail and the courts 
granting bail , should be held accountable. 
Mr. Mozammel Hoque J. of the High Court Division on 24 October 2000, disposed of all three applications (the 
case is reported as Mainul Hosein & others v Sheikh Hasina, 53 DLR (200 l) 138) with a note that, .. . the 
Han 'ble Prime Minister shall be more careful and respectful in making any statement or comment with regard 
to the Judicimy or the judges or the Courts of Bangladesh in future. 53 DLR ((2001) 138, at p. 142. para. I 0.) 
In doing so, he noted that the Court was taking into consideration the greater interest of the country, protection 
of the prestige and dignity of the highest executive post and avoidance of any possible political unrest over a 
sensitive issue. He further noted the need to prevent confrontation between the executive and the judiciary and 
to maintain and preserve harmonious coordination and cooperation between these two important organs of the 
State. 
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and Bangladesh concerning the appointment of judges (on which the substantive 
independence of the judges depends) of the superior courts shall be examined in the second 
and third chapters of this Dissertation. 
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Chapter II 
The Method of Appointment of Judges to the Superior Courts of Malaysia Under the 
Federal Constitution and t~e Judicial Appointments Commission 
Despite the fact that the q.uestion of performing judicial functions independently by judges 
comes after their appointment, the method of appoi~tment of judges is the crucial and 
dominant factor to ensure their substantive independence, the independence which greatly 
depends upon the independent character, integrity, equanimity, legal knowledge and keen 
intellect of the persons who would hold the office of judges. For, the appointment of a judge 
on account of political allegiance in utter disregard to the questions of his qualifications, 
merit, ability, competency, integrity and earlier performance as an advocate or judicial otftcer 
· may bring in, to use the words of President Roosevelt, 'Spineless Judges ' who can hardly be 
expected to dispense justice independently according to Jaw and their own sense of justice 
without regard to the wishes and desire of the government of the day. There is a great 
possibility that such a judge may remain 'indebted to those responsible for his designation .... , 
the beneficiary is exposed to the human temptation to repay his debt by a pliable conduct of 
.his office' 137 especially when the executive itself is a litigant. As H. J. Laski aptly said, 'It is 
not necessary to suggest that there will be conscious unfairness; but it is .... possible that such 
judges will, particularly in cases where the liberty of the subject is concerned', find 
themselves unconsciously biased through over-appreciation of executive difficulty .. .' 138 
Therefore, ' in appointing judges, a government owes a duty to the people ... to ensure 
appointees of the highest calibre. Judicial independence can also be subverted by the 
appointment of persons who do not possess an outstanding level of professional ability, 
intellectual capacity and experience and integrity, and who cannot shake off a sense of 
137 Karl Loewenstein, Political Power and the Governmental Process (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1957) at p. I 64. 
138 H. J. Laski, Studies in Law and Politics (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1932) at p. 164. 
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gratitude to the appointing authority. It is ... in the interests of the ... people [not] to have their 
judicial tribunals reduced to timorous institutions.' 139 The confidence of public in the judges, 
who administer law, can be retained and preserved if the judges are seen to be not only 
qualified to perform their functions, but also courageous, independent, "mpartial and of 
. . 
integrity- integrity of judges being, in the words of Francis Bacon, who as early as 1612 said, 
' above all things ... their portion and proper virtue.' 140 Thus the appointment of right kind of 
j udges having the requisite qualities of professional skill, ability and integrity will go a long 
' 
way in applying, interpreting and enforcing the law without fear or favour. If ' the judiciary 
should be really independent', rightly observed Justice Venkataramiah inS. P. Gupta v Union 
of India141, ' something more i.s necessary and that we have to seek in the judge himself and 
not outside ... . It is the inner of strength of judges alone that can save the judiciary.' 142 In the 
same case, Justice Bhagwati also eloquently said: 'Judges should be of stern stuff and tough 
fibre, unbending before power, economic or political, and they must uphold the core principle 
of the rule of law which says "Be you ever so high, the law is above you.'" 143 For this reason, 
some of the national constitutions of the world provide for qualities that a person should 
possess in order to be considered for appointment as a judge of the superior court. For 
example, the Constitution of the Islamic Federal Republic of the Comoros, 1978, provides 
that the members of the Supreme Court shall be chosen on the basi s of their competence, 
their integrity and their knowledge of law. 144 The international standards as laid down in the 
Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, 1983 and the Beijing Statement of 
Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAW ASIA Region, 995 (as amended 
in Manila on 28 August 1997) also provide for certain criteria for the selection of judges. The 
139 E. Campbell and HP Lee, the Australian Judiciary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) at p. 57. 
14
° Francis Bacon, Essay on Judicature (1612) . 
14 1 AlR 1982 SC 149. 
142 fbid, at 672. 
143 fbid. , at 152. 
144 Arti cle 32, the Constitution of the Islamic Federal Republic of the Comoros, 1978. 
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Universal Declaration enjoins that candidates for judicial officer shall be individuals of 
integrity, ability and well-trained in the law. 145 More or less in a similar manner, the Beijing 
Statement calls for 'that judges be chosen on the basis of proven competence, integrity and 
in~ependence.' 146 
Therefore, in order to select persons who are best qualified in terms of legal acumen, ability 
and knowledge of law for judicial office/ appointment, a suitable and appropriate method of 
appointment is to be haunted and resorted to as the just means . to ensure substantive 
' 
independence of the judiciary. As the Parliamentary Supremacy, Judicial Independence: 
Latimer House (in the UK) Guidelines for the Commonwealth, 1 998, emphasises that 'The 
appointment process .... should be designed to guarantee the quality and independence of 
. mind of those selected for appointment at all lives of the judiciary.' 147 However, the manner 
in which judicial appointments are made in various t:ountries of the world may broadly be 
grouped into four: 
a. appointment of judges by the head of the state either unilaterally (as in Sri 
Lanka148) or on recommendation of, or in consultation with, the Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court (as in South Korea149 and lndia150) or after obtaining the 
agreement of the Leader of the Opposition (as in the Republic of Guyana 151 ) or 
after selection by a standing committee or commission comprising of the 
representatives of the higher judiciary, the legislature, the executive and the bar 
145 Article 2.11, the Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, 1983. 
146 Article 11, Beijing Statement of Principles of the Independence of the Judi ciary in the LA WAS !A Region, 
1995 (as amended in Manila in August 1997). 
147 Guidelines I I( I) Parliamentary Supremacy, Judicial Independence Latimer House Guidelines for the 
Commonwealth, 1998. 
148 Article 107, the Constitution of Sri Lanka. 1978. 
149 Article I 04(2), the Constitution of the Republic of South Korea, 1948. 
150 Article 124(2), the Constitution of India, 1949. 
15 1 Article 127( I), the Constitution of the Co-operative Republic of Guyana, 1980. 
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(as in Israel 152) or on the recommendation of a Judicial Council (as in Nigeria153) 
or from a panel of nominees proposed by the Supreme Court (as in the Republic 
of Chile154) or upon approval of the upper chamber of the legislature (as in the 
USA I 55); 
b. election of judges by the legislature (as in Switzerland 156); 
c. election of judges by the people (as only in appointing judges of the lower courts 
in 38 ofthe States in the USA 157; and 
' d. appointment by the judicial service commission (as in case of appointing members 
of the judiciary by the Superior Council of the Judiciary in ltaly1511 and 
appointment of judges by the National Judicial Council in Croatia159). 
Of the four methods of appointment of judges, appointment by the head of the ~tate is 
followed in most of the countries of the world, particularly in most of the common law 
countries, with striking variations, regarding consulting, recommending or confirming 
entities. As common law countries, Malaysia and Bangladesh have adopted the method of 
appointing judges of superior courts by the Heads of the States involving scope for the 
intrusion of politics in the selection process. 
The following discussion will show how in Malaysia the provisions of the original Article 
122 of the Merdeka Constitution, 1957 concerning constitutional functionaries required to be 
consulted and acted upon by the Head of the State, the Yang di Pertuan Agong, in appointing 
other judges of the Supreme Court have been changed by the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 
152 Article 4(a), Basic Law: the Judicature, 1984. The .Judicial Committee of lsrael , which is chaired by the 
Minister of Justice, is comprised of nine members- of which three are judges of the Supreme Court, two are 
lawyers, two members of Parliament and two cabinet minister. 
153 Article 231, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999. 
154 Articles 75(2) & 75(3), the Political Constitution of the Republic of Chile, 1980. 
155 Article 2, Section 2, the Constitution of the USA, 1787. 
156 Article I (I 1). the Law on the Organisation of the Federal Judiciary. 
157 1981 (Supp) SCR 87 at p. 791. 
158 Article 105, the Constitution of Italy, 1947. 
159 Article 123, the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, 1990. 
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1960; the Head of the State' s obligation, after consulting the Conference of Rulers consisting 
of nine Rulers (the Rulers being the monarchical heads of the component States of the 
Federation of Malaysia) and four Governors, to act on the recommendation of the Judicial 
and Legal Service Commission was dispensed with. Furthermore, the discretionary power of 
• 0 
the Constitutional Monarch to appoint the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, after 
consulting the Conference of Rulers considering the advice of the Prime Minister, was done 
away with and the real authority to select the judges for appointment was vested in the Prime 
Minister. The deliberation will also reveal that the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1963 
introduced the new element of consultation by the Prime Minister with the Chief Justice of 
Malaysia and the respective heads of the three superior courts- the Federal Court, the Court of 
Appeal and the High Court of Malaya, and the High Court of Sabah and Sarawak- before 
tendering his advice to the Head of the State for appointing judg s of the relevant court. But 
an additional requirement of consultation with the Chief Minister of each of the States of 
Sabah by the Prime Minister is required in case of appointing the judges of the High Court of 
Sabah and Sarawak. It will also display that in order to facilitate the selection of the right 
candidates for the appointment of judges by the Head of the State, ultimately the Judicial 
Appointment Commission has been established under the Judicial Appointment Commission 
Act, 2009, the Act which has been passed without amending the relevant provisions (of 
Article 122B) of the Federal Constitution. Under the new arrangement, the Commission's 
independence has not been ensured, it has only been given the power to select and 
recommend candidates to the Prime Minister who retain'> his consftutional prerogative to put 
forward only those names from the list as per his choice and preference to the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong, for making judicial appointment acting on his advice. Thus the Commission 
has fallen much short of the expectation ofthe relevant quarters. 
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A. Method of Appointment of Judges to Superior Courts in Malaysia 
It may be recalled here that the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya was 
introduced on 31 August 1957- the Merdeka Day. Subsequently, it was introduced as 
the Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia on Malaysia Day on 16 September 
1963. 
A. I. Method of Appointment of Judges under the Constitution of the Federation of 
Malaya, 1957 
' The Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission headed by Lord Reid, a 
distinguished Lord of Appeal in ordinary, was set up to draft a Constitution of the 
independent Federation of Malaya. The Commission in its Report submitted in 1957 
recommended that the power to appoint the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
should be vested in the Yang di- Pertuan Agong (the Head of the State) and other 
judges should be appointed by him after consultation with the Chief Justice. 160 This 
recommendation was revised by a Working Committee, constituted to examine the 
Report of the Reid Commission in details, and ultimately the following provisions 
were included in the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya, 1957 for appointing 
judges ofthe highest court ofthe land: 
(2) The Chief Justice and the other judges of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by 
the Yang di- Pertuan Agong. 
(3) In appointing the Chief Justice the Yang- di Pertuan Agong may act in his discretion, 
but after consulting the Conference of Rulers and considering the advice of the Prime 
Minister; and in appointing the other judges of the Supreme Court he shall, after 
consulting the Conference of Rulers, act on the recommendation of the Judicial and 
Legal Service Commission. 
16
° Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission, 1956-1957 Report, Chapter XII (Summary 
Recommendations) at paras 54-55. 
so 
Before acting, in accordance with Clause (3), on the recommendation of the Judicial and 
Legal Service Commission the Yang-di Pertuan Agong shall consider the advice of the 
Prime Minister and may once refer the re~ommendation back to the Commission in 
order that it may be reconsidered. 161 
Although the executive authority of the Federation is vested in the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong 162, he is, as the constitutional monarch, required to exercise this power in 
accordance with the advice of the Cabinet163 and is obligated to 'accept and act in 
accordance with such advice.' 164 ·But he was empowered to act i~ his discretion in 
·· appointing the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court only after consulting the 
Conference of Rulers and considering the advice of the Prime Minister. Thus the 
Head of the State' s power to appoint the Chief ~ustice was to be exercised in 
accordance with his judgment after consulting and taking into account the advice of 
the two specified constitutional functionaries (the Conference of Rulers and the Prime 
Minister) who were in a best position to provide for detailed information about the 
background of the candidates for the position of Chief Justice e.g. education, 
reputation, integrity, credit history, temperament etc. On the contrary, they were not 
well equipped to offer any opinion with regard to the legal acumen, knowledge of 
law, professional skill, merit, competency and suitabi lity of the candidates for the 
appointment. But in appointing other judges of the Supreme Court, the Yang- di 
Pertuan Agong did not have any discretion, he was required, after consulting the 
Conference of Rulers and considering the advice of the Prime Minister to act on the 
recommendation of the (original) Judicial and Legal Service Commission headed by 
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. The Yang di Pertuan Agong's acceptance of 
161 Original Article 122, the Constitution ofthe Federation of Malaya 1957. 
162 Article 39, the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya, 1957. 
163 Article 40(1), ibid. 
164 Article 40(1A) ibid. 
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the recommendation of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission, consisting of the 
Chief Justice, the Attorney General, 'the senior puisne judge ', the Deputy Chairman 
of the Public Service Commission and one or more sitting or former judges of the 
Supreme Court165, having intimat~ knowledge ofthe persons who might be eminently 
suitable for appointment on the bench, ensured that- only· the most right kind and the 
most suitable candidates would be appointed as the judges of the Supreme Court. 
A.2. Method of Appointment of Judges under the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1960 
' 
Within three years of the coming into effect of the Constitution of the Federation of 
Malaya, the Parliament passed on 31 May 1 960 the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 
. 1960 (Act 10 of 1960) which replaced the original method of appointment of judges 
ofthe Supreme Court to the following effect: 
(2) The Chief Justice and the other judges of the Supreme Court shall be appomted by 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong. 
(3) In appointing the Chief Justice, the Yang di- Pertuan Agong shall act on the 
advice of the Prime Minister, after consulting the Conference of Rulers, and in 
appointing the other judges of the Supreme Court he shall act on the advice of the 
Prime Minister, after consulting the Conference of Rulers and considering the advice 
of the Chief Justice.' 166 
Thus the discretionary power of the Yang di- Pertuan Agong to appoint the Chief 
Justice (i.e. in appointing the Chief Justice, he could act in his discretion) of the 
Supreme Court, after consulting the Conference of Rulers and considering the advice 
165 Original Article 138, the Constitution ofthe Federation of Malaya, 1957. 
166 Amended Article 122, the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya, 1957. 
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of the Prime Minster, was taken away and real authority to select the Chief Justice 
was vested in the Prime Minister as the Yang di- Pertuan Agong was required to 'act 
on the advice of the Prime Minister in appointing the Chief Justice after consulting the 
Conference of Rulers. Furthermore, the Judicial and Legal Service Commission was 
abolished and under the new arrangement, it was made obligatory for the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong to act on the advice of the Prime Minister, instead of recommendation 
of the Commission, in· appointing other judges of the Supreme Court after consulting 
the Conference of Rulers and considering the advice of the Chier'Justice. Although 
the new provision of considering the advice of the Chief Justice was introduced 
because of the realisation that he was properly equipped to know the qualities of the 
candidate and assess his suitability for appointment as a Supreme Court Judge, the 
real authority to select the judges was vested in the Prime Minister which did open the 
door of making appointment to high judicial offices on political consideration or 
personal favouritism. 
B. Method of Appointment of Judges of the Superior Courts under the Constitution of 
the Federation of Malaysia, 1963 
It may be remembered that the Supreme Court was the highest court in the Federation 
of Malaya next below the Privy Council until 15 September 1963. When the 
Federation of Malaysia was established on 16 September 1963 under the Malaysia 
Act (Act No 26/1963), the Part IX of the Constitution was amended to restructure the 
superior courts in the following manner: 
a) establishment of three High Courts (under the Constitution and Malaysia 
(Singapore Amendment) Act, 1965, Singapore left the Federation of Malaysia 
on 9 August 1965 and, as such, the High Court in Singapore was abolished. 
Thereafter, there are now two High Courts of coordinate jurisdiction and 
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status- namely High Court for Peninsular Malaysia and High Court for the 
Borneo, 'the States of Sabah and Sarawak' were substituted for 'the Borneo 
States'); 
. 
b) establishment of the Federal Court as the apex court in place of the Supreme 
Court167• and 
' 
c) the Privy Council remained as the highest court appeal for Malaysia. But the 
Constitutional (Amendment) Act, 1983 provided fot the establishment of the 
Supreme Court of Malaysia replacing the Federal Court as 'the final court of 
appeal and the highest court of land. For, the provisions concerning all appeals 
in civil matters from Malaysia to the Privy Council were abolished from 1 
January 1985. 168 As a result, a two-tier superior court system came into 
existence in Malaysia-
1) the Supreme Court as the final court of appeal in Malaysia; and 
2) the two High Courts. 
But the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1994, passed on 24 June 1994, 
renamed the Supreme Court as the Federal Court and provided for the 
establishment of the Court of Appeal as an intermediary court. As a result, 
Malaysia reverted to the following three-tier superior court system: 
1) the Federal Court as the highest court of the country standing at the apex 
of the pyramid; 
2) the Court of Appeal as an intermediary court between the Federal Court 
and the High Courts; and 
3) the High Court of Malaya and the High Court ofSabah and Sarawak as the 
lowest tier of the three-tier superior courts. 
167 Amended Article 121 , the Constitution of the Federation of Malaysia, I 963. 
168 Article 131 of the Constitution was repealed. 
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The Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1963, as amended in 1965 and 1994169, 
provides for the following method of appointment of judges to the Federal 
Court, the Court of Appeal and the High Courts in the Federation of Malaysia: 
1. 'The· Chief Justice of the Federal Court, the President of 
the Court of Appeal and the Chief Judges ·of the High 
Courts and (subject to Article 122C) the other judges of 
the Federal Court, of the Court .of Appeal and of the 
High Courts shall be appointed by the Yang di- Pertuan 
Agong, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, after 
consulting the Conference of Rulers .. 
ii. Before tendering his advice as to the appointment under 
Clause (1) of a judge other than the Chief Justice of the 
Federal Court, the Prime Minister shall consult the 
Chief Justice. 
111. Before tendering his advice as to the appointment under 
Clause (1) of the Chief Judge of a High Court, the 
Prime Minister shall consult the Chief Judge of each of 
the High Courts and, if the appointment is to the High 
Court in Sabah and Sarawak, the Chief Minister of each 
of the States of Sa bah and Sarawak. 
1v. Before tendering his advice as to the appointment under 
Clause (1) of a judge other than the Chief Justice, 
President or a Chief Judge, the Prime Minister shall 
consult, if the appointment is to the Federal Court, the 
169 By the Constitution and Malaysia (Singapore Amendment) Act, 1965 and the Constitution (Amendment) 
Act, 1994. 
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Chief Justice of the Federal Court, if the appointment is 
to the Court of Appeal, the President of the Court of 
Appeal and, if the appointment is to one of the High 
Co~rts, the Chief Judge of that Court.' 170 
Thus the above procedure for the appoi11.tment of judges of superior courts in 
Malaysia resembled the British practice obtaining prior to the enactment of the 
Constitutional Reform Act, 2005. The Sovereign (the Queen) used to appoint 
the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary (Law Lords), the Lord Chief Justice, the 
Master of the Rolls, the President of the Family Division, the Vice-Chancellor 
and the Lord Justices of Appeal by convention on the a.dvice of the Prime 
Minister, who had consulted the Lord Chancellor171 , the Chancellor who used 
to wear executive, legislative and judicial hats 172 as a Cabinet Minister, as the 
presiding officer (i.e. Speaker) of the House of Lords (the Second Chamber of 
the Parliament) and as the head of the judiciary (when the House of Lords sat 
as the final court of appeal) respectively. In the words ofLord Jowitt, who was 
the Lord Chancellor in the Labour Government until October, 1951, 
in practice, the Lord Chancellor would always consult with the Head of the 
Division to which he was called upon to appoint a Judge. If I had to appoint a 
Judge to the Queen's Bench Division, I should, in practice, always consult with 
the Chief Justice; ifto the Divorce Division, with the President; if to the Chancery 
170 Article 1228, the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, 1963. 
171 0 Hood Phillips and Jackson, Constitutional and Administrative Law (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 200 I) at 
p. 431; R.M. Jackson, The Machinery of Justice in England (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960) at 
p. 232. 
172 
The Constitutional Reform Act, 2005 took away the judicial and legislative roles of the Lord Chancellor. 
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Division, with the senior judge .... When it came to the Court of Appeal, I should 
consult the Master of the Rolls as to who was the most suitable person. 173 
The ordinary judges of the High Court, who are often called puisne judges, 
were appointed by the Q).Jeen as a convention on the advice of the Lord 
Chancellor, who no doubt used to consult the Prime Minister. 174 It is 
maintained that the Lord Chancellor, 
who has always been a barrister, and must therefore be a member of one of the' 
four inns of Courts (completely independent of any governmental control), is the 
most appropriate Minister to advise on appointments and promotions for the very 
reason that he is a judge and is quali tied for that position by actual practice at the 
Bar. He knows by experience as an advocfite the nature and degree of the 
knowledge and kind of character and temperament which go to make the best 
Judges. When he sits he hears eminent Barristers arguing before him. He is in 
almost daily touch as a Law Lord and a Bem:her of his Inn, with the Lords of 
Appeal and other Judges and members of the Bar. [Sir Albert Napierf 75 
However, under the new arrangement, the Constitutional Head is 
circumscribed to exercise his power of appointing the heads and other judges 
of three courts- the Federal Court the Court of Appeal and the two High 
Courts (the High Court of Sabah and Sarawak) on the advice of the Prime 
Minister. The Prime Minister of the State, is always required to consult, before 
giving his advice to the Head of the State, the Conference of Rulers (the 
Rulers being the monarchical heads of the component nine States of the 
Federation of Malaysia) and in respect of the appointment of the judges of 
173 John Honnold (ed), The Life of the Law: Readings on the Growth of Legal Jn stitutiom (New York: The Free 
Press, 1964) at p. 270. 
174 Supra note 171. 
175 Sir Albert Napier, the Permanent Secretary of the Office of Lord Chancellor, wrote in a paper prepared in 
1963. John Honnold (ed). supra note 37. 
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three superior courts, the respective heads of the courts, i.e. Chief Justice, the 
President or the Chief Judge as applicable. Furthermore, in appointing judges 
of the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak, the Head ofthe State is obligated to 
consult the Chief Minister of each of the two States. The constitutional 
purpose of selecting the best and most suitable candidates from amongst those 
available for appointment as judges of the superior courts will be achieved 
through advice not only of the Prime Minister and consultation with the 
Conference of Rulers (and the Chief Minister of each of the two States of 
Sabah and Sarawak only in appointing judges of the High Courts in Sa bah and 
Sarawak) but also consulting the heads of three superior courts so that every 
relevant particular about the candidates is known and duly weighed as a result 
of effective consultation among all the consultees. It should be stressed here 
that each of the functionaries has a distinct and valuable role to play as to the 
antecedents and legal suitability of candidates for appointment. The 
Conference of Rulers, through their instrumentalities, can procure relevant 
information about the suitability of the candidates proposed in terms of 
honesty, integrity, general pattern of behaviour, social acceptability, political 
affiliation/allegiance and commitment to rule of law which have a 
considerable bearing on his working as a judge. Sultan Azlan Shah finds it 
difficult ' to rationalise why a Prime Minister would not want to consider, or 
even abide by the views of nine Rulers and four Governors who constitute the 
Conference of Rulers' as they are independent persons, with vast experiences, 
and with no vested interest in the nominated candidates. Their duty is to fulfil 
their constitutional role in ensuring that only the best and most suited 
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candidates are selected for the posts. 176 Simi Jar arguments can be put forward 
for the acceptance or giving great weight, unless there is strong and cogent 
reason for not doing so, of the advice of the heads of three superior courts- the 
Chief Justice of the Federal Court, the President of the Court of Appeal and 
the Chief Judges of the two High Courts as expert advices. For, they are in all 
likelihood profoundly qualified to render advice objectively on professional 
suitability of the candidates for judgeship in terms of their legal experience, 
reputation, knowledge of law, legal competence, keen intellect, neutrality of 
mind and judicial potentiality. Thus the provisions of consultation with the 
Conference of Rulers and the head of the three superior courts by the Prime 
Minister are aimed at to act as safeguards against the selection for appointment 
of improper and unsuitable persons as judges taken into account extraneous or 
irrelevant considerations. The effectiveness of this consultation process in 
making higher judicial appointment in Malaysia cannot straightaway be 
ascertained as the process is not transparent and known to the public; strict 
secrecy is maintained from identifying the candidates to the issuance of the 
warrant. Furthermore, after consultation with the constitutional functionaries, 
the final word in respect of the sensitive subject of the appointment of judg s 
of superior courts belongs to the Prime Minister on whose advice the Head of 
the State is obliged to make the judicial appointment and, as such, seemingly 
there is the scope of considering those with the right political patronage and 
right beliefs as the most suitable for appointment. But Justice Abdul Hamid 
Omar, a former Lord President of the Supreme Court of Malaysia, made a 
wholesale and unqualified comment in 1994 that no Prime Minister of the 
176 Sultan Azlan Shah, ' The Role of Constitutional Rulers and the Judiciary Revisited ' in Sinnadurai. V (ed.), 
Constitutional Monarchy, Rule of Law and Good Governance (Kuala Lumpur: Professional Law Books, 2004) 
at p. 397. 
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Country was ever moved by parochial considerations in selecting the 
candidates for appointment as judges of superior courts by the Head of the 
State. As he said: 
All successive Prime Ministers have been mindful of their constitutional role in 
the appointment of judges and have been sensitive to the .... need for an 
' . 
independent judiciary. As a result, unlike the appointment of judges in orne other 
countries, judges in Malaysia, are not appointed because they support, or belong 
to the ruling party in power or become they are sympathetic to~ards certain issues 
of public interest, or ideologies. 177 
But there is a complete different version from another former Judge of the 
then Supreme Court of Malaysia, Datuk George Seah, an independent minded 
Judge who was removed as a victim of judicial crisis of 1988, the crisis, to use 
the words of former Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (2003-2009) 
'from which the nation never fully recovered.' 178 He in an Article 179 published 
177 
Tun Dato' Seri Abdul Hamid Omar, The Judiciary in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Asia Pacilic Publications 
Sdn Bhd. 1994) at p. 85. 
178 Shaila Koshy, Chelsea L.Y. Ng, Shahanaaz Habib, Cecil Fung, Teh Eng Hock and Jo Teh, 'Government 
moves to strengthen judiciary' , The Star, 18 April 2008 < 
http:/lthestar.com.my/news/story.asp?fil e=/2008/4/ 18/nati on/20992653&scc=nation> (accessed on 5 N vember 
2010). 
179 
In that Article, Datuk George Seah referred to systematically the suspension of the then Lord President Tun 
Salleh Abbas which deprived him of the opportunity to preside over a full bench of nine judges of the upreme 
Court to hear and determine the appeal challenging the validity and legality of the 1987 UMNO Presidential 
election Then he referred to the subsequent hearing and dismissing of the appeal on 9 August 1988 by a Panel 
of 5 Supreme Court and High Court Judges headed by acting Lord President Tan ri Hamid and Chairman of 
the First Tribunal set up to investigate the charges against the incumbent Lord President Tun Salleh as to the 
convening of a meeting of the judges (in which ri Hamid Omar was also present) that decided to send the 
relevant letter (about the Prime Minister) to the King and State Rulers. Datuk George Seah also dealt with the 
convening of the Special Sitting of the Supreme Court on 2 July 1988 by five of its judges (presided over by 
Tan Sri Wan Sulaiman) that unanimously interpreted the provision of section 9( I) of the Courts of Judicature 
Act, 1964 to the effect that the acting Lord President Tan ri Abdul Hamid could not exercise the powers or 
perform the duties of his office by virtue of being appointed as the Chairman of the Tribunal set up under 
Article 125(4) of the Federal Constitution and should distance himself from being involved, directly or 
indirectly, in any court proceeding brought by Tun Salleh Abbas and an Interlocutory Order restraining the First 
Tribunal from ' submitting any recommendation, report or advice 'to His Majesty Yang di- Pertuan Agong-
pending the hearing and disposal of the civil suit that had been filed in the Kuala Lumpur High Court 
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in 2004 brought to light patronage appointments made after 1988 judicial 
crisis for the services rendered to the party in power: 
Unsurprisingly, all the High Court Judges who were involved in the UMNO 11 
appeal, in the Tun Salleh Abbas's civil suit and the Interlocutory Order and those 
in the Second Tribunal set up to deal with the charges against the five Judges of 
the Supreme Court were eventually elevated to the Supreme Court. Three of them 
were later app0inted Chief Justices of the High Court in Malaya. 180 
He also made public: 
The three Malaysian High Court Judges in the Second Tribunal who delivered the 
majority decision recommending the dismissal of [two Supreme Court Judges] 
Tan Sri Wan Sulaiman and Datuk George Seah were all appointed to the Supreme 
Court. One of them was subsequently appointed Chief Justice of the Federal Court 
(the Supreme Court of Malaya was later renamed the Federal Court) and another 
promoted as President of the Court of Appea1. 181 
He further divulged, 'Even Dato Ajaib Singh who first heard and refused' a 
temporary stay in the High Court in Kuala Lumpur, was later elevated to the 
Supreme Court. 182 
challenging the ' constitutionality, legality and validity of the Tribunal. He focussed on the setting aside of thi 
Interlocutory Order by a Panel of two judges of the Supreme Court and three judge!> of the High Court, and the 
establishment of the Second Tribunal to deal with the charges (intentionally convening the 2 July 1988 sitting of 
the Supreme Court in contravention of Section 38(1) and 39(1) of the Courts of Judicature Act, I 964 and 
without the permission or knowledge of the acting Lord President Tan Sri Abdul 1 I amid) against five judges of 
the Supreme Court. Furthermore, he commented on the signing of the majority judgment of the Tribunal by the 
three junior Judges of the High Court in Malaya (having ranked no 13, 14 and 25 in the seniority list as 
contained in MLJ Vol. I. 1988) against the five suspended judges of the Supreme Court which tantamount to 
pronouncing judgment by the colonels against the generals. Datuk George eah, ' Crisis in the Judiciary- Part 4 
& 5, the Suspension of the Supreme Court.' lnfoline, 1 May 2004, at pp. 46-49. 
180 Ibid, at p. 49. 
18 1 fbid, at pp. 49-50. 
182 Ibid, at p. 50 
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There are some other direct appointments to the Federal Court made on the 
grounds of personal or polit ical patronage. For example, former Attorney 
General Mokhtar Abdullah was appointed as a Federal Court Judge in January 
2002 allegedly for his service rendered as the head of the prosecution team 
against former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. 183 Similarly, Tan Sri 
Zaki Azmi, a form.er Legal Advisor to the UMNO and Chairman of the Party's 
Election Committee, was directly appointed as a Judge of the Federal Court in 
September 2007 and in October 2008 as its Chief Justice.184 ' 
However, commenting on the system of vesting the authority in the hands of 
the executi ve to appoint higher echelon judges, Justice Bh~gwati of the Indian 
Supreme Court in S. P. Gupta v Union of Jndra185 observed: 
This is, of course, not an ideal system of appointment of judges, but the reason 
why the power of appointment of judges is left to the Executive appears to be 
that the Executive is responsible to the Legislature and through the Legislature, 
it is accountable to the people, who are consumers of justice, .... [for making] 
any wrong or improper appointment. 186 
But it may be submitted that in a parliamentary democracy, which is prevalent 
in many countries, including Bangladesh, India and Malays ia, the Prime 
Minister commands a majority in Parliament and, as such, it can hardly be 
expected that a vote of censure be passed against him disapproving his wrong 
or improper appointment' of judges in superior courts. Even the Speaker of the 
Parliament, who always belongs to the ruling party, may not allow putting 
183 SUARAM, Malaysian Human Rights Report (Civi l and Political R1ghts), 200 1, at p. 135 . 184 SUARAM, Overview of the Malaysian Civil and Political Ri ghts Report. 2008, at pp. 19-20. 185 198 1 Supp sec 87. 186 Ibid .. at p. 230. 
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down a question in the Parliament involving improper appointment of judges 
of superior courts. 
However, the method to appoint judges in the superior courts, as provided for 
in the Fede_ral Constitution of Malaysia, contains two types of provisions, 
namely, a) general provisions for the appointment of the Chief Justice of the 
Federal Court and all judges, and b) additional provisions involving 
requirement of consultation for the appointment of the .Federal Court J dges, 
the Court of Appeal Judges, the High Court Judges, the President of the Court 
of Appeal and the two Chief Judges of the High Courts. 
a) General Provisions for the Appointment of the Chief Justice of the ~Federal 
Court and other Judges of the Three Superior Courts 
Article 122B(l) stipulates that the Chief Justice of the Federal Court the 
President of the Court of Appeal and the Chief Judges of the High Courts 
and the other judges of these courts shall be appointed by the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong ' acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, after 
consulting the Conference of Rulers. ' It should be stressed here that the 
Constitution of Malaysia does not provide for further consultation with any 
other functionary by the Prime Minister in giving advice to the Head of the 
State for the appointment of the Chief Justice of the Federal Court as it is 
required in case of appointment of the heads of the two other superior 
courts in Malaysia. Thus the selection of the head of the Malaysian 
Judiciary and pate1jamilias of the judicial fraternity depends entirely and 
exclusively on the Prime Minister' s pleasure. Furthermore the 
Constitution of Malaysia does not provide for any special criterion (e.g. 
senior most judge of the Federal Court for the appointment of Chief 
63 
Justice) except general eligibility criteria as laid down in Article 123 ofthe 
Constitution, to be discussed later on, which are equally applicable in 
cases of appointment of judges of all the three superior courts. Therefore, 
it can strongly be argued that theoretically any advocate or judicial officer 
who fulfils the stipulated criteria can directly be appointed as the Chief 
Justice of the Federal Court187 apart from the judges of the Federal Court, 
the Court of Appeal and the High Courts. But in practice, no such person 
(i.e. an advocate or a judicial officer) has yet been directly appointed as the 
Chief Justice of the Federal Court. It may be suggested that the 
Constitution be amended to provide for the appointment of the senior most 
judge of the Federal Court as the Chief Justice of the Federal Court 
whenever vacancy occurs in that office although he might not be a brilliant 
judge. For selecting the Chief Justice by seniority will prevent the Prime 
Minister from picking and choosing from among the judges taking into 
account political affiliation and will forestall a scramble among the judges 
for the highest post to show who has better imbibed the gospel of the party 
in power. This promotion/ appointment on the basis of seniority has been 
considered in France as a guarantee of judicial independence. As Brown 
and Garner say: ' Promotion ... . upon seniority of service .... is regarded by 
members of the Conseil [d'Etat, Judicial Section] as the essential 
guara11tee of their independence.' 188 
187 In Pakistan, when it was composed of West Pakistan and East Pakistan, Justice Monzur Quader Chowdhury 
was directly appointed as the Chief Justice of West Pakistan. 
188 L.N. Brown and J. F. Garner, French Administrative Law (London: Butterworth, 1983) at p. 55. 
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b. Special Provisions Involving Additional Requirement of Consultation 
for the Appointment of Judges of the Superior Courts and the Heads of the 
Court of Appeal and the two High Courts 
The Prime Minister, other than the appointment of Chief Justice of the 
Federal Court, has an additional constitutional duty to consult the Chief 
Justice and/or the heads of the different courts depending on which court 
the judge is being appointed. Thus he before tendering his advice to the 
Head of the State in respect of the appointment of a judge to the Court of 
Appeal, he is further needed to consult the President of the Court of 
Appeal and relating to the appointment of a judge to one of the High 
Courts, the Prime Minister is also enjoined to consult the Chief Judge of 
the [High] Court concerned. But it should be emphasised that for the 
appointment of all the judges of these three superior courts, the Article 
122B (2) of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia makes it mandatory for 
the Prime Minister to consult the Chief Justice of the Federal Court before 
tendering his advice to the Yang di- Pertuan Agong and, as such, the Chief 
Justice of the Federal Court plays a definite and positive role in the judicial 
appointment process of Malaysia. 
Since the President of the Court of the Court of Appeal is not 
categorised/graded as a Court of Appeal Judge and by virtue of his post is 
a member of the Federal Court, there is no additional stipulation 
mentioned in the Federal Constitution for his appointment; the Prime 
Minister under Article 122B (2) of the Constitution consults the Chief 
Justice of the Federal Court before tendering his advice to the Yang di-
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Pertuan Agong for appointing a Federal Court Judge to the post of the 
President of the Court of Appeal. 
In the appointment of the Chief Judge of the High Court of Malaya, the 
Prime Minister is required to consult the Chief Judge of Sabah and 
Sarawak and vice versa. But if the appointment is for the post of the Chief 
Judge of Sabah and Sarawak, the Prime Minister is further needed to 
consult the Chief Minister of each of the States of Sabah and Sarawak. 
The consultation of the Prime Minister with different consultees, as 
required by the Constitution before tendering his advice to the Head of the 
State as to the appointment of judges to the superior courts, namely, the 
Federal Court, Court of Appeal and the High Court, in Malaysia does not 
mean that he is under an obligation to secure their consent. The Prime 
Minister is not at all required to accept their opinion or views. 
The constitutional provisions concerning the appointment of judges of the 
superior courts in Malaysia were first examined by the Court of Appeal in 
2002 in Re Data' Seri Anwar Ibrahim 189 without addressing the main issue 
of disqualifying the judge concerned (Ya Datuk Hj Mokhtar bin Hj. Sid in) 
from hearing the present appeal from a decision of the High Court on the 
ground of likelihood of bias on the judge's part as the appellant, the then 
Deputy Prime Minister being the Acting Prime Minister (June- August 
1997) of the Country made adverse comments against the elevation of the 
relevant judge to the Court of Appeal at the Conference of Rulers. 190 ln 
interpreting the general provisions of Article 1228 (l) of the Federal 
189 [2000) 2 CLJ 570. 
190 
The Judge Lamin Mohd. Yunus PCA, who delivered the decision of the Court of Appeal, was quite 
convinced and sati sfied with the assertion of the judge concerned that ' he has nothing against' the appellant and 
with his assurance that 'he will perform his function and discharge his duties as a .Judge without fear or favour 
in order to serve the ends of justice.' Ibid., at 572 f. 
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Constitution concerning the manner in which judges of superior courts are 
appointed, Lamin Mohd . Yunus PCA, delivering the judgment of the 
Court, rightly held that: ' the Yang di- Pertuan Agong must act on the 
advice of the Prime Minister.' 191 Although the Prime Minister is required 
to advise the Yang di- Pertuan Agong as to the appointment of heads and 
other judges of the superior courts, ' after consulting the Conference of 
Rulers,' Lamin PCA misconstrued this requirement as specified in ArtiGle 
122B (1) as consultation between the King and the Con'ference of Rulers. 
As he observed: 
.. . the Yang di- Pertuan A gong is required to consult the Conference of Rulers 
before making the appointment. To consult means to refer a matter for ad ice, 
opinion or views .. .. To "consult" does not mean to "consent" [as] the word 
consent is used [ in separate context] in Atticle 159(5) of the Constitution 
which states that amendments to certain provisions of the Constitution cannot 
be passed by Parliament without the "consent" of the Conference of Rulers .... 
so in the matter of the appointment of judges, when the Yang di- Pertuan 
Agong consults the Conference of Rulers, he does not seek its "consent". He 
merely consults. So when the Conference of Rulers gives its advice, opinion 
or views, the question is, is the Yang di- Pertuan Agong bound to accept. 
Clearly he is not. He may consider the advice or opinion given but he is not 
bound by it. 192 
He further observed in thi regard: 
'So in the context of the Article 1228 (I) of the Constitution where the Prime 
Minister has advised that a person be appointed a judge and if tlte Conference 
of Rulers does not agree or withholds its views or delays the giving of its 
191 Ibid ., at 571-b. 
192 Ibid ., at p. 571-b, d, f. 
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advice with or without reasons, legally the Prime Minister can insist that the 
appointment be proceeded with.' 193 
Sultan Azlan Shah, who was the head of the Malaysia Judiciary from 1982 
to 1984 and is quite familiar with the constitutional practice of appointing 
judges (as an intimate insider), rightly called into question and objected to 
the above observation ofLamin PCA ~ A he contended: 
[T]he statements made by Lamin PCA in this case seem to suggest that the 
Conf~rence of Rulers gives its advice directly (and onliY) to the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong, and not to the Prime Minister. In practice, this is not the case. 
The Prime Minister submits the names of the candidates to the Conference of 
Rulers. The Conference then submits its views to the Prime Minister before he 
tenders his advice to the Yang di- Pertuan. Therefore, the views of the 
Conference are strictly speaking, given to the Prime Minister. It is then for 
him to consider these views before he makes the final recommendation to the 
Yang di- Pertuan Agong. 194 
He further stressed: 
To suggest that their [the Conference of Rulers] advice is given directly to the 
Yang di- Pertuan Agong will render this entire constitutional process 
meaningless, since when the Prime Minister submits the name to the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong, the Yang di- Pertuan Agong is duty- bound, under Article 40 
(lA) [and also under Article 122B (I)] to accept the advice of the Prime 
Minister. 195 
Thus after obtaining the views or suggestions of the Conference of Rulers 
(and other Constitutional functionaries, e.g. the three heads of the superior 
courts, the Chief Minister of each of the States of Sabah and Sarawak), the 
193 Ibid, at p. 57 I -i- 572- a. 
194 Sultan Azlan Shah, supra note 176. 
195 Ibid. 
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Prime Minister gives his advice to the Yang di- Pertuan Agong for the 
appointment of judges of the superior courts and the King has no choice 
but to accept and act on his (Prime Minister's) advice and, as such, the 
selection and ·appointinent of judges is virtually within the power and 
jurisdiction of the Prime Minister. Thus the Constitution has vested the 
pivotal role in the hands of the Head of the Government- the Prime 
Minister- regarding judicial appointment. 
c. Appointment of Additional Judge in the Federal Court ' 
Of the three superior courts- the Federal Court, the Court of Appeal and 
the High Courts- in Malaysia, the Federal Constitution speaks of the 
appointment of additional judges only in the Federal Court 'for such 
purposes or for such period of time as' the Yang di- Pertuan Agong ' may 
specify.' 196 Any person who has held high judicial office in Malaysia can 
be appointed by the Yang di- Pertuan Agong as an additional judge acting 
solely on the advice of the Chief Justice of the Federal Court. 197 It seems 
that, because of the temporary nature of appointment of an additional 
judge, unlike the appointment of regular judges of the Federal Court, the 
Head of the State has no obligation whatsoever to act on the advice of the 
Prime Minister, after consulting the Conference of Rulers in appointing an 
additional judge. Since any person who has held high judicial office in 
Malaysia can be appointed as an additional judge by the Head of the State 
entirely on the advice of the Chief Justice of the Federal Court and 'no 
such additional judge shall be ineligible to hold office by reason of having 
196 Article 122( 1A), the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. 
197 Ibid . 
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attained the age of sixty-six years,' 198 it seems that the provision for the 
appointment of an additional judge has been incorporated into the 
Constitution for judicial consideration. Thus such an additional judge can 
be appointed when a judge ofthe Federal Court is on leave of absence or is 
incapable of performing his functions or when the existing judges are 
either disqualified from hearing an appeal or insufficient in number to hear 
and determine a particular appeal involving constitutional interpretation. 
However, no 'additional judge has been appointed to the Federal Court .... 
in recent years.' 199 
d. Appointment of Judicial Commissioners in the Two High Courts 
The Federal Constitution of Malaysia, as · amended in 1963, provided for 
the first time the provision for the appointment of judicial commissioners 
in the two High Courts of Malaysia. Later on in 1994, the method of 
appointment was amended in the following manner: 
I) For the despatch of business of the High Court in Malaya and the High 
Court in Sabah and Sarawak, the Yang di- Pertuan Agong acting on the advice 
of the Prime Minister after consulting the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, 
may by order appoint to be judicial commissioner for such period or such 
purposes as may be specified in the order any person qualified for 
appointment as a judge of a High Court; and the person so appointed shall 
have power to perform such functions of a judge of the High Court as appear 
to him to require to be performed.200 
198 Proviso to Article 122( lA), ibid. 
199 Abdul Hamid Omar, supra note 177. at p. 79. 
200 Article 122AB, the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. 
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Thus under the new arrangement made in 1994, the previous difference 
introduced in 1963 between th~ method of appointment of judicial 
commissioners in twq different High Courts201 has been done away with. 
A new uniform procedure for the appointment of judicial commissioners in 
the High Court in Malaysia and the.l!igh Court in Sabah and Sarawak- the 
Yang di- Pertuan Agong, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, after 
consulting the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, may appoint a judicial 
commissioner- has been introduced in 1994. Thus unlike the appointment 
of regular judges of the High Courts, the Prime Minister is not required to 
consult the Conference of Rulers (Majlis Raja- Raja) ~nd the Chief Judge 
of the High Court concerned before tendering hi s advice to the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong as to the appointment of judicial commissioners in the 
High Court in Malaya and the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak. The 
provision for non-consultation of the Chief Judge of the relevant High 
Court in which judicial commissioners are to perform functions can hardly 
be justified. It should be stressed here that Article 122A (3), added to the 
Federal Constitution of Malaysia in 1963, expressly provided for the 
situation- when a judge of the High Court in Borneo 'is not for the time 
being available to attend to business of the court- in which judicial 
commissioners in that court could be appointed ' for such purposes as may 
be specified in the order. ' But in ~ase of the appointment of judicial 
commissioners in the High Court in Malaya no such express ground was 
20 1 
For the High Court in Borneo (since 1994 Sabah and Sarawak), the Yang di- Pertuan Agong acting on the 
advice of the Lord President of the Supreme Court (in 1994 the name of the Supreme Court was changed to 
Federal Court and the post of Lord President of the Supreme ~ourt was chan~ed to the Chief Justice of the 
Federal Court) or for ' either State the Yang di- Pertuan Negen of the State actmg on the advice of the Chief 
Justice of the Court' , could appoint judicial commissioner201 and for the High Court in Malaysia, 'the Yang di-
Pertua.n A gong acting on the advice of the Lord President of the ~u~reme Court,' . c~uld appoint judicial 
commtssioners. Article 122A (3) and (5), as added to the Federal Constitution of Malaysia m 1963. 
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Thus under the new arrangement made in 1994, the previous difference 
introduced in 1963 between the . method of appointment of judicial 
commissioners in two different High Courts20 1 has been done away with. 
A new uniform procedure for the appointment of judicial commissioners in 
the High Court in Malaysia and the.High Court in Sabah and Sarawak- the 
Yang di- Pertuan Agong, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, after 
consulting the Chief Justice ·of the Federal Court; may appoint a judicial 
commissioner- has been introduced in 1994. Thus unlike the appointment 
of regular judges of the High Courts, the Prime Minister is not required to 
consult the Conference of Rulers (Majlis Raja- Raja) and the Chief Judge 
of the High Court concerned before tendering his advice to the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong as to the appointment of judicial commissioners in the 
High Court in Malaya and the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak. The 
provision for non-consultation of the Chief Judge of the relevant High 
Court in which judicial commissioners are to perform functions can hardly 
be justified. It should be stressed here that Article 122A (3), added to the 
Federal Constitution of Malaysia in 1963, expressly provided for the 
situation- when a judge of the High Court in Borneo ' is not for the time 
being available to attend to business of the court- in which judicial 
commissioners in that court could be appointed 'for such purposes as may 
be specified in the order. ' But in case of the appointment of judicial 
commissioners in the High Court in Malaya no such express ground was 
----
201 F ~. --.------- . 
. or the H1gh Court in Borneo (since 1994 Sabah and Sarawak), the Yang d1- Pertuan Agong acting on the 
;ctvice of the Lord President of the Supreme Court (in 1994 the name of the Supreme Court was changed to 
Federal Court and the post of Lord President of the Supreme Court was changed to the Chief Justice of the 
J ect~raJ Court), or for ' either State the Yang di- Pertuan Negeri of the State acting on the advice of the Chief p~stJce of the Court' , could appoint judicial commissione.r201 and for the High Court in Malaysia, 'the Yang di-
e rtua.n ~gong acting on the advice of the Lord President of the ~u~reme Court, ' could appoint judicial 
ornrnJssJoners. Article J22A (3) and (5), as added to the Federal ConstJtutJOn of Malaysia in 1963. 
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provided for; only vague expression of 'for .... such purposes as may be 
specified in the order'202 was menti~ned. But the Federal Constitution of 
Malaysia, as amended in 1 994, does not expressly provide for the a-rounds 
• 0 . 
of appointment, by using the expression for ' such purposes' as may be 
specified in the order of appointmen; of judicial commissioners. As a 
result, judicial commissioners may sometimes be appointed not for judicial 
but for ·political' considerations. 
Furthermore, the tenure of judicial commissioners is at the pleasure of the 
appointing authority; they are appointed ' for such period ' as may be 
specified in the order of appointment. Justice Abdul Hamid Omar, during 
whose tenure as the Lord President/Chief Justice, the practice of 
appointing judicial commissioners on a two year contract became the 
standard procedure for the appointment of High Court Judges, maintained 
, 
'As a general rule, most judicial commissioners who were initially 
appointed for such a period, have, subsequently, been appointed as High 
Court judges '203 on the recommendation of the Chief Justice (or Lord 
President as it was known before) of the Federal Court, to the Prime 
Minister. This assertion of a former head of the Malaysian Judiciary 
reveals that not all the judicial commissioners, but 'most' of them 
, 
appointed on contract basis for an initial term of two years, found berths as 
the permanent judges of the High Courts. Later on, in March 2009, the 
Judicial Appointments Commission, which was set up in February 2009 , 
recommended only 6 out of twenty-five applications received from serving 
judicial commissioners for appointment as judges of the High Court and 
---
202 Ib ' ---------
2oJ Jd. 
Abdul Hamid Omar, supra note 177, at p. 8 I. 
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ultimately they were appointed as High Court Judges in October 2009_204 
Therefore, it can strongly be argued .that a judicial commissioner may not 
always hold the scale of justice even between the state and the citizen 
without fear or favour. ·For, rendering a fearless judgment against the 
government may· cost him ·appointment as a tenured judge of the High 
Courts. In an express reference to certain servile judicial commissioner 
Datuk Dato' Param Cumaraswamy, (a distinguished .La""er of Malaysia 
and) the United Nations (first) Special Rapporteur on the Independence of 
Judges and Lawyers said that the recent 'promotions of Augustine Paul 
. , 
Arifin Jaka and Pajan Singh Gill [in 2003] will be perceived by the public 
dfi h . "dl' d "'205 as a rewar or avmg e 1vere . nlike the judges of the three 
superior courts, the Federal Constitution does not limit the number of 
judicial commissioners to be appointed in the two High Courts of 
Malaysia. Taking the advantage of this lacuna, 68 judicial commissioners 
have been appointed until August 2010206 as against seventy-one regular 
High Court Judges (in the face of sanctioned posts of 60 for the High 
Court of Malaya and 13 for the High Court of Sabah and Sarawak 
, 
altogether 73207) allegedly ' to clear the backlog of cases ' who 'will be on 
204 
Annual Report of the Judicial Appointments Commission, 2009, at p. 28. 205 
2 lnfoline, the Malaysian Bar's Official Newsletter, July 2003. 06 
Tunku Sofiah Jewa, Salleh Buang and Yaacob Hussain Merican (eds), Tun Mohamed Suffian 's An 
introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia (Petaling Jaya: Pacific Publications, 3'd edn. 2007) at pp. ll8-ll 9 Annual Report of the Judicial Appointments Commission, 2009, at p. 34. Appointments Summary of th~ 
Judicial Appointments Commission until 13 August 2010 < 
h tt~ ://translate.google.com.my/trans l ate?hl=en&sl=ms&u=http://www.jac.gov.my/&ei=nyz9TKL IKY _RrQfBs 
qmZCA&sa=X&oi=translate&ct=result&resnum= l&ved=OCBsQ7gEwAA&prev=tsearch%3Fq%3Djudicial%2 Bappointments%2Bcom mission%2Bmalaysia%26hi%3Den%26safe%3Doft'%26prmd%3Div> (accessed on 20 November 2010). 
207 
Annual Report of the Judicial Appointments Commission , 2009, at p. 28. Appointments Summary of the 
Judicial Appointments Commission until 13 August 2010 < 
http://translate.google.com .my/translate?hl=en&sl=ms&u=http://www.jac.gov. my/&ei=nyz9TKL I KY _RrQms 
qrnzc A&sa= X&oi=translate&ct=res ul t&resnum= l &ved=OCBsQ7gEwAA&prev=/search%J F q%3 D judicial%2 Bappointments%2Bcommission%28malaysia%26hi%3Den%26safe%3DoffUio26prmd%3Div> (accessed 
011 20 November 2010). 
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.. 
probation pending their elevation as High Court judges. ' The number of 
judicial commissioners functioning. at the High Courts in Malaya and 
Sabah and Sarawak untiJ ·l 0 June 2009 is 38.208 
Therefore, taking into account the detrimental impact of appointing on 
temporary basis the judicial commissioners upon the independence of the 
judiciary, only very few constitutions of the world, e.g. the Consti~tion of 
Singapore, 1963 and the Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978 provide for the 
appointment of judicial commissioner to the Supreme Court of 
Singapore209 ('in order to facilitate the disposal of the business in the ... 
Court') and to the High Court of Sri Lanka210 (if th~ Justice Minister 
represents to the President that it is expedient that the number of the judges 
exercising the jurisdiction and power of the Court in any judicial zone 
should be temporarily increased) respectively. International standards also 
disapprove the institution of temporary judges. As the Montreal 
Declaration on the Independence of Justice, 1983 states that the 
appointment of temporary judges is inconsistent with judicial 
independence and calls for phasing out gradually where such appointments 
exist.211 
2os _________ _ 
Judicial Commissioners Of the High Courts In Malaya And Sabah And Sarawak (As at 10 JUNE 2009) < ~1JP: //www.kehak iman.gov .my/html/judiciary_memoers.shtml> (accessed on 20 November 2010). 
210 Article 94(4) and (5), the Constitution of Singapore, 1963. 
2 11 Article 111A, the Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978. 
Article 2.20, the Montreal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, 1983. 
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C. Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2009 
C.J. Background of Enacting the Act 
The 1988 judicial crisis, which is an unprecedented upheaval and tunnoil in the 
Malaysian Judiciary, witnessed the unceremonious dismissal of the then Lord 
Presidenr12 and two Supreme Court Judges213 and their vacant posts filled in· 
allegedly with the favourites of the regime. For example, the then Chief Justice of 
Malaya and acting Lord President of the Supreme Court Abdul H~mid Omar, who 
chaired the First Tribunal that recommended the removal of Tun Salleh Abbas as 
Lord President, was appointed as Lord President to succeed Tun Salleh Abbas on 1 0 
November 1988 and Tun Eusoff Chin, who chaired the Second Tribunal that 
recommended injudiciously the removal of two of the five Judges of the then 
Supreme Court, was first appointed as the Chief Justice of the High Court of Malaya 
on 21 May 1994 and eventually as the Chief Justice of Malaysia on 23 September of 
the same year (and remained in that office till December 2000).214 Both the justices 
' 
particularly Tun Eusoff Chin, confronted with grave allegations during their terms of 
office which had the dreadful impact of eroding the public confidence in impartiality 
and independence of the Malaysian Judiciary. Lord President Abdul Hamid Omar 
' 
who upheld the allegations of misconduct against his predecessor Tun Salleh Abbas in 
1988, faced allegations of meeting privately on 24 March 1994 with Chief Executive 
of a Company who had been involved in a litigation pending before the Supreme 
Court, and thereafter presiding over an interlocutory appeal (on 24 April 1994), in 
which he gave decision in favour of the company. Although later he admitted meeting 
the Executive in private, Abdul Hamid Omar maintained that he did not discus the 
212 ~---------
213 Tun Salleh Abas. 
214 Tan Sri Wan Suleiman and Datuk George Seah. 
Supra note 179. 
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case with him.215 If his admission is true, yet it is in violation of the celebrated oft-
quoted maxim that justice must not only be d0ne but also seen to be expressly and 
manifestly done. Perhaps Tun Eusoff Chin tops the list of the Chief Justices of 
Malaysia against whom several allegations of impropriety were brought about. In the . 
first place, he went to New Zealand in 1995 with a lawyer on a family holiday (as 
pictures of this family trip appeared on the internet, the de facto Law Minister in the 
Prime Minister's Department described the ·conduct of the Chief Jus~ice as 'improper 
behaviour'216), and, on return, he sat on an appeal case in which that lawyer appeared 
only to get the decision in his favour. Secondly, in deciding an appeal in 1995 in Ins as . 
Bhd and.Megapolitan Nominees Sdn Bhd v Ayer Molek Rubber Co Bhd and others217 
against the granting of an interlocutory injunction by fhe Court of Appeal restraining 
Insas from exercising any rights attached to the shares of RM 160 million in 
pursuance of an ex parte order of the High Court pending the disposal of the appeal, 
the Chief Justice, Tun Eusoff Chin, not only masterminded the Coram of the Federal 
Court co-opting the High Court Judge P.S. Gill to sit in the Federal Court in violation 
of the provisions of Article 122(2) of the Federal Constitution (which allows only a 
Judge of the Court of Appeal to sit as a Judge of the Federal Court where the Chief 
Justice considers that the interests of justice so require) but also overruled the decision 
of the Court of Appeal expunging some of the observations made by Justice N.H. 
Chan to the effect that 'an injustice perpetrated by a court of law.' This set the first 
example of expunging the observation of a second ranked court, the Court of Appeal, 
in the judicial history of Malaysia.218 In that case, N. H. Chan J of the Court of 
2 15 ----------
.Cited in Wu Min Aun, 'The Malaysian Judiciary: Erosion of Confidence' , (J 999) I (2) Australian Journal of 
Astan Law 124 2 16 • 
217 New Strait Times, 30 May 2000. 
2 18 [1995] 2 MLJ 833 (FCM). !~ September 2006, the High Court observed in Dato V. ~anagalingam v David Samuels & Ors that the 
decision of the Federal Court in the Ayer Molek case was a nullity. [2006] 3 CLJ 909; [2006] 5 AMR 402. 
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Appeal, with reference to the deliberate non-filing of the complex commercial case 
before the competent Commercial Division, observed: ' .... [the conduct of the judge 
and the lawyer in this case] give. the impression to the right-thinking people that 
litigants can choose the Judge befo~e whom they wish to appear for their case to be 
adjudicated upon.' 219 This case brought to the· surface the serious accusation of 
influencing the system of justice by some businessmen and lawyers which had the 
effect of undermining public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the 
Malaysian Judiciary. Thirdly, on 1 July 1996, a High Court Judge, Syed Ahmad Idid 
. ' 
who was allegedly forced to resign and subsequently to leave for London on 2 July, 
published a 33 page pamphlet accusing twelve judges including Chief Justi~.:e Eusoff 
Chin and bringing 102 allegations against them (of which 99 were charges of 
corruption, 21 of abuse of power, and 52 of misconduct, immorality and three claims 
of payments of RM 50,000 with recipients graduating to taking millions from named 
business entities).220 No tribunal was set up under Article 125 of the Federal 
Constitution to look into these serious allegations221 as it might have been believed: 
'To sweep things under the carpet like this will only make matters worse.'222 
However, the Bar Council's call for the establishment of an 'independent Royal 
Commission to look into the administration of justice and propose, if need be, radical 
reform' went unheeded and unobserved . Furthermore, in November 1999 and in June 
2000, the Malaysian Bar Council's attempt to convene Extraordinary General 
Meeting of its nationwide members to consider serious allegations of impropriety 
2i 9~----------
lnsas Bhd and Megapolitan Nominees Sdn Bhd v Ayer Molek Rubber Co Bhd and others, [ 1995] 2 MLJ 7-. 4 (CA) -' 
220 . 
221 Roger Mitton, ' A Flurry of Questions about Malaysian Justice,' Asiaweek, July 1996. 
a The Attorney- General Mohtar Abdullah, who was later in. January 2~02 appointed. as a Federal Court Judges 
s. a. reward particularly for his role as the head of the public. prosecut!on team agamst former Deputy Prime 
Ml?ister Anwar Ibrahim, disclosed that the Police and the Anti-Corruption ~gency found the judges clean and cl~imed that resignation of the whistle-blowing judge concerned was sufficient punishment for committing the 
~Jime~ of 'highly seditious, defamatory and derisive.' I?id. . 
This comment was made by Advocate Khaled Nordm, a Member ofthe Parliament from UMNO. fbid. 
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made against certain members of the judiciary and to call for either the appointment 
of a tribunal in accordance with Article 125 of the Federal Constitution to investigate 
into the conduct of the Chief Justice, Tun EusoffChin or the establishment of a Royal 
· Commission of Enquiry to investigate into the matter respectively were thwarted on 
· · · both occasions by the same Judge ofthe High Court, R.K. Nathan, on the applications 
of the same lawyer by granting injunctions to restrain the holding of the Bar Council's 
meetings in November 1999:and ori 23 June 2000.223 In 2005, the C~urt ofAppeal in 
A!aJlis Peguam Malaysia and Ors v Raja Segaran224, in which it was required to 
· .. :. consider as to whether the Bar Council had the right to question the conduct of judges, 
more particularly that of Tun Eusoff Chin, decided the matter in the negative holding 
that to allow ' an open discussion on conduct of His Majesty's Judges could amount to 
questioning the wisdom of the King in his selection. ' Furthermore, leave to appeal to 
the Federal Court was refused which prompted the Human Rights Commission 
(SUHAKAM) of Malaysia to make the following unhesitating comment: 'The .... 
Commission .... views with disquiet the discussion ofthe Federal Court on II October 
2005 dismissing the Malaysian Bar Association's application for leave to appeal 
against the decision of the Court of Appeal. '225 Despite so many controversies over 
the conduct of Eusoff Chin, his term of office as the Chief Justice of Malaysia was 
extended for a further period of six months from 20 June 2000.226 Fourthly, in June 
2001, Sabah High Court Judge Muhammad Kamil Awang, after cancelling the state 
assembly seat of Likas in Sabah, on Borneo island, won by Yong Teck Lee, a former 
Sabah Chief Minister, in election held in I999 because of the presence of 'phantom 
223 
Raja Segaran v Bar Council of Malaysia (No. 1), [2000] I MLJ 1 (HCM); Raja Segaran v Bar Council of ~alaysia (No. 2) , [2001] 1 MLJ 472 (HCM). 
22s [2005] I MLJ 15 (CA). . , 
226 Media Statement titled 'SUHAKAM: Federal Court Lost An ?pportunrty , 14 ?ctober 2005. 
International Bar Association Justice in Jeopardy: Malaysia, 2000 (unpublished), at p. 58; International Co · . ' · 
rnrruss10n of Jurists, Malaysia: Attacks on Just1ce, 2002. 
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voters ', alleged that he had been instructed by a superior court judge to strike off the 
election petitions without a hearing.227 This accusation has the oblique reference to 
the Chief Justice of Malaysia, Eusoff Chin as it was commented: 'CJ's may and/or 
can also give instructions [or advice] to judges on the cases they are hearing. •228 
· These kinds of improprieties in the state of affairs of the judiciary had the effect of 
seriously undennining and eroding the integrity and impartiality of the judges to such 
an extent that .a reputed fonner Chief Justice deplored: ' When T a,m asked what r 
t~ou~ht, my usual reply is that 1 wouldn't like to be tried by today's judges especially 
·: if I am innocent. •229 
Under the abovementioned circumstances, the demand for the establishment of an 
independent Judicial Appointments Commission in 'Malaysia gained ground and 
found favour with the relevant quarters particularly the legal professions to ensure 
dispassionate· scrutiny and eliminate political considerations in judicial appointments 
so that public confidence in the impartiality and independence of the judiciary can be 
restored and set to right. The Human Rights Commission of Malaysia, which was set 
up on 20 April 2000, recommended in 2005 for the establishment of an independent 
Judicial Appointments Commission to ensure transparency in the appointment process 
and enhance public confidence in the judiciary.230 But the proposal for the formation 
of such a Commission received a hostile and unfavourable response, from a person 
none other than the Chief Justice of Malaysia, Tun Dato Seri Ahmad Fairuz Bin Dato 
Sheikh Abdul Halim (who became CJ in 2003), first in November 2005 in an 
International Conference held in Philippines and then in an interview with the New 
227 ~---------
228 Supra note 183, at Po 1540 
1 Charles Hector, 'Fortifying the Independence of the Judiciary', Human Writes Issue (An lnfoline Pull-Out), 2 2~1y 2003, at po 6 0 
0 
Centre for Public Policy Studies (CPPS), Polley Factsheet: Judiciary < 
;;tJP:!/wwwocppsoorgorny/downloads/factsheets/.Judiciary%20factsheet.pdf.> (accessed on 2 February 20 1 O)o 
Report for the Universal Periodic Review on Malaysia, 4'h Session, February 2009, From the Human Right ~m 0 0 s 
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79 
Straits Times in February 2007 in Kota Baru after chairing a meeting with the 
Kelantan Judges. In the International Conference (held in Philippines), the Chief 
Justice said: 
There have also been calls by some quarters that a Commission should be set up to 
deaj with th~ appointment of judges in the superior courts. While that idea may be 
laudable, a commission to appoint judges does not necessarily guarantee judicial 
independence. The reverse may be true. when members in the commission may well 
flex their muscles in the course of selecting candidates for later advantage. One 
argument advanced in favour of the present process is that since the appointing. 
authority is the head of the elected representatives, judges are therefore appointed, 
albeit indirectly, in line with the wishes of the electors. Further the suggestion that the 
proposed commission should include civil servants and legal practitioners in its 
membership is incompatible with and would undetmine the very basic concept of 
independence of the judiciary. 
In my view the present system of appointment of judges in Malaysia had served well 
for the country since its independence. Change should not be made just for the sake 
of change. Under the present system it would appear that the Prime Minister has a 
major say in the appointment but in practice it is overall a process for consultation23 J 
In February 2007, the then Chief Justice in opposing the proposal for the 
establishment of an Independent Judicial Appointments Commission went to the 
extent of saying that: ' .. . transparency should have its limits. Don't tell me when we 
are transparent, wt: have to be nude. That is not transparency, that's nudity. You want 
everything to be absolute? There is no such thing as absolute freedom or absolute 
23 1 
Honourable Tun Dato Sri Ahmad Fairuz Bin Dato Sheikh Abdul Halim, 'Judicial Independence 
Accountability, Integrity and Competence- Some Aspects of the Malaysian Position' , presented during th~ lnt~:national Conference and Showcase on Judicial Reforms held at the Shangri- Ia Hotel, Makati City, 
Philippines on 28-30 November 2005. 
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transparency. That's the way I look at things.'232 This improper and indecorous 
comparison of the proposal for an Independent Judicial Appointments Commission, to 
ensure a more transparent process of appointment, with nudity by the Chief Justice 
displays his taste and frame of mi~d. The reasons for this antagonistic attitude of the 
Chief Justice towards the establishment of a Commission became distinct and crystal 
clear on 19 September 2007 when a video clip, recorded in 2002, showing senior 
lawyer V.K. Lingam's telephonic conversation with the then Chief.Judge of Malaya 
~the Judiciary's third ranked post) Ahmad Fairuz Sheikh Abdul Halim on the urgency 
to get the latter appointed to the position of the President of the Court of Appeal 
(second in rank) and then Chief Justice of Malaysia- the highest judicial post in the 
country- was made public by the People's Justice Party. That the incumbent Chief 
Justice had been an overt beneficiary of the prevailing system of appointment was 
substantiated in the Report of the Royal Commission of Enquiry submitted to the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong on 9 May 2008, thus : 
In the final analysis, .. . we are of the view that there was, conceivably, an insidious 
movement by Lingam with the covert assistance of his close friends ... to involve 
themselves actively in the appointment of judges, in particular, the appointment of 
Ahmad Fairuz as the Chief Justice of Malaya and subs{'quently as Court of Appeal 
President .... [which] had the effect of seriously undermining and eroding the 
independence and integrity of the judiciary as a whole. 233 
23 2 
New Straits Times, 21 February 2007; Lim Kit Siang, ' CJ Fairuz' s poor taste in equating Judicial 
Appointments Commission to "nudity'", 22 February 2007 < 
http://v,·ww.malaysian bar.orcr. mv/general opi nions/comments/cj_fa iruzs _poor_ taste _in_ equating_j udicial appo· 
nt . o - - b 2010) - ' 233ments_commission_to_nudity.html> (accessed on 10 ~ovem er_ · 
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However, the Malaysian Bar Council's reaction to the issuance of the said Video-
Clip, as expressed in its Extraordinary General Meeting held in November 2007, was 
not only to propose the terms of reference for a Royal Commission of Enquiry but 
also to call for the establishment of an independent Judicial Appointments and 
Promotions Commission. Perhaps taking into account the seriousness of the matter 
and its far-reaching implications on the judiciary, the then Prime Minister Datuk Seri 
Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (replaced by Datuk Seri Najib Razzak as :~;>rime Minister in 
March 2009) in April 2008, one month before the submission of Report by the Royal 
Commission of Enquiry's on the V.K. Lingam affair, announced the decision of the 
Government to set up a Judicial Appointments Commission. Ih order to ensure 
transparency in the method of judicial appointment· to the superior courts, much 
expected Judicial Appointments Commission Bill was placed before the Parliament 
on I 0 December 2008. It is pertinent to mention here that, the initial response of the 
Cabinet to the draft Bill was not positive; the Cabinet meeting held in July 2008 
witnessed the opposition of several lJMNO Ministers as to the size (consisting of 13 
members) of the proposed Commission and as to the curtailment of the powers of the 
Prime Minister regarding judicial appointments.234 
However, the Judicial Appointments Commission Bill was approved by the Cabinet at 
its weekly meeting held on 9 November 2008 in which new Law Minister Mohamed 
Nazri Abdul Aziz gave a satisfactory and convincing answer to the question raised by 
his colleagues stressing the fact that the size of the Commission has been reduced 
from I 3 to nine Members.235 The Bill, placed on 10 December 2008 before the House 
of Representatives, the Lower House of the Parliament, was passed on 17 December 
234 • 
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2008. Then the Bill was tabled in the Upper House of the Parliament, Senate, on 22 
December and was approved on the next day,. 23 December 2008.236 The passing of 
the Bill by the House of Representatives within eight days of its initiation and 
approval by the Senate within two days of its introduction demonstrate that the Bill 
' 
concerning the establishment of an important body to ensure transparency .in the . 
judicial appointments, was not passed after adequate deliberation, thoughtful debate 
or meaningful discussion to maximise reasons and minimise th defeyts of the Bill. 
However, a very few former Justices and Judges, namely former Chief Justice, Tun 
Mohamed Dzaiddin Abdullah (who was the Chief Justice from 20 December 2000 0 . 
15 March 2002) and a former High Court Judge Dato Syed Ahmad Idid, who was 
allegedly forced to resign in July 1996 for publishing a pamphlet accusing the 
incumbent Chief Justice and eleven other judges of corruption, abuse of power and 
misconduct, hailed the Government for eventually introducing the Bill for 
establishing a Judicial Appointments Commission as a step forward to ' improve the 
process of appointing judges' and as a means to ensure the selection of 'the right 
candidates to be judges' respectively.237 The Judicial Appointments Commission Bill, 
passed by the Parliament, received the Royal Assent on 6 January 2009. The Judicial 
Appointments Commission Act, 2009 came into force on 2 February 2009238 which 
provides ' for the establishment of the Judicial Appointments Commission in relation 
to the appointment of judges of the superior courts, to set out the powers and 
functions of such Commission, to uphold the continued independence of the judiciary, 
. h . "d I h '239 and to provide for matters connected therew1t or mc1 enta t ereto. Under the 
236 ~---------
htt Annual Report of the Judicial Appointments Commission, 2009, at p. 5 
237 P:/Iwww.jac.gov.my/appl ication/laporantah unan/Jt2009 ...:bi.pdf (acc~ssed ~n 14 November 201 0). 
' lAC Bill does not affect constitutional status of Sa bah ' Daily Express, 18 December 2008 ;j~w.dailyexpress.com .my/news .cfm?NewsiD=6 1757 (accessed on I 1/ 11 /2009). 
239 P. U. (B) 43/2009. . . 
As contained in the broad title of the Judicial Appointments CommJsswn Act, 2009. 
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Act, the Judicial Appointments Commission has been empowered to deal with 'the 
appointments of judges of the Federal Court, ·Court of Appeal and High Court and 
judicial commissioners and shall iAclude the appointments of the Chief Justice of the 
· Federal Court, .the President of the Court of Appeal, the Chief Judge of the High . . 
Court in Malaya and the Chief Judge of the High Court ·in Sabah and Sarawak made . 
on or after the commencement of this Act. '240 
C.2. Composition of the Commission 
~he Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2009 provides that the 'Commission 
shall consist ofthe following members: 
a) · the Chief Justice of the Federal Court who shall be the Chairman; 
b) the President of the Court of Appeal; 
c) the Chief Judge of the High Court in Malaya; 
d) the Chief Judge of the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak; 
e) a Federal Court judge to be appointed by the Prime Minister; and 
f) four eminent persons, who are not members of the executive or other 
public service, appointed by the Prime Minister after consulting the 
Bar Council of Malaysia, the Sabah Law Association, the Advocates 
Association of Sarawak, the Attorney General of the Federation, the 
Attorney General of a State legal service or any other relevant 
bodies. ' 24 1 
Thus the Commission is composed of nine members who are oftwo types: ex-officio 
and non ex-officio. The number of ex-officio members from the three superior courts-
the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, the President of the Court of Appeal, the Chief 
Judge of the High Court in Malaya and the Chief Judge of the High Court in Sabah 
24Q 
24 1 Sect! on 1 (3), the Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2009. 
Sect JOn 5(1 ), ibid. 
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242 
and Sarawak- is four, whereas the number of non ex-officio members is five to be 
appointed by the Prime Minister. Of the five non ex-officio members, one is to be a 
judge of the Federal Court to be appointed by the Prime Minister at his sole discretion 
without consulting any relevant person or authority while other four non ex-officio 
members are to be 'eminent persons', not being ·'members ofthe executive or other 
public service ', who are to be appointed by the Prime Minister after consultation, not 
concurrence, with various stakeholders in the administration ofjustic~, namely, (i) the 
~ar Council of Malaysia, the Sabah Law Association, the Advocates Association of 
Sarawak, . the Attorney General of the Federation, the Attorney General of a State 
legal service or any other relevant bodies. Thus the Prime Minister appoints the 
majority of the members of the Commission- five out of nine- and in doing so he is 
more likely to be swayed by political allegiance of the persons concerned. This leaves 
the door wide open for selecting candidates by the Judicial Appointments 
Commission in deference to the Prime Minister's covert wishes for vacancies in the 
superior courts and, as such, the very purpose of setting up of the Commission, 
independent of the Prime Minister, for a fair, independent and impartial selection is 
tend to be defeated. The position may eventually go from bad to worse if the Prime 
Minister exercises, under the Act, the power of appointing 'any person he deems fit to 
fill the vacancy ... created [out of death, conviction, bankruptcy, insanity, resignation, 
absence from three consecutive meetings of the Commission without leave of the 
Prime Minister] for the remainder of the term vacated by the member or for the 
interim period until a new person is appointed to the office or the position held by that 
• . , 242 
member prior to his vacating the office or pos1t10n. 
Section I 0(2) ibid. 
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Therefore, in view of the fact that the prerequisite independence of the Judicial 
Appointments Commission precludes appointment of its members by a political 
authority like the Prime Minister; involving the risk of party-political . bias in the 
·appointment of judges, it may be suggested that provisions for the appointment of non 
ex-officio members of the Commission may be replaced with those of the 
appointment of the immediately retired Chief Justice of the Federal Court, the 
President of the Court of Appeal and Chief Judge of the High· Co~rt in Malaya/the 
Chief Judge of the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak (by rotation) and two Deans of 
the Faculties of Law of the recognised UniversHies in Malaysia (in alphabetical order 
of the name of the Universities). The Chairman of the Judicial Appointments 
Commission should be given the power to fill in casual vacancy in the Commission as 
the Chief Justice of Namibia has been empowered by the Constitution to fill in any 
casual vacancy in the Judicial Service Commission.243 
C.3. Establishment of the Judicial Appointments Commission 
However, the Judicial Appointments Commission has been constituted for the first 
tim_e in the history of Malaysia on 11 February 2009 with Chief Justice Tan Sri Zaki 
Azmi as the ex-officio Chairman, and the Court of Appeal's President Tan Sri 
Alauddin Mohd Sheriff, Chief Judge of Malaya Datuk Arifin Zakaria and Sabah and 
Sarawak Chief Judge Tan Sri Richard Malanjum as its ex-officio members. The five 
non ex-officio members appointed to the Commission by the Prime Minister are 
Federal Court Judge Datuk Zulkefi Ahmad Makinuddin and four eminent persons 
namely former Chief Justice, Tun Abdul Hamid Mohamed, former Chief Judge of 
Sabah and Sarawak Tan Sri Steve Shim Lip Kiong, former High Court Judge Tan Sri 
243 
Article 85( 4) of the Constitution of Namibia, 1990 provides that 'Any casual vacancy in the Judicial Service 
Cornrnission may be filled by the Chief Justice or in his or her absence by the Judge appointed by the President. 
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L. C. Vohrah and former Attorney- General Dato' Seri Ainum Mohd Saaid.244 Thus 
no senior law Professor of recognised merit having knowledge of the legal profession 
has been included in the Commisskm from the category of eminent persons. 
It is pertinent to mention here that the present ex-officio Chairman of the Judicial 
. Appointments Commission, Tan Sri Zaki Azmi, who had been a former legal adviser 
to the UMNO and had served the Party's Election Committee as Chairperson and 
Deputy Chairperson respectively, was appointed as the Chief Justice of Malaysia· on 
16 October 2008 only about one year after his direct appointment to the Federal Court 
in Se.ptt~~ber 2007, bypassing the convention of first serving in the High Court and 
the Court of Appeal. Thus the apprehension and concern of a Parliament Member 
. ' 
expressed in the Parliament in 2007 and during the Royal Address in Parliament on 6 
May 2008, about his appointment as the Chief Justice came true. As the Parliament 
Member said: 
Will the Judicial Appointments Commission be fonned in time to influence the 
appointment of the next Chief Justice in less than six months to ensure that the 
country does not have another infamous first, in having the first UMNO Chief 
Justice? 
In the last Parliament, I had questioned the fast-track elevation of Tan Sri Zaki Tun 
Azmi in the judiciary, with his unprecedented triple jump to become Federal Court 
judge last September without ever being a High Court or Court of Appeal judge, then 
quadruple jump in three months as Court of Appeal President, and whether this is to 
be followed by quintuple jump in a matter of a year to become the next Chief Justice 
244 d' . I A . 
" Zaki Azmi is Chairman of . J~ _JcJa . PP?m~ments Commission 
c""vw.themalaysianinsider.comlindex.php/malays ia/1854-zakJ-azm J-JS-chalrman-of-.JudJcral-appointments-
ommission (accessed on 1 0/11 /2009). 
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when Datuk Abdul Hamid Mohamed steps down from the topmost judicial post in 
October.245 
Then the Member put forward a q'uestion to the Prime Minister as to the appointment 
of next Chief Justice through the Judicial Appointments Commission: ·Is the Prime 
Minister prepared to make a public commitment that the appointment of the next 
Chief Justice will be first referred to the Judicial Appointments Commission, which 
he has agreed to set up?'246 
Therefore, it seems that the appointment of Zaki Azmi as the Chief Justice of the 
Federal Court in October 2008, between the Cabinet's disapproval of the draft 
Judicial Appointments Commission Bill in July 2~08 and approval in November 
2008, was a calculated move to head the proposed Judicial Appointments 
Commission with a person of political allegiance in order to influence the selection 
process for having patronage appointments in the superior courts of Malaysia. 
Furthermore, the appointment of a former Chief Justice (previously Lord President) 
Tun Hamid Omar, who drew widespread criticism for his meeting in private with the 
Chief Executive of a Company whose case was pending before the Supreme Court 
and against whom the Malaysian Bar Council passed a resolution to boycott his court 
after his appointment as a regular Lord President, reinforces mistrust and scepticism 
in the impartiality of the Commission. 
~45 Lim Kit Siang Online, On Judicial Reform, 7 May 2008 < http://blog. limkitsiang.com/2008/05/0?/on-
{Udicial-reform/> (accessed on 9 February 2010). 46 Ibid. 
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C.4. Functions and Powers of the Commission 
The main 'functions ofthe Commission are-
a) to select suitably qualift.ed persons who merit appointment as judges of the . 
superior court for the Prime Minister's consideration; 
b) to receive applications from qualified persons for the selection of judges to 
the superior court; [and] 
c) to formulate and implement mechanisms for the selectio~ and appointment 
f . d fh . rt' 247 o JU ges o t e supenor cou . · 
The Commission, which meets every month, discusses, subjects other . than the 
selection and appointment of judges, the disposal of cases and improving the 
P .1'. f . . d 248 er1ormance o supenor courtju ges. 
C. 5. Selection Criteria 
A candidate is qualified for selection as a judge of the High Court, as mentioned 
earlier, if he fulfils the requirements laid down in Article 123 of the Federal 
Constitution.249 Since the functions performed by judges demand the qualities of 
independence, impartiality, honesty, integrity, high legal acumen and sound 
knowledge of Jaw, the Judicial Appointments Commission Act, though not required 
by the Constitution, has spelled out the following criteria to take into account by the 
Commission in selecting candidates for appointment: 
a) integrity, competency and experience; 
b) objective, impartial, fair and good moral character; 
247 
248 Section 21(1), the Judicial Appointments Commission ~ct, 2009. . . . 
249 In the Forward from the Chairman in the Judicial Appomtments Comm1sswn ·s Annual Report, 2009. 
Section 23(1) ibid The constitutional requirements are: i.e. citizenship, ten years experience as an advo t 
of th . ' · . f . ca e 
e H1gh Courts or as a member of the judicial and legal serv1ce o the Federatwn or of the legal service f 
state. o a 
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c) decisiveness, ability to make timely judgments and good legal writing skills; 
d) industriousness and ability to manage cases well; and 
e) physical and mental health.250 • 
The enumeration of certain important criteria of honesty, fairness, good health, strong 
achievement, aptitude, knowledge and the ability to write judgments in time . is a 
positive development in line with the modem trend of specifying certain benchmarks 
to be found in some of the constitutions of the world for selecting in• a holistic manner 
the. best candidates as judges. For example, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic 
of Comoros provides that the members of the Supreme Court shall be chosen on the 
basis of their competence, their integrity and their knowledge of law.25 1 Jurist like 
Chief Justice Dickson (of Canada) also looks for in a good judge the five qualities of: 
. . I d . d 252 Integrity, equanimity, legal know e ge, patience an common sense. 
However, a serving judge or judicial commissioner must be disqualified . for 
appointment if he has three or more pending judgments or unwritten grounds of 
judgments that are overdue by sixty days or more from the date they are deemed to be 
due.253 Such a provision is also to be found in the 1994 Code ofEthics, adopted by the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong on the recommendation of the Chief Justice of the Federal 
Court, the President of the Court of Appeal and the Chief Judges of the High Court 
' 
after consulting the Prime Minister in pursuance of the Constitution (Amendment) 
Act, 1994, which provides that judges should not inordinately and without reasonable 
explanation delay in the disposal of cases, the delivery of decisions and the writing of 
grounds of judgments. Despite these provisions, the justification of incorporating 
25o ~---------
251 Section 23(2), ibid. 
25 Article 32(6), the Constitution of the Islamic Federal Republic of the Comoros, 1978. 
S
2 
Garry Sturgess and Phillips Chubb, Judging the World Law and Politics in the World's Leading Courts ~5ldney: Butterworths, 1988) at p. 148. 
Section 23(3), the Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2009. 
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similar provisions into the Judicial Appointments Commission Act demonstrates 
Government 's seriousness to address pa.st public criticisms regarding the 
appointment/promotion of a High Court Judge to the Federal Court in August 2007 
'who had not submitted written judgments in 33 cases',254 of which in three cases 
. ' 
death sentences were passed against the accused .. 
C.6. Selection Process/Procedure 
In exerci;e of the powers conferred255 by the Judicial Appointments 'commission Act 
' 
2009, the Prime Minister, on the recommendation of the Commission £ :mulated the 
Judicial Appointments Commission (Selection Process and Method of Appointment 
of Judges of the Superior Courts) Regulations 2009, which came into effect on 1 June 
2009, in order to achieve the underlying objectives of the parent law, i.e. to ensure 
transparency in the selection process as well as to select the best candidates for 
appointment of judges in the superior courts of Malaysia. Previously nothing was 
known to anybody from the day of proposing a person for judicial appointment till the 
issuance of the warrant except to the persons who were involved in it. The newly 
adopted Regulations provide for a detailed transparent procedure to be followed by 
the Judicial Appointments Commission from the advertisement of the judicial 
vacancies to the consideration and recommendation of persons for appointment b the 
Commission. 
C.6.1. Advertisement ofVacancy 
The Judicial Appointments Commission has been given the discretion as to 'advertise 
in the Commission's website or in any other medium the Commission deems 
254 
255 SUARAM, Overview of the Malaysian Civil and Political Rights, Kuala Lumpur, December 2007, at p. IS. 
Section 30, Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2009. 
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appropriate to fill any vacancy in the office of a judge'256 and the advertisement, inter 
alia, shall state: ' .... b) the requirement under Article 123 of the Federal Constitution· 
, 
c) the experience, academic qualification and other qualification required; [and] d) the 
Y7 ' 
remuneration and allowances.' ' 
C.62. Vacancies in the High Courts 
Any citizen having the experience of practising in a High Court as an advocate for ten 
years or of a member of the judicial and legal service of the Federation or of a state 
for the same period (i.e. ten years) may apply for selection as a judge of the High 
Court.258 Only the qualified serving judicial and legal service officer is required to 
submit the application to the Commission through the head of the department, who 
'shall forward the application to the Commission together with the relevant service 
information and a statement as to whether he supports the application or otherwise. · 259 
C.6.3. Vacancies in the Federal Court and the Court of Appeal 
But in case of the vacancies m the Federal Court and the Court of Appeal, the 
following persons have been entrusted with the core responsibility of identifying and 
proposing suitable 'names' to the Commission for selection: 
1) .... 
a) the retiring Chief Justice, for vacancy in the office of Chief Justice; 
b) the Chief Justice and the retiring President of the Court of Appeal, for vacancy in the 
office of President of the Court of Appeal; 
256 _________ _ 
Regulation 3( 1), the Judicial Appointments Commission (Selection of Judges of the Superior Courts) ~;gulations, 2009. 
258 Regulation 3(2), ibid. 
259 Regulation 4(1), ibid. 
Regulation 4(3), ibid. 
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c) the Chief Justice and retiring Chief Judge of the High Court in Malaya or the retiring 
Chief Judge of the High Court in Sabah an~ Sarawak, as the case may be, for vacancy 
in the office of Chief Judge ?f the High Court in Malaya or Chief Judge of the High 
Court in Sabah and Sarawak; · 
d) the Chief Justice, for vacancy in the office of judge of the Federal Court; and 
e) the Chief Justice and President of the Court of Appeal, for vacancy in the office of 
judge of the Court of Appeal. 
2) Notwithstanding subregulation (1 ), the Commission may consider names proposed by 
eminent persons who have ·knowledge of the legal profession or who have achieved 
distinction in the legaJ profession in respect of vacancies in the Federal Court and the 
Court of Appeal. 260 
Thus it is a very rare arrangement that the initiations of the proposals for selecting the 
candidates for vacancies in the offices of the Chief Justice of Malaysia (i.e. head of 
the Federal Court), President of the Court of Appeal, Chief Judge of the High Court 
in Malaya and Chief Judge of the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak have been given 
to the retiring, not retired, heads of three superior courts respectively- the retiring 
Chief Justice, the President and Chief Judges- who are, through their long association 
with the respective court, conversant and best equipped to assess objectively the 
attributes of their fellow colleagues for proposing the names of their successors in 
office. 
But the Chief Justice of Malaysia, the head of th Malaysian Judiciary and 
paterfamilias of the judicial fraternity, has also been given, following the 
constitutional scheme, the role of proposing names to the Commission for selection 
against the vacancies of the President of the Court of Appeal, and the Chief Judges of 
26Q ~---------
Regulation 5, ibid. 
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the two High Courts. Furthermore, he has been empowered, not only to propose the 
names against vacancies in the office of the .judges of the Federal Court, but also, 
along with the President of the Court of Appeal, for the vacant posts of judges of the 
Court of Appeal. For, he is in a better position to know the functional suitability of 
the candidates in terms of experience or knowledge of law, ability to handle cases 
' 
firmness and fearlessness requisite for appointment as superior court judges for 
ensuring dispassionate and objective adjudication. It is expected that the incumbent 
' 
Chief Justice of Malay~ia, President of the Court of Appeal and retiring heads of the 
' . 
three superior courts shall not be imperceptibly influenced by extraneous or irrelevant 
considerations and shall be free from bias, predilection or inclination in proposing 
names of the suitable candidates for appointment or1 the bench. Perhaps taking into 
account the nature and importance of judicial appointment, plurality of sources of 
proposing competent candidates from outside judiciary have been provided for: 
eminent persons having knowledge of the legal profession or achieved distinction in 
the legal profession have been empowered to propose names for the consideration of 
the Judicial Appointments Commission in respect of vacancies in the Federal Court 
and the Court of Appeal. Thus there is the scope for the stalwart in legal profession to 
be associated with the selection process for judicial appointment. This is line with the 
Indian Bar Council's opinion that 
of all the segments ofthe society, the members ofthe Bar are pre-eminently suited to 
judge persons who should be appointed as Judges' of the superior courts and 
therefore, 'any reform or modification in the model for selection and appointments of 
94 
Judges .... must provide for adequate representation of the organized bar in the 
mechanism. 26 1 
C. 6. 4. Vetting and Screening the Application or Proposal for Appointment in the 
Superior Courts 
Upon receiving an application or proposal, the Secretary to the Commission shall 
' 
inter alia, 'vet the application or proposal to ensure that the applicant or candidate is 
qualified under Article 123 of the Federal Constitution. '262 Then he shall, as soon as 
may be practicable, send the names of those candidates who have fulfilled the 
selection criteria laid down in Section 23 of the Act to the following agenc.ies for 
screening: 
... (I) .... 
a) Malaysian Anti Corruption Commission; 
b) Royal Malaysia Police; 
c) Companies Commission of Malaysia; and 
d) Department of Insolvency Malaysia. 
(2) An agency specified in subregulation ( 1) shall, within seven days from the date of 
the receipt of the request from the Secretary, forward its report to the Commission. 
(3) After receiving all the reports from the agencies specified in subregulation (1), the 
Secretary shall proceed to prepare a deliberation paper on each applicant and 
261 
The opinion was expressed by the Bar Council of India in 1979. 'National Commission to Review th 
Working of the [Indian] Constitution', A Consultation Paper on Superior Judiciary, 26 September 200~ 
htlp://lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/fi nalreporUv2bJ-J4.htm (accessed on 9 February 2010). 
262 Regulation 7(1)(b), the Judicial Appointments Commission (Selection of Judges of the Superior Courts) 
Regulations, 2009. 
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proposed person who has passed the screening process by the agencies for the 
selection process by the Commission. 263 
Thus the transparent process of selection involves two parts, namely the screen ina of 
e 
the antecedent or background of the candidates and ascertaining the suitability of the 
candidates for judicial appointment on the basis of fitness and competence. The 
initial investigation of potential judicial candidates by the four agencies of (a) 
Malaysian Anti Corruption Commission, (b) Royal Malaysia Police, (c) Companies 
. Co_mmission of Malaysia, and (d) Department oflnsolvency Malaysia to verifY their 
educational qualification, financial position statement, tax payment record and credit 
history as to arrest and conviction may be compared with the cruCial investigation of 
the prospective judicial candidates done by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) on receipt of three names from the Office of Policy Development (OPD) of the 
Department of Justice (supervised and directed by the Attorney General) after its 
positive preliminary evaluation.264 However, the Secretary to the Commission 
prepares a deliberation paper on each of the candidates, about whom the relevant 
agencies have given satisfactory and positive reports, for the consideration of 
selection by the Commission. 
C.6.5. Selection Meeting 
The Chairman of the Judicial Appointments Commission- the Chief Justice of 
• • 265 ' h Malaysia- shall preside over the electiOn meetmg except w ere the se ection 
263 __________ _ 
264 Regulation 8, ibid. . . . ~he names of the candidates are also sent to the Ame:•can Bar ~ssoc1at10n (ABA) for assessing their 
qu~hfications including temperament. The ABA 's informal p1ece of ad:•ce to the Department of Justice on the 
ratJng of the candidates states· 'well qualified' ' qualified ' or ' not quahfied.' If the ABA rating is positive th 
FBJ . ' I . . "" bl h ' e report is satisfactory and the Department of Justice's eva uat10n 1s ,avoura e, t en the Attorney General f~;rnally recommends the nomination to the President. 
Section 13(3), the Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2009. 
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meeting is to consider the selection of persons for vacancies in the High Courts. ,266 It 
seems unjustifiable to disqualifY the Chairman of the Commission from presiding 
over the select!on meeting to consider selection of candidates for the lowest tier of 
superior courts (the High Court)' and to require him to nominate 'a judge from 
amongst the members of the Commission to be -the Chairman '267 of such a selection 
meeting. As to the quorum of the selection meeting of the Commission, the Act in 
Section 13(4) provides that the quorum of the Commission shall b~ seven inc luding 
the Chairman. But in another place of the Act, it has been provided that 'The quorum 
for every selection meeting shall be seven'268 without any reference to the Chairman. 
Taking into account the facts that it may be a difficult task in reaching quorum 
requirement of seven in selecting the candidate for he posts of the Chief Justice of 
Malaysia and President of the Court of Appeal, for example, if the names ofthre ex-
officio members of the Commission- the President of the Court of Appeal, Chief 
Judge of Malaya, Chief Judge of Sabah and Sarawak- and of the nominated Federal 
Court Judge, are considered for the position of the Chief Justice, they would be 
'disqualified from attending or participating in a selection meeting' 269 and if any of 
the members of the Commission is related or connected to any candidate he would 
also be disqualified from attending such a meeting, it has further been provided that 
' then the quorum shall not be less than five. ' 270 'Every member of the Commission 
present shall be entitled to one vote by secret ballot and in the event of a tie in the 
number of votes casted, the Chairman or the member of the Commission presiding as 
the Chairman for the meeting shall have a casting vote' 271 and the selection shall be 
----
266 ---------
267 Section 24(1), ibid. 
268 Section 24(2), ibid. 
269 Section 24( 4), ibid. 
270 Section 25, ibid. 
271 Section 13(5), ibid. 
Section 13(6), ibid. 
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made 'by majority decision' 272 i.e. on the basis of the majority of votes received. But 
if the Commission invites 'any person to attend a meeting of the Commission for the 
purpose of advising it on any matter under discussion, then that person shall not be 
. I d 273 . I . . h enttt e to vote at the meeting.' In a se ect10n meetmg, t e Commission shall : 
. 
a) 'select not less than three persons for each vacancy in the High Court; or 
b) select not less than two persons for each vacancy where the vacancy is for 
judges of the superior courts other than the High Court. ' 274 • 
. After receiving the report of the Commission as to the selection of the candidates for 
the appointment to the office concerned containing reasons for selection and 
necessary information275, the Prime Minister may ' reguest' for two more names to be 
selected and recommended for his consideration with respect to any vacancy to the 
office ofthe Chief Justice ofthe Federal Court, the President of the Court of Appeal, 
the Chief Judge of the High Court in Malaya, the Chief Judge of the High Court in 
Sabah and Sarawak, judges of the Federal Court and the Court of Appeal, and the 
Commission [which maintains reserve candidates for this purpose] shall, as soon as 
may be practicable, comply with the request in accordance with the selection process 
as prescribed in the regulations made under this Act.' 
Thus the Judicial Appointments Commission, which has been given the authority to 
vet and select the best candidates taking into account the selection criteria as laid 
down in Article 123 of the Federal Constitution and Section 23 of the Jud icial 
Appointments Commission Act, 2009, requires unjustifiably to propose varying 
number of minimum candidates: not less than three candidates for each vacancy of 
272 
213 Section 24(5), ibid. 
274 Section 13(7), ibid. 
275 Section 22(2), ibid. 
Section 26(1), ibid. 
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the High Court Judge and not less than two persons for each vacancy of the Federal 
Court Judge and the Court of Appeal Judge. Again the Prime Minister may require 
the. Commission to select and recommend two more names for his consideration, not 
for an appointment against a vaca~t post of the High Court, but only for appointment 
to an office bearer position of the three superior courts- the Chief Justice of the 
. Federal Court, the President of the Court of Appeal, the Chief Judge of the High . 
Court in Malaya and the Chief Judge of the High Court in Sabah ~nd Sarawak- and 
judges of the Federal Court and the Court of Appeal. The Commission is required to 
comply with such a request from its reserve candidates as soon as may be practicabte. 
Thus the Prime Minister is empowered to reject the well considered selection of t\vo 
candidates by the Commission for vacant positions of the office bearers of three 
superior courts and judges of the Federal Comt and the Court of Appeal without any 
obligation to make his reasons for such a rejection known to the Commission and 
request for two additional names without assigning any reasons whatsoever. 
Generally it is expected that the Commission will recommend the best two suitably 
candidates available for the first instance against those vacant posts and being 
requested for two additional names it shall comply with the request from the 'reserve 
candidates'276 who may be of comparatively less appropriate candidates. The 
provision for providing the Prime Minister with the multiple choices of four 
candidates for appointment to the each office bearer position of the Federal Court, the 
Court of Appeal and two High Courts and each vacant post of judges of the Federal 
276 ----------
As Regulation 9 the Judicial Appointments Commission (Selection Process and Method of Appointment of 
Judges of the Supe;ior Courts) Regulations, 2009 provides that ' I) In selecting candidates to be recommended 
for appointment to the superior courts the Commission shall ensure that reserve candidates are available fo 
Purposes of complying with any reques~ that may be made b~ the Prime Minister under se.cti?n 27 of the Act. 2) 
Upon receiving a request from the Prime Minister under sectwn 27 of the Act, the CommiSSion shall submit th 
names of the reserve candidates and its report under section 26 ofthe Act.' e 
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Court and the Court of Appeal is incompatible and inconsistent with the very purpose 
of establishing the Commission as an effective. and meaningful selecting body. 
C. 6. 6. Tender of Advice 
As to the acceptance of the candidates recomm~nded by the Commission for Prime 
Minister's consideration, the Judicial Appointments Commission Act provides that: 
'Where the Prime Minister has accepted any of the persons recommended by the 
. ' ' . . 
Commission, he may proceed to tender his advice in accordance with Article 122B of 
the. Federal Constitution. ' 277 
Thus it is . not explicitly and unequivocally stated that the Prime Minister must accept 
only those candidates recommended by the Commission for proceeding to tender his 
advice to the Yang Di Pertuan Agong under Article 122B of the Federal Constitution. 
Because of the using of vague and imprecise words of 'where the Prime Minister has 
accepted any of the persons recommended by the Commission', it appears that the 
Prime Minister is not bound to recommend to the Head of the State after consulting 
the Conference of Rulers from among those candidates shortlisted by the Judicial 
Appointments Commission for appointment in the vacant posts of judges of the 
Superior Courts. If the Prime Minister is free to accept or reject the recommendation 
of the Commission, then there is little point and justification in having such a 
'toothless tiger.' 
C. 7. Independence of the Commission 
The kernel and success of the Judicial Appointments Commission lie in its 
independence. The member ofthe Judicial Appointments Commission is expected to 
perform their function of selection and recommending suitable persons for judicial 
Section 28, the Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2009. 
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appointment without submitting to their personal likeness or dislikeness and 
improper influences, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences from any 
quarter except toeing the line with the constitutional and legal criteria and the 
commands of their conscience. The Commission will only be as independent as the 
members of which it is composed of. The · question of independence of the 
Commission is inextricably linked with, apart from the method of appointment, its 
members' security of tenure, salaries and other terms and conditions, of service. 
The empowering of the Prime Minister to appoint majority of the members of the 
Judicial Appointments Commission (five out of nine) is, as it seems, deliberately 
designed to staff the Commission with pro-Government people to retain his grip over 
the judicial selection and recommendation process. Furthermore, the four out of five 
appointed (except appointed Federal Court Judge) members of the Commission from 
the category of 'eminent persons' have not been given the security of tenure, the most 
fundamental of the guarantees of independence of the members of the Commission 
for enabling them to perform their functions without fear of the consequences 
regardless of whether their job or actions do not please the Prime Minister or some 
other person. For the appointment of any of the four eminent persons as members 
'may at any time be revoked by the Prime Minister without assigning any reason. •27& 
Thus the four non ex-officio members ofthe Commission (indeed eminent persons), 
who are appointed ' for a period of two years and are eligible for reappointment'279 
for another term only, cannot be expected to acquire that habit of independence in 
discharging their duties without fear or favour requisite in their office if their grounds 
of removal are not clearly specified and their removal procedure is not made a 
----
278 ---------
279 Section 9(1), the Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2009. 
Section 6(1), ibid. 
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difficult process involving careful consideration by an independent body other than 
the Prime Minister. 
Furthermore, all the members oft~e Commission have not been given the security of 
providing them with adequate allowances and appropriate privileges during their 
terms of office, For, the 'members of the Commission shall be paid such allowances 
as the Prime Minister may determine'280 which implies that the Prime Minister has 
not only given the absolute and unfettered power to determine the amount of 
allowances for the Commissioners but also to alter the amount of allowances to their 
· disadvantages. Taking these realities into account, the Constitution of the Sovereign 
Democratic Republio of Fiji, 1990 has aptly vested the power with the Parliament to 
fix allowances for the members to the Judicial Service Commission.281 
On top of it, the Judicial Appointments Commission Act contains a very unusual 
stipulation as to the amendment of its provisions in Section 37 which provides that: 
1. The Prime Minister may, whenever it appears to him necessary or expedient to do so, 
whether for the purpose of removing difficulties or preventing anomalies in 
consequence of the enactment of this Act, by order published in the Gazette make 
such modifications to any provisions of this Act as he thinks fit. 
2. The Prime Minister shall not exercise the powers conferred by this section after the 
expiration oftwo years from the date of coming into operation ofthis Act. 
3. In this section, 'modifications ' includes amendments, additions, deletions, 
substitutions, adaptations, variations, alteration and non-application of any 
provisions of this Act. 
---
280 ---------
28! Sec.tion 37, ibid. . . ... 
Arttcle 131 (3), the Constitution of the Sovereign Democratic Republic of FIJI, 1990. 
102 
Thus the Parliament, which has passed the Judicial Commissions Act, has been 
deprived of its inherent power of modifications, including 'amendments . 
' 
alteration and non-application of any provisions of this Act,' to remove the 
defects of the Act after its coming into force with a view to improve the existing 
arrangement keeping pace with changing needs of time. The power of 
modifications has been completely given to the Prime Minister in the two years 
of the coming into operation of the Act by ministerial order usuf{'ing the power of 
the Parliament. 
Therefore, .it appears that the provisions of the Judicial Appointments have been 
carefully crafted to incapacitate the members of the Commission, particularly the 
members appointed from the category of eminent persons, from performing their 
functions of selecting and recommending candidates for appointment as judges of 
the superior courts independently and 'to uphold the continued independence of 
the judiciary' without paying any attentions to the wishes and desires of the 
Prime Minister. 
D. Whether the Judicial Appointments Commission Act is a Valid Piece of Legislation? 
The Federal Constitution of Malaysia provides for a detailed procedure in Articles 122B, 122, 
1220A) and 122AB, as mentioned earlier, for the appointment judges of three superior 
courts, appointment of additional judges in the Federal Court and appointment of Judicial 
Commissioners in the High Court in Malaya and the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak 
respectively by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong acting on the advice of, and, after consulting the 
designated constitutional functionaries. The qualifications for the appointment of judges in 
the superior courts of the Federal Court, Court of Appeal and of High Courts have been, as 
stated earlier, outlined in Article 123 of the Constitution. The Federal Constitution neither 
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contemplates of establishing any Judicial Appointments Commission for selecting candidates 
for the consideration of the Prime Minister with respect to judicial appointment in superior 
courts nor does it empower the Parliament to enact law determining the organisation, p0 wers 
and functioning of the Commission, a po~er which has been given to the Parliament in the 
Constitution of Algeria, 1989, the Constitution of France, 1958, the Constitution of Italy, 
1947, the Constitution of Namibia, 1990, the Constitution of Sudan, 1998 and the 
Constitution of Rwanda, 2003.282 The Constitution of Malaysia has also no~ empowered the 
Parliament to pass any Jaw prescribing additional qualifications for the appointment of judges 
of superior courts as it is to be found in Article 95(2) of the 1972 Constitution of 
Bangladesh.283 Furthermore, the Constitution has given the Prime Minister unfettered 
Prerogative of exp.loring any number of candidates for each Judicial vacancy. Therefore, it 
can be strongly argued that the enactment of the Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 
2009 providing for the establishment of a Judicial Appointments Commission, prescribing 
selection criteria and limiting Prime Minister' s choice to three candidates for the appointment 
of judges in the High Courts and ultimately (2 + 2=) four candidates for appointment as 
judges of the Federal Court and the Court of Appeal is unconstitutional. For, the Pari iament 
cannot assume a power which has not been conferred on it by the Constitution itself. 
Furthermore, the establishment of the Judicial Appointments Commission under an ordinary 
Act of the Parliament consisting of, inter alia, the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, the 
------------------------:~2 Articl·e· 155 of the Constitution of Algeria, 1989, provides that 'The Hig~ Council M~gistr~cy decides, within 
e conditions defined by the law, the appointment, transfer and the progress. of the magistrates careers.' Article 
65 of the Constitution of France states that 'An institutional Act shall determine the member in which this article [~e~Jing with the jurisdiction and powers of the High Council of the .Tu?iciary concerning appointment and 
disciplining the judges and public prosecutors] is to be implemented.' Article 1.05 ?f the Constitution of Italy ~~4 7, lays down that 'The superior council of the jud!ci~ry.' as defined by orga?'z~ti.onal' law •. has the exclusiv~ 
C rnp~tence to appoint, assign, move, promote and .d~ scipiine members of t~e JUdiciary. Article 1 02(2) of the 
C onst,~ution of Sudan, 1998, provides that ' The JudiCia~y shall have a cou,nc~l to be know~ as t~e "the Suprerne 
C oun~ll of the Judiciary", its composition and functlo~Is shall be pre:;cn~ed by law .. ~JCl e 158 of the 
onstitution of Rwanda 2003 stipulates that 'An organic Jaw shall determine the organization, powers and 
functi . , d' . , 
283 oning of the Supreme Council of the Ju Iciary. . 
After laying down the criteria of citizenship and 10 years ofexpenen~e as an.Advocate of the Supreme or Cou~ or holding judicial office for 10 years, Article 95(2)(c) as an alternative requirement speaks of'such other 
qualifications as may be prescribed by Jaw for appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court.' 
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President of the Court of Appeal, the Chief Judge of the High Court in Malaya and the Chief 
Judge of the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak as ex·officio members, has given rise to an 
over-lapping exercising of p wer under the Federal Constitution regarding judicial 
appointment in superior courts. For, after receiving the names of the candidates 
recommended by the Commission, the Prime Minister is required under the Constitution to 
consult again the Chief Justice of the Federal Court before tendering his advice to Yang di-
Pertuan Agong for the appointment of all the judges of the superi~r court .(Federal Court), 
consult ~he President of the Court of Appeal for the appointment of judges to the Court· of 
Appeal and consult each of the Chief Judges of the two High Courts for appointing puisne 
judges to the High Court concerned. This will enable the heads of the superior courts, 
Particularly the Chief Justice of Malaysia who is a common consultee in appointing all judges 
of superior courts, to express their personal impression and point of view for the second time 
as to the suitability of the candidates having disagreed with the Commission's decision taken 
in the selection meeting . 
.However, it should be stressed here that the present world shows a tendency to invest an 
independent nominating body (Commission or Council) with the power of selecting and 
recommending best candidates to the Head of the State for judicial appointment. For, the 
Principles on the independence of judiciary, formulated and adopted by various international 
and regional organisations, particularly in the 1980s and thereafte~84, favour the appointment 
of judges of superior courts by, on the recommendation, proposal/advice of, or after 
----
284 S --------- . I C . . 
1 ee Article 3, the Text of the Lagos Conference of the JnternatJOn? . o~m1ss1on of Jurists, 1961, Article 
0(?), the Principles and Conclusions on the Independence of the JudiCiary . ~~ the LA WASIA Region. 1982, 
irtlc)e 3(a), the International Bar Association ' s Minimum St~ndards of Ju~ICial Independenc~, 1982, Article 
·
14(b), the Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, 1983, Art.lcl~ 10, the UN Bas1c Principles on ~he .~~dependence of the Judiciary, 1985, Article 14, Beijing Statem~nt of Pnnclples ?n t~e Independence of the 
Udlclary in LA WASIA Region 1995 and Article 11(1), the Latimer House Gwdehnes for Parliamentary 
Supremacy and Judiciallndepend~nce in the Commonwealth, 1998. 
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consultation with an appropriately constituted and representative judicial body.285 In very 
recent times, the Constitutions of some of the countries of the world have been amended to 
Provide for the establishment of an independent body for selection and recommendation of 
duly qualified persons for appointment ofj.udges in the superior courts in order to ensure that 
neither political bias nor personal favouritism . and animosity play any part in judicial 
appointment. For example, in the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973, Article 175(A) has . been 
added to by the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, which proyides for the new 
method .of appointment of judges of the superior courts involving a Judicial Commission 
headed by the Chief Justice of Pakistan (two senior judges of the Supreme Court and. a retired 
judge nominated by the Chief Justice constitute a majority in the Commission) and a 
Parliamentary Committee (comprising of eight members with equal representation of the 
Government and the Opposition) having only the authority to return the recommendation 
back to the Judicial Commission only if least six out of eight members favour such an 
action.286 Similarly, in the UK, the Constitution Reform Act, 2005, has been passed by the 
Parliament providing for the establishment of a Judicial Appointments Commission of 1 5 
members headed by a Jay person (as Chairman) having the authority to submit its report to 
the Lord Chancellor selecting one person for each vacancy in high judicial offices (i.e. Lord 
Chief Justice, other Heads of Division, Lords Justices of Appeal, High Court Judges) ' solely 
on merit. ' 287 In order to bring in greater transparency and accountability in judicial 
appointments, the Government of India introduced first in 1990 in the Lower House of the 
---
285 ----------
Article 128, the Constitution of the Co-operative Republic of Guya~a, 1980, Article 155, the Constitution of 
( 1geria, 1989, the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, 1990, . Art1cle 8~( I), t~~. Constitution of Namibia, 
c99o,. Article 132(2), the Constitution of the Sovereign Democr~tiC Repubhc 0~ FIJI, .1990, Article 87(1 ), the 
t onstltution of Nepal, 1990, Article 52, the Constitution of the Kmgdom ?f ~aud1 Arabia, 1992~ Article 174(3), 
he ~onstitution of South Africa, !996, Article 147 an~ 149, the Const1tut10~ o.f the Federa~10n of Rwanda, ~00.,, Article 179, the Constitution of Poland, 1997, Article ! 36( 4), the Constltutlo~ o~ Albama, 1998, Article 4.(~) , the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq, 2005, Artlcl: 1?4CI), the Constl.tutJOn .of the Republic of A~1 nldad and Tobago, 1976, Article 231(1) and 231 (2), the Con~ti~utJOn of.the Rep~bhc ofN1geria, 1999. 
Hasan- Askari Rizvi ' Constitutional Amendment and JudiCial Appomtments ' The Daily Times 16 May 2oto , , 
287 . 
Sections 67-96, the Constitutional Reform Act, 2005 
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Parliament a Bill, titled the Constitution (Sixty-Seventh Amendment) Bill, I 990, seeking to 
constitute the National Judicial Commission and to make appointment to the Supreme Court 
and the High Court on the basis of its. recommendation. But the Bill, which proposed 
Introduction of Part XIIIA (apart from amending Articles 124, 2 I 7, 222, and 231) in the 
Constitution, lapsed with dissolution of that · Lok .Sobha (the lower house of the 
Parliament)/88 Again in 2002, the Government introduced the Constitution . (98th 
Amendment) Bill to constitute a National Judicial Commission, by includin~ Chapter TV A in 
Part V of the Constitution, consisting ofthe ChiefJustice ofindia [CJI] as its Chairman, two 
Judges of the Supreme Court next to the CJI in seniority, the Union Minister for Law and 
Justice, and one eminent citizen to be nominated by the President in consultation with the 
Prime Minister. Because of the controversies regarding the composition and functions of the 
Commission, the second Bill also lapsed in 2003.289 Thus it may be suggested that the 
Federal Constitution of Malaysia be amended providing for the establishment of an 
independent, effective and meaningful body for vetting and selecting best candidates for the 
consideration of the Prime Minister excluding the present overlapping process which enables 
the office bearers of the superior courts, to be the constituent members of the Commission, to 
have a 'second bite at the cherry', while expressing their personal views about the candidates 
Under the Constitutional selection procedure if they disagreed earlier with Commission's 
choice. 
---
288 , --------- • ] C · · , A 
National Commission to Review the Working of the [Indian onst1tut10n , Consultation Paper on 
Superior Judiciary, 26 September 2001 http://lawmin.nic.in/ncm:c/finalreport/v2bl -1 4.htm (accessed on 9 fs~bruary 20 10). . 
Rajeev Dhavant, 'The Transfer of .Judges,' The Hindu (IndiaJ,. 29 October 2?04; V. Venkatesan, ·.Judiciary: 
A Flawed Mechanism', (2003) 20(II) Frontline (A Magazine Published by the Hmdu Group of Publications). 
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E. Constitutional and Statutory Provisions in Malaysia Concerning the Number of Judges 
of Superior Courts 
The .original Federal Constitution of 1957 .. fixed the maximum number of judges of the then 
Supreme Cou~ and .empowered the Parliament to increase the number of puisne judges: 'The 
Supreme Court shali .consist ~fa Chief Justice and other Judges; but the number of the other 
judges shall not exceed fifteen until Parliament otherwise provides. ' 290 In 1963, the 
Constitution was amend~d, 'on the for~ati~n of the Federation of Malaysia, which, inter alia, 
Provided that the number of judges of the Federal Court (which replaced the Supreme Court), 
excluding the Lord ·P~esident and the three High Court Chief Justices (Malaya, Borneo and 
Singapore) ~hould. be four other judges, until the Parliament otherwise provides. But the 
Power of the Parli~me~t to alter the number of judges was abolished on 27 August 1976 and 
Parliament was replaced with the Yang di- Petuan Agong as the authority to increase the 
number of judges of the Federal Court.291 
In 1982, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong by an order increased the number of Federal Court 
Judges to seven excluding the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, and the two Chief Judges of 
the High Court in Malaya and the High Court in Borneo.292 When in 1994, the Court of 
Appeal was established as an intermediate court between the Federal Court (Federal Court 
Was renamed in 1985 as the Supreme Court having its head styled as Lord President and then 
again redesigned on 24 June 1994 as the Federal Court) and the High Courts, its President 
w h . . h 
as made an ex-officio Judge of the Federal Court t us ra1smg t e number of ex-officio 
judges to four. 293 However, next increase in the number of other Judges of the Federal Court 
Was accomplished by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in 2005 when the number was increased, 
---
29o ---------
291 Original Article 122(1), the Federal Constitution of Malaya, 1957. 
292 The Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1976, (Act A 354), P.U.(A) 114/1982. 
293 P.U.(A) I 14/ 1982. 
The Constitution (Amendment) Act, I 994. 
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by one, to eight294 (thus the total number stood at 4 + 8= 1 2). In 2009, the number of other 
judges of the Federal Court has been increased by 3.~95 Thus presently the total number of 
judges of the Federal Court is (12 + 3=) IS including the Chief Justice of the Federal Court; 
the President of the Court of Appeal and th~ two Chief Judges of the High Courts. 
Thus it is evident that the Parliament did not ever exercis~ its power of increasing the number 
of judges of the highest court of the land for a period of twenty years from 1957-1976. But 
after conferring this power on the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, the number Of judges of the 
Federal Court has been increased thrice: in 1982, 2005 and 2009. In exercising its 
constitutional power, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong was required to 'act in accordance with the 
advice of the Cabinet or of a Minister acting under the general authority of the Cabinet and 
" h w ere the Yang di-Pertuan A gong is to act in accordance with advice, on advice, or after 
considering advice, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall accept and act in accordance such [an] 
advice. ,,296 
E. I. Number of Judges of the Court of Appeal 
The Court of Appeal, established in 1 994, was to 'consist of a Chairman (to be styled the 
'President of the Court of Appeal') and, until the Yang di-Pertua A gong by order otherwise 
Provides, of ten other judges.'297 By virtue of this power, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
increased the number of judges in the Court of Appeal from ten to fifteen in 2001,298 from 
fifteen to twenty-two in 2006299 and from twenty-two to thirty-two in 2009. Thus the present 
number of judges of the Court of Appeal is more than three times of the original number 
00:32), the increase being executed in a period of nearly eighteen years. 
;;;----_ __ _ 
295 P.U.(A) 229/2005. 
296 P.U.(A) 163/2009. 
297 Article 40(IA), the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. 
29s Article 122A, the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. 
299 :·U.(A) 378/2001. 
.U.(A) 385/2006. 
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£. 2. Number of High Court Judges 
The Federal Constitution of Malaysia, 1963 o;iginally .specified the maximum and minimum 
numper of judges of the High Courts exci~ding the Chief Justice. It was provided that each 
'of the High Courts shall consist of a Chief Justice and not less than four other judges; but the 
. 
number of other judges shall not, until Parliament otherwise provides, exceed-
a) in the High Court in Malaya, twelve [and] 
b) in the High Court in Borneo, eight .... ' 
Thus like Article 124 of the Indian Constitution, the Constitution of Malaysia has fixed the 
number of judges of the High Courts and then empowered the Parliament to vary the number. 
In exercise of this power, the Federal Parliament in 1969 increased the number of judges of 
the High Court in Malaya, not of the High Court in Borneo, to 15300 (in place of 12 fixed by 
the Constitution). But this power of the Parliament was taken away and handed over to the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong by a constitutional amendment in August 1976.301 
The Yang di-Pertuan Agong increased the number of judges of the High Court in Malaya 
from 15 to 16 in 1977302, from 16 to 20 in 1980303, from 20 to 27 in 1984304, from 27 to 33 in 
1989
305
, from 33 to 47 in 1994306 (to accommodate the increase in the number of High Courts 
In the Country) and from 47 to 60 in 2006.307 Thus the present number of judges of the High 
Court in Malaysia is 60. On the other hand, curiously enough, the number of judges of the 
l-Iigh Court in Sabah and Sarawak (since 1994 it is so called) has only been enhanced twice 
(as against six times done in case of the High Court of Malaya) first in 1994 when the number 
---
30o ---------
3o1 P.U.(B) 83/ 1969. 
3o2 The Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act A354). 
3o3 P.U.(A) 308/ 1977. 
31 PU(A) 139/1980 (came into force on I March 1980) increased the number of judges to 18 and then P.U.(A) 
304 OI I980 (came into force on I January 1981) increased the number to 20. 
3os P .. U.(A) 304/84. 
3o6 P.U.(A) 132/ 1989. 
307 Section 15, the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1994 (Act A88S). 
P.U.(A) 384/2006. 
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of judges was increased from eight to 10308 and then in 2006, from 10 to 13309 by the Yang 
di-Pertuan Agong. Thus the number of judges of the High Court in Malaya has been 
Increased five times more than its originaJ strength (12:60), but in case of the judges of the 
High Court in Sabah and Sarawak; original number has not even been doubled (8: 13) in 
2010. 
Therefore, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong's various orders, as gazetted, increasing the number of 
. . 
other judges of the Federal Court from four to 1 1 between 1976 and 2010, enhancing the 
number ·of.other judges of the Court of Appeal from 10 to 32 between 1994 and 201 o, 
augmenting the number of judges of the High Court in Malaya from 15 to 60 between 1977 
and 2006, and raising the number of judges in the High Court of Sabah and Sarawak form 
eight to thirteen between 1993 and 2006, do not contain any reasons or justifications 
whatsoever as to the increase in the total number of judges of the superior courts in Malaysia. 
It cannot, therefore, be maintained that the decisions to increase the number of judges of the 
superior courts by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong in accordance with the advice of the Cabinet 
have always been taken on judicial considerations (e.g. increased number of cases, speedy 
disposal of cases etc), for accommodating (finding berth on the bench) and rewarding those 
favourites who have 'delivered' (as Jaw officers, as party men and as judges). Therefore, it 
may be suggested that, in view of the establishment of the Judicial Appointments 
Commission in 2009, an amendment should be introduced in the Constitution requiring the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong to exercise his power of increasing the number of judges of the 
superior courts either on the recommendation of the Commission as it is to be found in the 
---
3os ---------
Jo9 Supra note 306. 
Supra note 307. 
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Constitution of Namibia, 1990310 or upon request of the Superior Court concerned as 
provided for by the Constitution of the Commonwealth. of Puerto Rico, 1952.311 
~----------
J ~rticle 79(1) of the Constitution of Namibia provides that ·The Supreme Council shall consist of a Chief 
CUstrce and such additional Judges as the President, acting on the recommendation of the Judicial Service 
a ~Tnrnission, may determine.' Article 80(J) of the same C~nstitutio~ states that 'The High Court shall consist of 
S · u~ge-President and such additional Judges as the Presrdent, actrng on the recommendation of the Judicial 
~~cec · · · Jrr . ommrssron, may determrne. ' . 
Art rcle 3 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rrco, 1952 provrdes that 'The Supreme Cou t ~~::.1 be the court of last resort in Puerto Rico and shall be composed of a Chief Justice and four Associa~ 
rces. The number of Justices may be changed only by law upon request of the Supreme Court.' 
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Chapter III: 
Method of Appointment of the Judges of the Supre~e Court Under the Constitution of 
B~ngladesh, 1972 (as Amended from Time to Time by the Civilian and Martial Law 
Regimes) and the Defunct Supreme Judicial Commission Ordinance, 2008 
The following discussion will reveal how the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh originally 
conferred on the President the power to appoint the Chief Justice ofBan~ladesh on the advice 
' 
of the Prime Minister. By amending the Constitution in 1991the President has been freed . 
from the obligation of acting in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister. This 
analysis will also demonstrate that the convention of appointing the seniormost judge of the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court as the Chief Justic , developed in order to ensure 
that extraneous considerations do not play a part in this pivotal appointment process, has been 
Violated since 2003 on 5 occasions. Additionally, the deliberation will show that the original 
Provision of the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh concerning appointment of the judges of 
the Appellate and High Court Divisions of the Supreme Court by the President in 
consultation with the Chief Justice of Bangladesh was changed by the Constitution (Fourth 
Amendment) Act, 1975 giving him (the President) the authority to appoint judges only on the 
advice of the Prime Minister thereby allowing wide scope for the intrusion of politics into the 
Process. But the first Martial Law regime (1975-1 979) took an unexpected step to restore the 
Provision concerning consultation into the Constitution in May I 976. But, only within one 
and a half year, in November 1977, the regime changed its mind to be in line with the 
1111Illediate previous civilian regime to delete the provision relating to consultation with the 
Chief Justice from the Constitution. It will further manifest the violations of the convention 
Of appointing the senior most judges of the High Court Division as the judges of the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court by the successive civilian governments and Martial 
law regimes on numerous occasions. finally, this discourse will show how the journey of the 
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Supreme Judicial Commission, established in 2008 by the third Non-Party Care-taker 
Government (an interim Government set up for ninety days mainly to assist the Election 
Commission in conducting the General Elections) by promulgating an Ordinance, to 
recommend the best candidates to the President for appointment as the judges of the Supreme 
Court was calculatedly brought to an end by the Awami League Government in February 
2009 by not placing the said Ordinance before the first session of the newly constituted 
Parliament. 
A .. App~intment of Judges to the Supreme Court of_Bangladesh 
Part VI, titled 'THE JUDICIARY' having pyramidal structure, of the Constitution of the 
People 's Republic of Bangladesh, 1972 provides for in Chapter I provisions concerning 
composition, jurisdiction, appointment and removal of judges of the Supreme Court, the 
highest court of Jaw in Bangladesh. As to the composition of this apex court, the Constitution 
states that 'There shall be a Supreme Court for Bangladesh (to be known as the Supreme 
Court of Bangladesh) comprising the Appellate Division and the High Court Division. '3 12 
Although under one compendious name of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh there are two 
divisions of the Court, namely the Appellate Division and the High Court Division, they are 
erroneously called as two separate and independent courts, the High Court and the Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court of Bangladesh is indeed a single Court having two Divisions: the 
1-Iigh Court Division of the Supreme Court and the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. 
Similar structure of the highest court is also to be found in the Constitufon of the Republic of 
G 314 
uyana, 1980313 and the Constitution ofBarbados, 1966. 
-----
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313 Article 9(1) The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 1972· Jud~rticle 123: The Constitution of the Republic of G_uyana, 19,80 provides that 'the Supreme Court of 
314 lcature shall consist of a Court of Appeal and a H1gh Court. 
c Article 80(1), The Constitution of Barbados, 1966 states that the Supreme Court of Judicature of Barbados is 
001Posed of a High Court and a Court of Appeal. 
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The Constitution of Bangladesh contains provisions relating to the appointment of the Chief 
Justice, Judges of the Appellate Division and additional as well as regular Judges of the High 
Court Division of the Supreme Court. These provisions shall be examined as to show whether 
they ensure a proper selection of judges which lies at the heart of all the problems facing the 
judiciary in Bangladesh. 
A.J. The Appointment of the Chief Justice Of Bangl~desh 
The Chief Justice, designated by the Country' s 1972 Constitution as ' the Chief Justice of 
Banglad~sh; ' 3 15 is the · head of the Bangladeshi Judiciary and paterfamilias of the judicial 
fraternity. His office is, therefore, the most dignified and exalted post in the Judiciary of 
Bangladesh having ranked fourth in the State Order of Precedence. 
The Chief Justice, who as the head of the judiciary sits only in the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court,316 is the symbol of justice and freedom and, as such, his appointment is of 
critical importance in the administration of justice for retaining public confidence in the 
1111
Partiality, credibility and reliability of the highest court of the land- the Supreme Court. 
The people must be ensured that the Chief Justice is not appointed only for sharing the 
Political and social philosophy of the party in power as it is required to adjudicate the 
lawfulness of the actions of the executive and that there is a mechanism, independent of the 
government control, for the appointment of the Chief Justice taking into account the well-
defined objective criteria. As to the importance of the selection and appointment of the Chief 
Justice to ensure the independence of the judiciary, the observations of then Chief Justice of 
the Pakistan Supreme Court, Saiduzzaman Siddiqui, made in 1994 in Asad Ali v Federation 
of Pakistan3 17 are well deserved to be mentioned: 
-----
3]5 ---------
3]6 Article 94(2), The Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 1972. 
317 Article 94(3), ibid. 
PLD 1998 SC 161. 
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The selection of a person to the high office of the Chief Justice of Pakistan is a pivotal 
appointment for maintaining the independence of judiciary and for providing a free and 
unobstructed access to impartial and irydependent Courts/Tribunals to the ordinary citizens ... . 
guaranteed under Articles 9 and 25 of the Constitution.318 
These realities were indeed ignored and disregarded when the Constitution of Bangladesh, 
1972 originally provided that: 'The Chief Justice shall be appointed b the President ... .'319 
Thus the power to appoint the Chief Justice is an executive power vested in t~e President who 
is duty bound . t~ exercise thfs power under Article 48(3) as a constitutional head 'in 
accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister.' Later on, in September 1 9.91, the 
Constitution (T~elfth Amendment) Act, 1991, which was passed on 14 August 1991 and 
carne into force on 18 September on being majority of the votes cast in the referendum in 
favour of the President's assent, is one of the two Amendment Acts320 passed by the 
Parliament unanimously in the same year (an unprecedented event in the history of 
Bangladesh), freed the President from the obligation of consulting the Prime Minister in 
appointing the Chief Justice ofBangladesh.321 
Before making any comment on the changed method, it would be apposite to touch upon here 
the manner in which the Chief Justice of the highest court is appointed in different countries 
of the world. The methods of appointment followed in various jurisdictions can be grouped 
into four- which are as follows: 
----
318 ---------
319 Tbid. , at p. 189. 
32o Article 95(1), The Constitution of the People' s Republic of Bangladesh, 1972. 
321 The other Act is the Constitution (Eleventh Amendm_ent) A~t, 1991 passed on 14 Augu~t 1_991 . 
. ~mended art 48(3) provides that' In exercise of all h1s functiOns, save only that of appomtmg the Prime M1~1ster pursuant to clause (3) of art S6 and the Chief Justice pursuant to clause I of art 95. the President shall 
act In accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister.' 
116 
1. appointment of Chief Justice by the head of the state either unilaterally as in Ireland 
' 
Kenya, Sri Lanka and Sudan322; or 
a) on the advice of the Prime -Minister as in Malta and Western Samoa, on the 
advice of the Prime Minister after and/consultation with the leader of the 
opposition as in Fiji and Trinidad and Tobago, on the advice of the Prime 
Minister after consulting the Conference of Rulers as in Malaysia, on the 
advice of the Cabinet as in Greece and Japan; with · the , consent of the 
Parliament as in South Korea and Puerto Rico323; or 
b) on obtaining the agreement ofthe leader ofthe opposition as in Guyana324; or 
c) on the proposal/recommendation of, or in consultation with, an independent 
selection body such as judicial council/national judicial commission/ judicial 
322~-----------
b Article 35(1), The Constitution oflreland, 1937 states: 'The Judges of the Supreme Court shall be appointed 
Y the President.' 
Article 61(1), The Constitution of Kenya 1963 provides that the Chief Justice of the High Court shall be app . , 
_omted by the President. ~hcle !07(1), The Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978 stipulates that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shal l 
A ~PPomted by the President. 
J rtJ?Ie I 04( 1), The Constitution of Sudan, 1998 states that the President of the Republic shall appoint the Chief UstJce 323 . 
b Article ~8, The Constitution of Malta, 1964 provides that t~e app~i~tment of the Chief Justice shall be made j ~he Pres1dent acting in accordance with the advice of the Pnme Mm1_ster. . . 
B rtJc]e 65(2), The Constitution of Western Samoa, 1960 states 'The Ch1ef Just1ce shall be appomted by the 
A e~d of the State; acting on the advice of the Prime Ministe:.' . ... . 
Jurt1_cle 132(1 ), The Constitution of the Sovereign Democratic Repubi_Jc of FIJI , 19?0 stJ~ul_ates: ' The Chief 
stJce of the Supreme Court is appointed by the President on the adv1ce of the Pnme Mm1ster following 
con_su]tation by him or her with the Leader of the Opposition.' 
Article 102, The Constitution of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, 1976 states: 'The Chief Justice shall be 
app_ointed by the President after consultation with the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition.' 
Article 1228, The Federal Constitution of Malaysia, 1963 provides that the Chief Justice of the Federal Court ~haJJ be appointed by the Head of the State acting on the advice of the Prime Min ister, after consulting the 
onference of Rulers 
Article 91 (5), The Co~stitution of Greece, 1975 states 'Promotion to the office of President of the Supreme 
Court shall be effected by Presidential decree issued on the proposal of the Cabinet by selecting from among the ~rnbers ~ft~e highest court.' . . 
e Const1tut10n of Japan, 1946 provides that the appomtment of the Ch1ef Judge of the upreme Court shall be ~:~e by the Emperor as designated by the Cabinet. . _ . . 
hcle 8, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto RJCo, 19-'2 st1pulates that the Ch1ef Justice shall be ap . 
P_omted by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. 
Article 104(1), The Constitution of the Republic of South Korea, 1948 states that the Chief Justice of the ~~Pre~e Court is appointed by the President with the consent ?f the National Assembly. 
Article 127(1), The Constitution of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana, 1980 states that the Chief Justice of 
the S ·d · ft bta. · h L upreme Court of Guyana shall be appointed by the Pres1 ent actmg a er o mmg t e agreement of the 
eader of the Opposition. 
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service commission/constitutional council/ high council of justice as in 
Armenia, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Namibia, Nepal, Nigeria, in 
consultation with the judges. of superior courts as in India;325 or 
2. appointment by the parliament upon . proposal/nomination/recommendation by the 
head of the states as in Croatia, Ethiopia and Russia;326 or 
3. election of the Chief Justice by the judges of the Supreme Court as in Belgium, 
' Denmark and Ukraine;327 or 
-----
325 _--...;.. __ ---: _____ --" 
a A;ticie 95(3), The Constitution of Armenia, 1955 provides that the President of the Court of Appeals shall be. 
XP?mted on .. the proposal of the Judicial CounciL . , · 
rtr,cle 179(_, ), The Constitution of Poland, 1997 states that the Ftrst Prest dent of the Supreme Court shall be ~PPhed by the President of the Republic from amongst candidates proposed·by the General Assembly of the Ud~es of the Supreme Court, 
trtrc]e,52, The Constitution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 1992 stipulates that the appointment of judges rn~ludmg the Chief Justice) by Royal Decree upon a proposal from the Higher Council of Justice. Artt~Je 123(2), The Constitution of Spain, 1978 provides that the President of the Supreme Court shall be ~P_omted by the King at the proposal of the General Council of the judicial branch, th~tcle 82(1), The Constitution of the Republic ofNamibia, 1990 st.ates that the ap~ointme.nt of Chief Justice of 
A .supreme Court shall be made by the President on recommendation ofthe Judtcral Servrce Commission. th~rcJ~ 87(1),_The Constitution of the Kingdom ofNepal, 1990_rr~vides that t~e Head of the State shall appoint ArtiChre~Justtce ofNepal on the recommendation of the. Constr,tutt?nal Coun~tL 
cle 2_, 1( 1 ), The Constitutional ofthe Federal Repubhc ofNrgena, 1999 stipulates that the appointment of a ~er~on to the office of Chief Justice ofNigeria shall be made by the President on the recommendation of the 
at,ronaJ Judicial Council subject to confirmation of such appointment by the Senate. 
Artrc,Je 124(2), The Constitution offndia, 1949 provides that every judge of the Supreme Court shall be 
::.;Pomted by the President after consultation with such judges ofthe Supreme Court and of the High Court in 
J26e St~tes as the President may deem necessary for the purpose, 
C Artrcle 118, The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, 1990, provides that the President of the Supreme 
ourt of the Republic of Croatia shall be appointed by the Croatian Parliament at the proposal of the President 
Of the Republic with a prior opinion of the general session ofthe Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia rurd ~~e authorised committee of the Croatian Parliament , . , , 
Pre 
1 ~ 1 e 81 (1 ), The Constitution of the Democratic Repubhc of Et_hwpra, 1994 .states ~h~t the Presrdent and Vice-
B Stdent of the Federal Supreme Court shall upon recommendatiOn by the Pnme Mmrster be appointed by the A~~se of Peoples ' Representatives. . , . 
rcle 128( I), The Constitution of the Federation of Russra, 1993 strpulates that the JUdges of the Supreme 
Court of the Russia Federation shall be appointed by the Federal Council following nomination by the President Of the R , 
A . ussran Federation, _ , . . 
bertrcJe ~I (3), The Constitution of the Kingdom of Bhutan, 200.) provrdes that .the C~te,f Ju~trce of Bhutan shall 
th app~mted from among the Judges of the Supreme Court or from among emmentJurrsts m consultation with 
A e _Natrona! Judicial Commission, 
8 rtr~Je 174(3), The Constitution of South Africa, 1996 states that the President, after consulting the Judicial 32~rvrc~ Commission, appoint the Chief Justice of the Supr~me Court of AppeaL , 
Artrcle 151 (4) The Constitution of Belgium, 1970 provrdes that the Court of Cassat ron and the High Courts' ~o_ose Within themselves their Presidents and Vice-Presidents, _ , , 
trc]e 59(2) The Constitution of the Kingdom of Denmark, 19.)3 strpulates that the Hrgh Court of the Realm Sha]] I ' . , 
A , e ect a Presrdent from among rts members. , 
e]rtrc]e 128, The Constitution of Ukraine, 1996 states that the Charrman ?fthe Supreme Court of Ukraine is 
ected to office by the Plenary Assembly of the Supreme Court ofUkrame by secret ballot 
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4. election of the Chief Justice by the Parliament upon 
nomination/proposal/recommendation by the head of the state as in Georgia, Hungary, 
Rwanda and Serbia and Montenegro;328 
Therefore, it is evident that there are four broad modalities prevalent in different 
jurisdictions for appointing the Chief Justice, of which the method of appointment by the 
head of the . state on the basis of proposal/recommendation of, or in consultation with, an · 
independent judicial/advisory body has been resorted to by a large number of countries 
followed by the procedure to appoint by the head of the state on the advice of the prime 
minister/cabinet or on the agreement of the leader of the opposition. Since the Chief 
Justice symbolizes and epitomises the independence of the judiciary, his appointment 
cannot be left to the exclusive discretion of the executive thereby paving the way of 
intruding political consideration into the process and, as such, only a very few countries 
(e.g. Ireland, Kenya, Sri Lanka and Sudan) have bestowed exclusive power to appoint the 
head of the judiciary on the President. As a matter of fact, the President of Bangladesh 
has been given a blank cheque of unfettered discretion to appoint the Chief Justice of 
Bangladesh ignoring the benefit of the shared responsibility, preferably with a selection 
committee consisting of majority members from the higher judiciary, to exclude 
Politically motivated appointment for improper motives. 
---
328 --------
sh Article 90(2), The Constitution of Georgia, 1995 provides tha.t the President of_th~ Supreme Court of Georgia 
Ill all be elected for a period of not less than ten years by the Parll~m~nt by the maJ?nty of the nu~ber of the 
e~bers of Parliament on the current nominal list upon the submiSSIOn ofthe President of Georgia. ~rtlcle 48(1), The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, 1949 s~ates that bast:d on the recommendation made 
/~he President of the Republic, the Parliament shall elect the Pres1dent of the Su~reme Court. 
el rtlc]e 14 7, The Constitution of the Federal Rwanda, 2003 stipulates that the PresJden~ of the Supreme Court is 
coected b~ the Senate from two candidates in respect ?f each port _r~oposed by the President of the Republic after 
n.sultatJOn with the cabinet and the Supreme Council of the Jud.lclary. ~rtJc]e 47, The Constitutional Charter of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro, 1990 provides that the ~~dges of the Court of Serbia and Montenegro shall be elected by the Assembly of Serbia and Montenegro upon 
e Proposal of the Council of Ministers. 
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There is no specific qualification (competence) in the Constitution of Bangladesh as to 
the appointment of the Chief Justice. Therefore,. the qualifications laid down in the 
Constitution for the appointment of judges of the High Court Division and Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court are equ~lly applicable in case of appointment of the Chief 
Justice of Bangladesh. As to the criteria for selecting the Supreme Court Judges, the 
Constitution originally provides that: 
(2) A person shall not be qualified for appointment as a judge unless he is a citizen of 
Bangladesh and-
a) has for not less than ten years been an advocate of the Supreme Court; or 
b) has, for not less than ten years, held judicial office or an advocate in th . territory of 
Bangladesh and has, for not Jess than three years, exercised the power of a District 
Judge.329 
Thus the Constitution of Bangladesh provides for the appointment of judges to the 
Supreme Court both from the bench and the bar. Under the original provision, only a 
citizen of Bangladesh, not a foreigner, could be appointed as a Judge of the Supreme 
Court provided he fulfilled one ofthe three qualification requirements, namely, 
1. experience as an advocate of the Supreme court for not less than ten years; 
2. experience as an advocate in the territory of Bangladesh for not less than 
ten years and functioning as a district judge for not less than three years; or 
3. experience a a judicial officer for not less than ten years and performing 
the functions of a district judge for not less than three years. 
It should be stated that ordinarily an advocate who has practised before subordinate courts 
in Bangladesh for a period of two years may be enrolled as an advocate of the Supreme 
~----------------
Original Article 95(2), The Constitution ofthe People 's Republic ofBangladesh, 1972. 
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Court
330 
and after practising before the Supreme Court for a period of not less than 10 
Years he shall be eligible for appointment as a jud~e of the Supreme Court. In 1977, the 
provision for appointing an advocate having the experi .nr;c of practising before the 
st.Jbordinate courts for not less than 10 years and of exercising the powers of a district 
judge for not less three years, has been dispense~d with by an amendment to the 
. Constitution. 331 Furthermore, the same amendment deleted from the Constitution the 
requirement of acting as a district judge for a judicial officer having at least ten years 
' 
experience for appointing as a judge of the Supreme Court. Therefore, under the existino-
e 
arrangement of the Constitution, an advocate having 1 0 years practice before the Supreme 
Court or a judicial officer having not less than ten years experience shall be qualified for a 
berth in the apex court of the country. 
It is noticeable that the Constitution does not provide for a Y guidelines as to the 
academic qualification (e.g. preference should be given to the advocate having LLM, 
MPhil or PhD degree) and brilliant result, professional ability, reputation and integrity for 
the selection of the Supreme Court advocates and judicial officers as the judges of the 
Supreme Court. Therefore, any Supreme Court advocate having no standing practice (e.g. 
Who only kept his enrolment updated by paying the prescribed fees without going to the 
Court) or having no experience of handling crucial cases (only moved simple matters like 
bail or stay petition before the Court) can be appointed as a judge of the Supreme Court. 
Similarly, the Constitution is also silent as to the criteria- e.g. seniority, disposal of cases, 
quality of judgment given, maintenance of good relationship with the colleagues and the 
bar- which should be kept in mind in appointing a judicial officer, having at least ten 
Years experience, as a judge of the Supreme Court. Thus any judge of the subordinate 
;---------------------33~ Article 2 1(1 ), .Bangladesh Legal Practitioners and Bar Council Order, 1972. . 
27 Section 2, Second Proclamation (Tenth Amendment) Order 1977 (Second ProclamatiOn Order No 1 of 1977), 
November 1977. 
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court, who has served the court for at least ten years, having not been appointed as a 
district judge (for the appointment of a districtjudg~, a judicial officer requires at least ten 
Years experience including three years experience as a joint district judge or both as a 
joint district judge and additional district judge332) can theoretically be appointed as a . 
judge of the Supreme Court although no one below the rank of the district judge has ever 
(until December 2010) been appointed as a judge of the Supreme Court. 
It is -pertinent to mention here that in 1977 clause (c) has been added to ,Article 95(2) of 
the _Constitution empowering the Parliament to enact law prescribing any other 
qualification as an alternative to 10 years experien~e as a Supreme Court advocate or 10 . 
Years experience as a judicial officer for appointment as a judge of the Supreme Court_3J3 
But no such law prescribing other qualification for the appr. intment of judges of the 
. Supreme Court has yet (December 201 0) been enacted. 
However, in the absence of any constitutional provision specifying that the Chief Justice 
is to be appointed from amongst the judges of the Appellate Division, it can strongly be 
argued that any advocate of the Supreme Court or judicial officer, having fulfilled the 
qualifications as laid down in Article 95(2) of the Constitution of Bangladesh for the 
appointment of judges of the Supreme Court, can directly be appointed as the Chief 
Justice ofBangladesh. 
But, the appointment of the Chief Justice has been left at the pleasure of the President 
Who is not supposed to know the judicial track record of the jurlges of the Appellate 
Division (i.e. their performance in handling and conducting cases including cases of 
constitutional importance), their keen intellect, legal acumen, integrity and reputation. In 
fact, it is the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs which initiates the 
~-----------------33; ~art XXII, Bangladesh Civil Service Recruitment Rules I 98 I (as amended in I 995). 
he Second Proclamation (Tenth Amendment) Order, I 977. 
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proposal through the Prime Minister recommending the senior-most judge of the 
Appellate Division for the appointment as the C?ief Justice of Bangladesh whenever 
vacancy occurs· in that office. The President as a rule ordinarily approves the proposal and 
tn is convention of appointing the most senior judge ofthe Appellate Division as the Chief 
Justice was consistently observed in Bangladesh unt~J June 2003 although there was an 
abortive attempt.made by the then President, H.M. Ershad, in January 1 990. 
After the retirement of the Chief Justice Badrul Haider Chowdhury o,n 31 December 
1989? the then President H. M. Ershad appointed on 1 January 1990 the senior most Judge 
of the Appellate · Division, Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed, as the Acting Chief Justice, 
instead of the regul~r Chief Justice, under Article 97 of the Constitution, which evoked 
sharp reaction of the Supreme Court Bar Association. The Association demanded the 
maintenance of the tradition of appointing the senior most Judge of the Appellate 
Division to the Office of the Chief Justice of Bangladesh. After thirteen days, on 14 
January 1990, Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed was appointed as the sixth regular Chief 
Justice of the country. 
A.J.J. Violation of the Convention of Seniority in Appointing Chief Justice of Bangladesh 
The convention or tradition of seniority in appointing the senior most Judge of the Appellate 
Division as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh was violated by the regime of the B.N.P- Jamaat 
Alliance (200 J-2006), the Non-Party Caretaker Government (2006-2008) and the Awami 
League regime (2009-to date). 
<1.1.2. Supersession During the Regime of the B.NP-Jamaat Alliance (2001-2006) 
The convention of seniority was first violated on 23 June 2003 by the regime of the B.N.P-
Jarnaat Alliance when Justice K.M. Hasan, who had been superseded twice by the previous 
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Awami League Government (1996-2001) first on 9 January 2000 in elevating Justice Rabbani 
and Justice Ruhul Amin and on 15 May 2001 in elev~ting Justice Md. Fazlul Karim to the 
Appellate Division ignoring the recommendation of the Chief Justice, was appointed as the 
Chief Justice of Bangladesh in supersession of two fellow colleagues, Justice Md. Ruhul 
Amin and Justice Md. Fazlul Karim, who had earlier bee~ elevated to the Appellate Division 
superseding their senior judge Justice K.M. Hasan. The four party Alliance Government 
justified this supersession by terming it as a corrective measure aimed at to provide 
redress/reliefto the earlier injustice_ perpetrated on Justice K.M. Hasan. 
The next violation took place when, .after the retirement of Justice K.M. Hasan on 26 January 
2004 as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh, Justice J R Mudassir Hussain was appointed as the . 
Chief Justice of Bangladesh on 27 January 2004 in preference io the same two judges- Justice 
Md. Ruhul Amin and Justice Md. Fazlul Karim, who had also superseded him in getting berth 
on the Appellate Division.334 This supersession was also justified in the same vein as it had 
been done on the previous occasion. 
A..J.J Supersession During the Non-Party Care-taker Government (2007-2008) 
During the regime ofthe Non-Party Care-taker Government (consisting of the Chief Advisor 
and ten other advisors), which is an interim government established within fifteen days of the 
dissolution of Parliament that have the mandate to carry on ordinarily the routine functions of 
the government and is destined to 'give to the Election Commission all possible aid and 
assistance for holding the general election of members of Parliament peacefully, fairly and 
1lnPartiaiil35, President Professor Dr. Iajuddin Ahmed appointed on 25 May 2008 Justice 
M.M. Ruhul Amin as the (16th) Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh (on 
)]4 • • s ~ Asian Human Rights Commission, 'Bangladesh: Culture of SupersessiOn m upreme Court will Undermine JJ~Ie of Law' 26 May 2008. . 
The Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1996, added ArtJcles 58B, 58C and 580 to the Constitution. 
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retirement of Chief Justice Mohammad Ruhul Am in) in supersession of the senior most judge 
of the Appellate Division, Justice Fazlul Karim. 
The President of the Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) Barrister Shafique Ahmed, 
expressed his dissatisfaction and disapproval of such an appointment, thus: 
Although supersession has also taken placed in appointing Chjef Justice and Appellate 
Division Judges during the past governments, the Bar has never accepted such supersession ... 
such supersession has led the people concerned to apprehend political il1-detention of the 
g?vernment. 336 
The Association broke its tradition of welcoming the new Chief Justice when it refrained 
from facilitating Justice M.M. Ruhul Amin on his first appearance in the Court on 1 June as 
the Chief Justice. It also refrained from giving a traditional farewell felicitation to the 
outgoing Chief Justice Mohammad Ruhul Amin on 29 May. This abstention from the 
customary practices of the SCBA of honouring the outgoing and the newly appointed Chief 
Justice was also held to be a mark of protest against the Appellate Division's recent verdict 
that barred the highest court from hearing bail petition of any accused under the Emergency 
Power Rules, 2007.337 
A..J.4. Supersession During the Present Awami League Government (2009-todate) 
Within a period of two years, the present Awami League Government has violated the 
Principle of seniority in appointing the Chief Justice on two occasions, first in December 
2009 and then in September 201 o. President Zillur Rahman appointed Justice Md. Tafazzul 
Islam, who headed the five member special bench of the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court that pronounced on 19 November 2009 the 'landmark verdict in Bangabandhu Sheikh 
336 
337 Asian Human Rights Commission, supra note 333. Ibid; Staff Correspondent, 'New CJ takes oath', The Daily Star (Dhaka), 2 June 2008, I. 
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Mujibur Rahman (father of the present Prime Minister) assassination case' mainly retaining 
the High Court ' s decision338, as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh in supersession of the senior 
rnostjudge of the Appellate Division Justice Mohammad Fazlul Karim339 (thus Justice Karim 
became the victim of supersession for the fourth time). It is ironical that the then President of 
the Supreme Court Bar Association who in May 2098 criticised and disapproved the 
appointment of M.M. Ruhul Amin as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh, made during the 
regim~ of th·e. Non-Party Care-taker Government in supersession of the senior most judge of 
the Appellate Division Mohammad F~zlul Karim, has now a complete cha~ge of heart (as 
Minister. for Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs of the present regime) in proposing 
Justice Tafazzul Islam, ignoring the same ~enior Justice Mohammad Fazlul Karim, to appoint 
as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh. · The President again violat~d the principle of seniority on 
26 September 2010 when he appointed Justice A.B.M Khairul Haque (replacing Justice 
FazJuJ Karim) as the nineteenth Chief Justice of the country ahead of his two senior 
colleagues in the Appellate Division.340 
Because of his appointment as an additional and regular judge of the High Court Division in 
1998 and 2000 respectively by the then A wami League Government, his elevation to the 
Appellate Division in July 2009 by the present Awami League regime, upholding a lower 
court' s verdict sentencing 15 killers ofBangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his family, 
his judgment as a judge of the High Court Division declaring the Constitution (Fifth 
Amendment) Act, 1979, passed to ratify and confirm all the actions of the first Martial Law 
Regirne (1975-1979), unl)onstitutionaJ341, Chief Justice Khairul Haque's appointment has 
been stigmatized and branded by the legal and political circles as a politically motivated 
::---_ 
33g ---------
339 Staff Correspondent 'Tafazzul new chief justice', The Daily Star (Dhaka), 16 December 2009, 1. 
340 Staff Correspondent' 'Outgoing CJ slated at farewell ', The Daily Star (Dhaka), 30 September 201 o, 1. 
I Staff Correspondent~ ' Justice Khairul Haque new chief justice ', The Daily Star (Dhaka), 27 September 2010, 
34
•
1 Ibid. 
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appointment in which considerations of sharing ideological views has mainly intruded into 
the h · 
c 01ce. However, the present President and the Secretary-General of the Supreme Court 
Bar Association maintained the Associa:ion's tradition of protesting (and criticising) the 
supersession of the two judges (who considered it dignified to go on leave) senior to the 
newly appointed Chief Justice terming the 'appointment ~s politicall motivated' and had the 
effect of tarnishing 'the image of the apex court. ' 342 
F'urtherm.ore, it is believed that appointing a judge, ranked third in the seni,ority list, as the 
Chief J~stice, the Gove~ment might have two hidden agendas, namely, immediate and 
Ultimate. Th~ immediate plan was to get oath administered to the newly appointed (appointed 
Jn April2010) two additional judges, ofwhich one was accused in a murder case while other 
allegedly kicked on the door of the Chief Justice ' s room in ovember 2006, by the present 
Chief Justice as his predecessor (Chief Justice Fazlul Karim) had declined to do so citing 
'una•·oidable reasons.' Its immediate plan has, in the meantime, been executed by the new 
Chief Justice A.B.M Khairul Haque who administered oath in November 2010 to the 
aforesaid judges, to use his words for discharging 'constitutional obligation.' The eventual 
and terminal plan is to secure the appointment of the new Chief Justice as the Chief Advisor 
of the next Non-Party Care-taker Government (for being retired last). 
Thus it appears that the consideration of political allegiance has played a dominant factor, in 
fact main factor, instead of seniority, in appointing the Chief Justice since 1996 when the 
Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act, 1996 made the provision of heading the Non-
Party Care-taker Government by the immediate past Chief Justice to be constituted after the 
dissolution of Parliament (within 15 days) for ensuring free, fair and credible General 
Elections. lt is not kept in mind that the violation of the principle of seniority in appointing 
;----_______________ __ 
42 M. Abdul LatifM d I 'A rt"ng controversy in appointment of Chief Justice ', The Daily Star (Online) 10 0 ona , vei . h ?'d- 15777? ( ' 2Qc;~~er 2010 http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/ne"vs-detaJ ls.p p .m - - accessed on 15 November 
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Chief Justice not only causes injustice to the superseded judges by shattering and crashing 
their legitimate expectation of becoming Chief Justice but also makes room for further 
injustice likely to be meted out in future against the litigants, particularly in cases where the 
government is a party. This has also the disastrous impact of making the highly dignified and 
Prestigious office of the Chief Justice controversial and of lowering public faith, confidence 
and trust in the impartiality of the highest court of the land. No one can calculate the 
aggregate amount of evil inflicted on the community by such a bad decision of supersession. 
Furthermore, if the superseded judges in protest resign or take leave until retirement, the 
country wili be deprived of the service of the senior, experienced and competent judges. It 
can hardly be expected, especially in the third world countries, that the junior judge appointed 
as the Chief Justice overlooking the claim of his senior colleagues, will refuse to accept such 
an appointment or even accepted will resign later on, to save the apex court from political 
clout and controversy. 
A..J. 5. Justification for Observing the Convention of Seniority in Appointing the Chief Justice 
01 Bangladesh 
Although Article 95 of the Bangladesh Constitution does not provide that the senior most 
judge of the Supreme Court shall be appointed as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh, a 
convention of appointing senior most judge of the Supreme Court as the Chief Justice, as 
lllentioned earlier, has developed which must consistently be followed as an inflexible and 
lllechanical rule. Although it is quite possible that in a given case, the senior most judge 
lllight not be the most suitable choice or might not come up to the highest standard expecting 
of him and, as such, the inflexible rule of seniority can lower judicial performance, yet the 
rule of seniority must be adhered to in appointing the Chief Justice for the following reasons: 
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In the first place, there is a greater safety in appointing invariably the senior most judge as the 
Chief Justice, the sentinel qui vive/ watchdog of the independence of the judiciary, as the 
President would be unable to pick and choose among the judges on the basis of extraneous 
considerations, e.g. political or personal favouritism. 
Seco~dly, the senior most judge of the Supreme Court· has a legitimate expectancy to be 
considered as the Chief Justice and, as such, in the absence of his sickness or unwillingness to 
accept the office of Chief Justice, he is entitled to be appointed as the ~hief Justice of 
Bangladesh. This legitimate expectation ofthe most senior judge to be appointed as the Chief 
Justice because of the established convention/practice has been recognised by Chief Justice 
Sajjad Ali Shah of the Pakistan Supreme c ·ourt in Al-Jihad Trust v J.ederation of Pakistan34J. 
Thirdly, the upersession of the senior most judge in appointing the Chief Justice of 
Bangladesh will hurt his sentiment, ego and self-respect and, as such, he may find it difficult 
to accept the appointed Chief Justice's leadership in good grace. As a result, he may take 
retirement or take leave until retirement and thereby creating a vacuum of experienced and 
competent judge in the Appellate Division ofthe Supreme Court. 
Fourthly, the appointment of the Chief Justice by seniority, as mentioned earlier, will prevent 
a scramble among judges of the Supreme Court for the highest office- the competition to 
show who has better imbibed the gospel of the ruling party as to catch the eye and ear of the 
appointing authority whenever a vacancy arises. Even the junior most judge may think that, 
by giving decision in favour of the executive in a case and by cultivating good 1elation with 
it, he will stand a good chance to become the Chief Justice of Bangladesh which will 
invariably ruin the highest institution of justice and shatter public confidence in it. 
~----------------
PLo 1996 sc 324, at p. 365. 
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Fifthly, it should be mentioned here that the Constitution of Bangladesh provides for the 
appointment of regular Chief Justice and acting Chief Justice. Article 95 of the Bangladesh 
Constitution stipulates for the regular appointment of the Chief Justice, while Article 97 
speaks of the appointment of an Acting Chief Justice as a stop-gap arrangement for a shorter 
Period. Unlike the Constitution oflndia, which in Article !26 has empowered the President to 
appoint any judge of the Supreme Court irrespective of seniority in cases when the office of 
the Chief Justice of India is vacant or when the Chief Justice is unable to perform his .duties 
by reason of absence or otherwise, the Constitution of Bangladesh i~ Article 97344 
unequiv~cally provides for following the mechanical rule of seniority (mandatorily) by the 
President in appointing the acting Chief Justice of Bangladesh (in cases of vacancy in the 
office of the Chief Justice or because of absence and illness of the Chief Justice if he is 
unable to perform his functions). It seems that the expression 'If the office of the Chief 
Ju t~ · 
s Jce becomes vacant' does not refer to the vacancy wh1ch occurs on account of the normal 
retirement of the incumbent Chief Justice, rather it refers only to the vacancy caused by 
SUdden death, resignation or any other unforeseen reasons. 
Therefore, since in case of an unexpected vacancy, the Constitution of Bangladesh provides 
for the appointment of an Acting Chief Justice by the President entirely on the basis of 
seniority denying him the power to pick and choose from amongst the judges of the Appellate 
Division and, thereby negating the possibility of patronage appointment, it can strongly be 
argued that similar approach is to be taken either by following without deviation whatsoever 
the conventional rule of seniority or by introducing an amendment to Article 95 of the 
Constitution to the effect that the President shall appoint only the senior most judges of the 
:----__ 
344 ---------
Article 97 The Co t't t. fthe People's Republic of Bangladesh, 1972 states that 'If the office of the Ch· f ' ns I u IOn 0 . h ch· fJ t' . ill Ie Justice becomes vacant, or if the President is sat~sfied tha.t t e Ie us ICe IS: on account o.fabsence, 
ness, or any other cause, unable to perform the functions of his office, tho~e fu~ctwns shall, until some other 
Person has entered upon that office or until the Chief.Justice has resumed his duties, as the case may be, be 
Per£ ' o· · . ' 
ormed by the next most senior judge of the Appellate IVISIOn. 
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Appellate Division of the Supreme Court as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh. In this context 
, 
the recommendation of the Arrears Committee (consisting of three Chief Justices of the High 
Courts [of Kerala, Kolkata and Madras] appointed by the Government of India in 1989 to 
examine large arrears in the High Courts and to suggest remedies, made in its Report would 
be of much relevance to quote: 'The Committee, therefore, recommends that the second 
Proviso to Article 124(2) be deleted and an appropriate proviso be substituted to the effect 
that the senior most Judge of the Supreme Court shall ordinarily be appointed as the Chief 
Justice of India. ,345 
A.2. Appointment of Jud~es of The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court 
The Appellate Division is the higher Division of the Supreme Court (High Court being the 
lower Division) which hears and determines appeals against judgment, decrees, orders and 
sentences ofthe High Court Division.346 The judges (along with the Chief Justice) appointed 
to the Appellate Division, the maximum number of which has neither been determined by the 
Constitution nor has Parliament been empowered to fix the number of judges, sit only in that 
Division. 347 It is the President of the Country who has been invested with the power of 
ascertaining the strength of the judges of the Supreme Court on the advice of the Prime 
Minister.348 Accordingly, the number of judges to be appointed in the Appellate Division was 
initially fixed at five, which was later in 2002 enhanced to 7 by the President during the 
regirne of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (2001-2006). Finally on 9 July 2009, the present 
President Zil.lur Rahman increased the number of posts of judges in the Appellate Division of 
---
345 ---------
346 Arrears Committee constituted by the Government of India, The Report ( l 989), para 7.20. 
n Article 103(1 ), The' Constitution of the People' s Republic of Bangladesh, 1972. The Appell at: Division does 
ot ~ave any original jurisdiction except the power subject to Jaw to make an order for the Investigation of or ~~015h.ment for any contempt of itself. 
348 Article 94(3), ibid. 
Articles 94(2) and 48(3), ibid. 
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the Supreme Court from seven to I 1 as per Article 94(2) ofthe Constitution ofBangladesh.349 
The official handout did not specify the reasons (e.~. increased number of cases, speedy 
disposal of backlog of cases) for increasing the number of judges in the higher division of the 
Apex Court. There is ·neither any provision in the Constitution of Bangladesh nor any 
Constitutional convention .requiring the President to con~ult the Chief Justice of Bangladesh 
Who is the most competent and well-equipped person to articulate his objective opinion ·after 
discussing the matter with the senior colleagues and after taking into account the number of 
' 
cases pending before the Appellate Division. Therefore, in order to prevent the practice of 
Packing .of .the Appellate Division with the judges having similar political allegiance and 
ideological outlook after increasing the number of judges in accordance with executives' 
subjective satisfaction, an amendment should be introdu9ed in Article 94(2) of the 
Constitution of Bangladesh · requiring the President to exercise his power of increasing the 
number of judges either upon a request of the Supreme Court as provided for by the 
Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 1952350 or on the recommendation of the 
Supreme Judicial Commission as it is to be found on the Constitution ofNamibia, 1990.351 
With regard to the appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court, the 1972 Constitution of 
Bangladesh originally provided that 'The .... judges [of the Supreme Court] shall be 
appointed by the President after consultation with the Chief Justice. ' 352 
Thus under this method of appointment, which is equally applicable to the appointment of 
judges of both the Appellate and High Court Divisions of the Supreme Court, the President 
~------------------
49 Staff Correspondent ' SC Appellate Division gets 4 more judges', The Daily Star (online), 15 July 2009, ~~p://www. thedailysta:.net/newDes ign/news-detail s.php?nid=96?98 (accessed ?n 15 No,vember 201 0). 
[ Article 3, The Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 1952 provides that The number of Justices 3~fthe Supreme Court] may be changed only by Jaw upon request ofthe Supreme Court.' 
a ~~icle 79(1), The Constitution ofNamibia, 1990 provide~ that 'The Su~r~me Co~rt shall c~n~ist of . ... Such 
d ddJtlonaJ judges as the President acting on the recommendation of the JudiCial Service CommiSSion may 
35~tennine. ' 
-Article 95(1), The Constitution ofthe People's Republic of Bangladesh, 1972. 
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Was required to exercise his power in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister.JSJ 
This is essentially the British method of appointing ju~ges of higher judiciary prevalent until 
the enactment of the Constitutional Refoz:ns Act, 2005 when the Crown used to appoint the 
judges by convention on the advice of the Prime Minister after consulting the Lord 
Chancellor354 as the head of the judiciary (i.e. Lord Chancellor used to sit as the Chief Justice 
in the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords). In the Subcontinent, it is the Indian 
Constitution, . I 949 which for the first time provides for the consultation by the President with 
the Chief Justice along with 'such of the Judges of the Supreme Court and of the High Court 
in the State's as the President may deem necessary355 in appointing judges of the Supreme 
Court. The 1956 and 1 962 Constitutions of Pakistan adopted the Indian method by providing 
for the appointment of judges of the Supreme Court by the President after consultation with 
the Chief Justice with the modification that he is not required to consult such of the judges of 
the Supreme Court and ofthe High Courts in the States in his discretion .356 
This method of appointing judges of the Supreme Court in consultation with the Chief 
Justice, as incorporated originally into the Constitution of Bangladesh, was in accordance 
With the suggestion of the International Congress of Jurists, held in New Delhi in January 
---
353 ---------
354 Article 48(3), ibid. 
355 0. ~ood Phillips ' , Constitutional and Administrative Law_ (S~eet & Maxwell, 1987) at pp. 380-1. 
a A:ttcle 124(2), The Indian Constitution, 1949 which provtdes Every Jud~e oft.he Supreme Court shall be 
PPomted by the President by warrant under his hand and seal after consultatiOn w1th such of the Judges of the 
Supreme Court and of the High Courts in the States as the President may deem necessary for the purpose and ~~all.hold office until he attains the age of sixty-five years: . . . . 
0 VIded that in the case of appointment of a Judge other than the Ch1ef Just1ce, the Ch1ef Just1ce of fndia shall ~;vays be consulted:' 
a A.s Article 149(1), the Constitution of Pakistan, 1956 provided that the Chief Jus.tice of Pakistan shall be 
PPomted by the President and the other judges of the Supreme Court s~all. be appomted after consultation with ~~e Chief !ustice. Article 50 (1), The Constitution of.Pakistan, 19.62 wh1ch ~~fact reproduced in it the provisions 
r the Article 149(1) of the 1956 Constitution regardmg the appomt~ent of Judges o~the Supreme Court, ~h OVided that 'The Chief.Justice of the Supreme c:ourt ~hall be a~pomte~ b~ the President, and the other Judges 
all be appointed by the President after consultatiOn w1th the Chief Justice. 
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1959 that, whatever, body actually makes judicial appointment, it is desirable that the 
lud· · 357 ICJary should itself cooperate or at least be consulted. 
s· 
lnce the President (as a layman) can have no knowledge about the legal acumen, legal 
expertise, independence and firmness, abili.ty to handle cases, personal conduct of advocates 
or subordinate judicial officers, the requirement of consulting the Chief Justice, having expert 
knowledge about the ability, competency and suitability of an advocate or a judicial officers 
for judgeship, was provided for to ensure the selection of the most approwiate person for 
appoin~ent. Apart from fulfilling the general qualification requirements as laid down in 
Article 95(2) of the Constitution, e.g. citizenship of Bangladesh and either experience as an 
advocate of the Supreme Court for not less than 10 years or experience as a judicial officer 
for not less than 10 years as mentioned earlier, there is no other pre-requisite provided for 
either by the Constitution or by any other Jaw. Therefore, theoretically it is possible that any 
advocate or any judicial officer, who fulfils the prescribed Constitutional requisites, can 
directly be appointed as a judge ofthe Appellate Division without being a judge ofthe High 
Court Division. But in practice, no such an advocate or a judicial officer, except High Court 
Division Judges, has yet been appointed directly as a judge of the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court. Of course, Bangladesh, as a former province of Pakistan, first under the 
narne of East Bengal and then of East Pakistan (August 1947- March 1971), witnessed the 
direct appointment of two jurists of outstanding calibre, Manzoor Qadir and Tufail Ali Abdur 
Rahman, as the Chief Justice of West Pakistan High Court during the regime of President 
A.yub Khan (1958-1969) and as the Chief Justice of the then High Court of Sind and 
Balochistan (restored this original spelling by the Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 
20 1 0) in 1972 respectively. 358 
---
357 ---------
Jss International Congress of Jurists, Committee of Committee IV, The Report (New Delhi, 1959) Article II. 
PLD 1996 SC 324, at pp. 494-5. 
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However, a convention has been developed to provide flesh to cloth the dry bone of the 
Constitution to the effect that the appointment of ju~ges to the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court shall be made from amongst the judges of the High Court Division on the 
basis of seniority and, as such, the meaning-and nature ofthe pivotal word 'consultation' used 
in the appointme~t process shall be examined in discussing the appointment of the judges of 
the High Court Division . of the apex court with special reference to the relevant leading 
decisions ofthe Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi Supreme Courts. 
A.2.J. IJ_eleting the Constitutional Provision Regarding Consultation by the Constitution 
(Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975 
The Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975, which was passed by the. Parliament about 
two Years and two months of coming into effect of the Constitution during the first elected-
Government of the Awami League (1973-1975), is ~m extreme amendment that changed the 
fundamental character of the Constitution. For, it, inter alia, replaced parliamentary 
dem . 359 Am · tt · h . ocracy With a presidential form of government on en can pa ern Wit out 1ts checks 
and balances, concentrating virtually all the powers in the hands of the President including 
the Power to remove the judges of the Supreme Court at his pleasure360, to withhold assent to 
a bill passed by the Parliament361 and to declare Bangladesh as a one-party State362 (in fact, 
Bangladesh was declared as a one-party State on 25 February 1975). Prime Minister Sheikh 
Mujibur Rahman, who was proclaimed by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act as the 
President of Bangladesh for a five year term (24 January 1975- 24 Janurtry 1980)363, 
described this adroit political manoeuvre as the 'second revolution', the 'historic struggle for 
national liberation'/ 'the war for national independence' of (March- December) 1971 being 
---
359 ---------
360 Art!cle 4, The Constitution (Fourth Amendment? A.ct, 1~7~ . 
361 Article 15 (i.e. amended Article 96 of the Const1tutwn), ~b~d. 
362 Article 12 (i.e. amended Article 80 of the Constit~tion): '?'d. 
363 Article 23 (newly added art 117A ofthe ConstitutiOn), ibid. 
Article 35, ibid. 
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the first revolution. However, the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, provided that 'The 
···· judges [of the Supreme Court] shall be appointed by the President.' 
Thus the President' s obligatio~ to consult the Chief Justice in appointing puisne judges of he 
Supreme Court was dispensed with. The abolition of Constitutional requirement of 
consultation with the Chief Justice extended the door too wide-open for the appointment of 
judges by the President on extraneous considerations such as broad sympathy with the social 
and ideological outlook of the party in power or rewarding someone by givi~g a place on the 
bench for rendering service in the past. For. the President, who could not be expected to have 
the knowledge about the candidate's legal acumen and suitability for appointment to the high 
judicial offi e being influenced and persuaded would likely to mea'5ure fitness of a candidate 
in terms of political affiliation and allegiance rather than judicii:ll quality. This would result in 
appointing spineless, obedient and manageable judges which is quite the opposite and 
antithesis of an independent and courageous judiciary as enshrined in the Constitution of 
Bangladesh as a fundamental characteristic to the effect: 'Subject to the provisions of this 
Constitution the Chief Justice and the other judges shall be independent in the exercise of 
their judicial functions. •364 This Jed Justice Md. Joynal Abed in to observe in 2009 in 
.Bangladesh and Justice Syed Md Dastagir Hossain and others v Md Idrisur Rahman365: 
Since the fourth amendment of the Constitution, amongst others, affected one of the basic 
structures of the Constitution by destroying the independence of judiciary by eliminating the 
proce s of consultation in the matter of app0intment of Judges in the superior Judiciary it is 
considered as invalid but for some unavoidable reason it could not have been set aside.366 
;----------------~-----3~ Article 94(4), The Constitution of the People's Republic ofBa~gla.desh, 1972. 
38 CLc (AD) 2009< htrp://www.clcbd.org/judgments/19-constltutwnal-law/3431-bangladesh-and-justice-
syed-md d . . d ·d · ·ahman-?009-38-clc-ad-.html>. 366 - astag1r-hossam-and-ors-vs-m -1 nsur-1 ' -
Ibid., at para 64. 
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'Unavoidable reason ' , as mentioned in above observations may imply that this 
Amendment has never been challenged before the Supreme Court as most of the chancres 
. ~ 
introduced by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act were dispen ;ed v/th by the first 
. .  
Martial Law Regime (1975-1979) . 
. 1.2.2. Restoration of Constitutional Provision Concerning Consultation And ele.tion Again 
by the First Martial Law Regime (1975-1979) · 
For the first time in the history of Bangladesh, Martial Law was declared on '15 August 1975 
' 
immediately after the assassination of the President of the Country, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. 
It Was declared at a time when the country had already been in a State Emergency imposed 
011 28 December 1974. It seems that Martial Utw was proclaimed as a precautionary measure 
as emergency powers were not considered enough to obviate any public resistance and meet a 
Possible threat to the newly established regime. The authorities on Constitutional Law in the 
United Kingdom do not deal with this kind of Martial Law declared by the leaders of a coup 
d 'etat after the overthrow of a legitimate civilian regime by force. 367 'This kind of .... Martial 
Law' observed Justice Murshed of the East Pakistan High Court in 1 963, with reference to 
the imposition of Martial Law in Pakistan in 1958, in Lt. Col. G. L. Bhattacharya v State36B 
' 
'constitutes a class apart and has nothing to do with "Constitutional" Martial Law. ·369 In 
Constitutional Law, Martial Law, which is the great Jaw of social defence, tinds justification 
In the doctrine of necessity for its promulgation in times of grave emergency, when society is 
disordered by civil war, · insurrection or invasion by a foreign enemy, for he speedy 
restoration of peace and tranquillity, public order and safety in which the civi I authority may 
;---------------------0; M. Ershadul Bari , Martial Law in Bangladesh, 1975-1979: A Legal Analysis (PhD Thesis. SOAS, University 
368 London, 1985) at pp. 1 50-I . 
J59 !3 PLR (Dacca Series) 377. 
Ibid., at pp. 420-1. 
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function and flourish. 370 Since Martial Law was proclaimed in Bangladesh in peace time and 
there was no question of suppressing riot, rebellion or insurrection, the declaration of Martial 
Law on 15 August 1975 did not satisfy th~ test ofthe common law doctrine ofnecessity. 37 1 It 
Was - to be seen as an extra-constitutional act since throughout the text of the 1972 
Constitution of Bangladesh no reference whatsoever has ~een made to Martial Law.372 Unlike 
the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions of Pakistan, which had been abrogated after Proclamation of 
Martial Law in 1958 and 1969 respectively, the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh was not 
abrogated .by the 1975 Martial Law ad~inistration: Neither was it suspen~ed at any time 
during the Martial Law period. But it ceased to exi~t · ~s 'the Supreme Law of the Country as it 
Was made subject to the First Proclamation (issued on 20 August 1975),_ and Martial Law 
Regulations or Orders issued by the Martial Law regime from time to time and, as such, the 
Constitution assumed a subordinate status.373 Although under the 1972 Constitution of 
Bangladesh only the Parliament did have the power to amend it and the President was not 
given any authority to make and promulgate any ordinance for altering or suspending any 
Provision of the Constitution, the President assumed on I 9 September I 975 the power of 
making orders on any subject in, or provided by the 1972 Constitution through the 
Promulgation of the Proclamation (First Amendment) Order, I 975 (Proclamation Order No 1 
of 1 975). Accordingly, he amended the Constitution from time to time by issuing 
Proclamations (Amendments) Orders. 
Thus President A.M. Sayem, a former Chief Justice of Bangladesh (1972-1975) who had 
replaced Khandaker Mostaque Ahmed (the first President under Martial Law who had 
retained the structure of civilian administration) as the President on 6 November 1975 and 
Chief Martial Law Administrator (who perhaps was the first Chief Justice to assume the 
---
37o ---------
371 Bari, supra note 367, at pp. 423-4. 
372 Ibid., p. 428. 
373 Ibid., p. 429. 
Tbid., p.J53. 
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Powers of the Chief Martial Law Administrator in the history of Martial Law administration) 
on 8 November 1975374, issued the Second Proclamati.on (Seventh Amendment) Order, 1976 
on 28 .May 1976 which provided that 'The . .. .. judges shall be appointed by the President after 
consultation with the Chief Justice. ' 375 
Thus the constitutional provision of consultati~n with the Chief Justice by the President in 
appointing judges to the Supreme Court, removed by the civilian regime of Awami League, 
Was restored by the Martial Law Administration. But the .stipulation ofcon~ulting the Chief 
Justice !n ~ppointing t~e judges of the Supreme Court by the President was destined to 
remain in force only fo~ one year and six months. Pr~sident and Chief Martial Law 
Administrator Ziaur Rahman, who had replaced Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayem as the Chief 
Martial Law Administrator on 29 November 1976 and the President on 21 April 1977, issued 
on 27 November 1977 the Second Proclamation (Tenth Amendment) Order, 1977 which 
restored the method of appointment as had been introduced by the Constitution (Fourth 
Amendment) Act, 1975. As it provided that the 'The .... judges [of the Supreme Court] shall 
be appointed by the President. •376 This provision contained in Article 95(1) is still (20 1 O) in 
the Constitution in view of ratification, confirmation and validation by the Constitution (Fifth 
Amendment) Act, passed by the Parliament on 6 April 1979. 
Thus the President has again been freed from the Constitutional obligation of consulting the 
Chief Justice, who was in the best possible position to assess the probable fitness of the men 
likely to prove successful on the bench, in appointing judges of the Supreme Court. Since the 
President cannot be expected to intimately know the members of the bar and the bench and, 
as such, may be moved by political considerations, it appears that the President's existing 
---
374 ---------
375 Ibid., at p. 135. 
Article 4, The Second Proclamation (Seventh Amendment) Order, 1976 (Second Proclamation Order No TV 
Of 1976) 376 . 
Article 2 The S d p l t' n (1 o•h Amendment) Order, 1977 (Second Proclamation Order No 1 of 1977 , econ roc ama 10 ). 
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Power of appointment, is not circumscribed with safeguards to ensure that appointments of 
judges will be made only with the need ofthe offices i~ view. 
Alt~ough the provision for consultation with the Chief Justice, restored in Article 95 of the 
Consft · 
I ut10n of Bangladesh in 1976, was again deleted in 1977 by the Martial Law regime 
and the deletion was ratified, confirmed and validated by the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) 
Act, 1979, Justice A.B .. M Khairul Huque (as he then was) in August 2005 in Bangladesh 
Italian Marble Works Limited v Government of Bangladesh and others, 377 wqile declaring the 
Constit~tion (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1979 ultra vires to the Constitution, condoned and 
Validated Article 95 as amended incorporating into it the provision regarding consultation 
With the Chief Justice by the Second Proclamation (Seventh Amendment) Order, 1976 which 
had not been in force when the said Fifth Amendment was passed. A he observed: 
we do n~t condone the amendment of clause (1) of Article 95 by the Second Proclamation 
(Tenth Amend~ent) Order, 1977 .... which would amount to revival of Article 95(1) as 
amended by the Second Proclamation (Seventh Amendment) Order, 1976 .... which 
commensurate with that of the original Constitution which reads as follows: 
"95. Appointments of Supreme Court Judges (!) The .... Judges shall be appointed by the 
President after consultation, with the Chief Justice."378 
On appeal, in 201 0 in Khondker De/war Hossain & Others v Bangladesh Italian Marble 
Works Limitecf79 the Chief Justice of Bangladesh, Justice Md. Tafazzul Islam rightly 
observed that the repealed provision of the Second Proclamation (Seventh Amendment) 
Order 1976 concerning consultation with the Chief Justice by the President cannot legally be 
;-----------------------
c 77 3~ CLC (HCD) 200S < http://clcbd.org/judgments/19-constitutional-law/3536-fifth-amendment-to-the-
onstltution -of-bangladesh-j udgment-2005-34-clc-hcd.html>. 
37g 
379 Ibid., at p. 383. · 
The case has not yet been published in the annual Dhaka Law Reports.CJ?~R), which publishes judgments of 
the superior courts namely the High Court Division and the Appellate DIVISion of the Supreme Court of ~angladesh How:ver the Judgment is available at bdnews24.com (Bangladesh ' s first Online Newspaper) < ttp://bdne\~s24.com/{mage/Sth%20Amendment.pdf.> (accessed on 10 December 2010). 
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retained and validated by the High Court Division. As he held that the appointment of judges 
by the President after consultation with the Chief Justice 
as provided by Second Proclamation· (Seventh Amendment Order 1977) was deleted by the 
Second Proclamation (Tenth Amendment) Order, 1977. Accordingly, after the amendment of 
the amended Article 95 by the Second ~roclamation (Tenth Amendment) Order, I 977, Article 
95 as amended by the Second Proclamation Order No. IV of 1976, did no longer exist, and 
therefore, it was not ratified or validated or confirmed by the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly 
this Article 95 as amended by the Second Proclamation Order No. IV of I 976 could not be 
fegally [sic] condoned by the High Court Division as it was not in force on the day the Fifth 
Amendment was passed. More so, a repealed provision cannot be legally [sic] retained and/or 
validated by the Court. So Article 95 will remain as it existed on August 15, 1975.380 
fiowever, although the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator after restoring the 
Provision regarding consultation with the Chief Justice for one and half year (28 May 1 976-
26 November 1977) again abolished it by the Second Proclamation (Tenth Amendment) 
Order from 27 November 1977, then Chief Justice of Bangladesh, Justice Kemal Uddin 
fiossain (February 1978- 11 April 1982), made it public in 1986 in Justice Ibrahim Memorial 
Lecture that he (President Ziaur Rahman) had established the convention of consulting the 
Chief Justice in appointing judges of the Supreme Court.381 In an interview with the author, 
Justice Kemal Uddin Hossain maintained, it was true that his recommendations had not 
always been accepted by President Ziaur Rahman in appointing judges, but it was equally 
true that none was appointed as a judge of the Supreme Court by the President without his 
concurrence.382 It appears that the restoration of Constitutional provision of consulting the 
-----------------------380 Khondker De/war Hossain & Others v Bangladesh Italian Marble Works Limited, 2010, 178-9, available at ~dnews24.com (Bangladesh ' s first Online Newspaper) < http://bdnews24.com/ image/5th%20Amendment.pd.t> 
3:,ccessed on 10 December 2010). . . . 
Justice Kemal Uddin Hossain 'Independent Judiciary in Developmg Countnes' (Speech delivered at the f~stice Ibrahim Memorial Lectur~ Series, University of Dhaka, 1986) at P· 4S. 
lnterview with Justice Kemal Uddin Hossain (Dhaka, 30 August 2008>· 
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Chief Justice by President Sayem and the creation of a convention of consultation with the 
Chief Justice in 1978 after its abolition in 27 Novem~er 1977 were unknown to Justice Syed 
Arn irul Islam of the Supreme Court of ~angladesh when he observed in fune 2001 in S.N 
Go~a ·Adv 383 h 
· nu . ocate v Bangladesh t at: 
This is not true that there is consistent practice and convention regarding consultaticn wit!
1 
the 
Chief Justice in the matter of appointment of Judges of both the Division. It is untrue and a 
misstatement of fact. It was true up to 1974 and since 1975 when the 4rh .Amendment came 
into force the process of consultation was done away [with] and since then until February 
1994 no consultation was made with the Chief Justice while making appointment of Judges in 
both the Divisions .... after the 4th Amendment of the Constitution the President never 
consulted the Chief Justice. The Executive on their own apP,ointed the judges. 384 
But Within a period of one year, it seems that Justice Syed Amirul Islam became aware and 
enlightened about the convention of consulting the Chief Justice by the President in 
appointing judges, though not about the restoration of consultation with the Chief Justice. As 
in 2002 he observed in the State v Chief Editor, Manabjamin & Others385: 
.... but it is, revealed that even after the Fourth Amendment the judges were, appointed in 
consultation with the Chief Justice of Bangladesh even during the Martial Law Regime 
though the matter of consultation was not reflected in the notificatiou .... until February 
1994.386 
----
383 ----------
384 
55 DLR (2003) 392. 
38s Ibid., at pp. 344-5. · · 
31 CLC (HCD) (2002), Part 1 & 2 < http ://c l cbd.org~judgments/18-cnm l n~ l-law/3805-stat~-v.s-ch i et:.editor­
n,anaqjami n-and-others-2002-31-clc-hcdpart-one.html> & < http://clcbd.org/J udgments~ l 8-cnmmal-law/3806-
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A. 2.3. Method of Appointment of Judges Under the Second Martial Law Regime (1982-1986) 
Bangladesh returned to democratic rule on 6 April 1979 at the initiative of President Ziaur 
Rahman when the Martial Law, which had been declared on 15 August 1975, was withdrawn. 
But the civilian governments of Bangl~desh did not last long. For, the President was 
assassinated on 30 May 1981 by a handful of members of the anned forces and the elected 
President Justice Abdus Sattar, who had first succeeded Ziaur Rahman as the acting President 
Under Article 55(1) of the Constitution and then got elected as the President in November 
1981 se~ur!ng a landslide victory, was eased out of power merely four months and four days 
of his election, on 24 March 1982 in a bloodless coup. This time the anned forces were again 
back in the saddl~ under the leadership of the Chief of Army Staff Hussain Mohammad 
Ershad who placed the entire country under Martial Law and the 1972 Constitution was 
suspended. This declaration of Martial Law belied the assertion of the then Prime Minister 
Shah Azizur Rahman made on 2 March 1982 (merely 20 days before the proclamation of 
Martial Law) in the Parliament that there was no possibility of imposing Martial Law in 
Bangladesh as 'democracy has found finn roots in the soil of Bangladesh. ' 387 However, 
General Ershad did not exactly come riding on horseback as a disinterested non-partisan 
saviour of the nation as he, only 12 days after the election of Justice Abdus Sattar as 
President on 27 November 1981 put forward publicly the idea of evolving a mechanism 
through which the Army could share power with civilian government so that the periodic 
coup attempts or pos~ibility of any form of anny adventurism would come to an end.388 
General Ershad was first satisfied with the assumption of the office of the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator with the absolute power of promulgating Martial Law Orders and Regulations 
dealing practically with every organ of the Government. Although he himself took up 'the 
---
387 ---------
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entire executive and legislative authority' 389 eliminating the constitutional process of the 
separation of powers, he did not assume the office of the President of the Country. Justice 
A.F.M Ahsanuddin Chowdhury was SWOf!l in as the 9th President of Bangladesh on 27 March 
1982 with the degrading and ignominious condition that he could 'not exercise any power or 
Perform any function without the advice and approval of the Chief Martial Law 
Administrator. ' 390 
The Proclamation ofMartial Law, issued on 24 March 1982, which provided that the judges 
of the ~upreme Court including .the Chief Justice would continue to function391 , did not 
contain any provision whatsoever regarding the appointment of judges of the Supreme Court. 
But the Proclamation (First Amendment) Order, issued on II April I 982, empowered the 
Chief Martial Law Administrator, not the President of the Country, to appoint the 'Chief 
Justice and other Judges of the Supreme Court . .. from among Advocates of the Supreme 
Court or Judicial officers.' Although the Chief Martial Law Administrator was given the 
Power of appointing judges of the Supreme Court from amongst advocates of the apex court 
or judicial officers irrespective of their length of experience in contravention of 
Constitutional provisions (i.e. at least I 0 years standing practise as an advocate of the 
S . . d. . I f'l': )392 upreme Court or at least 10 years expenence as a JU rcra o 11cer , no advocate of the 
Supreme Court or judicial officer having less than ten years experience was ever appointed 
by the Second Martial Law regime.393 
However, on 1 J December I 983, the Chief Marital Law Administrator H.M. Ershad replaced 
Justice A.F.M. Ahsanuddin Chowdhury as the President of the country allegedly to pave the 
way for the transition from Martial Law to democracy and, as natural consequence of this 
389 
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change, the Chief Martial Law Administrator was substituted by the President as the 
appointing authority of the judges of the Supreme Cou~.394 Thus Lt. General Ershad followed 
the footstep of General Zia-ui-Hoque of .Pakistan, who had first assumed the office of the 
. Chie-f Martial Law Administrator upon ·· seizure of power in July 1977 apparently to 
demonstrate that he was not power hungry, but later. in September 1978 when he felt 
confident enough, took over as the President of the country. 
A. 2. 4. Violation of the Convention of Seniority in Appointing Judges of the Appellate Division 
. . 
Since me· ConstitUtion of Bangladesh does not contain any explicit provision as to the 
appointment of judges of the Appellate Division from amongst the judges of the High Court 
Division, a convention was established not only to appoin! the Judges of the Appellate 
Division from the High Court Division Judges but also to make the appointment on the basis 
of seniority. The convention of following seniority in appointing judges of the Appellate 
Division was consistently followed for about four years from 16 December 1972- 12 August 
I 976. But since 13 August 1976, the convention of seniority has been transgressed at regular 
intervals by successive governments, whether military or civilian. 
A.2.5. Contravention of the Principle of Seniority in Appointing Judges of the Appellate 
Division by the First Martial Law Regime (August 1975- April1979) 
The convention of the principle of seniority in appointing judges of the Appellate Division of 
the Supreme Court from the High Court Division was first violated on 13 August 1 976 when 
President and Chief Martial Law Administrator Justice Sayem elevated Justice Debesh 
Chandra Bhattachari to the Appellate Division superseding the then senior most judge of the 
Bigh Court Division Justice Ruhul Tslam.395 The next civilian regime of the Bangladesh 
394 
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Nationalist Party first headed by President Ziaur Rahman (6 April 1979- 29 May 1981) and 
then by President Justice Abdus Sattar (30 May 1981.- 23 March 1982), did not violate the 
Principle of seniority. 
A.2. 6. Violation of the Principle of Seniority in Elevating Judges to the Appellate Division by 
the Second Martial Law Regime (24 March 1982- November 1986) 
After the declaration of Martial Law on 24 March 1982, the convention of seniority was 
violated on two occasions, in April 1982 and December 1985, in appointi~g judges to the 
Appellate Division from the judges of the High Court Division. Lt. General H.M. Ershad as 
the Chief Martial Law Administrator appointed on 21 April 1982 A.T.M Masud as the judge 
of the Appellate Division bypassing his senior, Justice Mohsin Ali. Then as the President of 
Bangladesh, H.M. Ershad on 26 December 1985, elevated Justice M.H. Rahman and Justice 
A.T.M Afzal to the Appellate Division superseding three senior High Court Division Judges-
Justice A.R.M Amirul Islam Chowdhury, Justice Md. Habibur Rahman (CSP) and Justice 
Abdul Matin Khan Chowdhry.396 
A.2. 7. Breach of the Principle of Seniority in Appointing Judges of the Appellate Division by 
the Civilian Regime of HM Ershad (1986- 1990) 
B.M. Ershad as the civilian President of the country violated the convention of following 
seniority in appointing Justice Mustafa Kamal, a High Court Division Judge, as the Judge of 
the Appellate Division ignoring his two senior fellow colleagues- Justice ARM Amirul Islam 
Chowdhury and Justice Sultan Hossain .Khan.397 
396 
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A.2.8. Violation of the Principle of Seniority In Elevating Judges to the Appellate Division 
During the Civilian Regime of the Bangladesh Nationa_list Party (B. N P) (1991-1996) 
President Abdur Rahman Biswas of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (B.N.P) elevated 
Justice Abdur Rouf to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court bypassing his ::;enior 
colleague Justice ARM Amirul Islam Chowdhury. Justice Amirul Islam Chowdhury was 
again superseded on 8 June 1995 in appointing Justice Ismailuddin Sarkar as the Judge of the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.398 Thus Justice A.R.M Amirul Islam Chowdhury 
Was ign?'re? on four occasions in elevating various junior judges to the Appellate Division-
twice by President H.M. Ershad and twice by President Abdur Rahman Biswas. 
A.2.9. Violation of the Convention of Seniority in Appointing Appellate Division .Judges 
During the Awami League Regime (1996-2001) 
President Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed, a former Chief Justice of Bangladesh (I January 
1990- 31 January 1995), superseded during the civilian regime of the Awami League two 
senior judges of the High Court Division- senior most Justice Md. Mozammel Haque and 
second senior most Justice Kazi Shafiuddin- on three occasions in appointing Justice 
Mahrnudul Amin Chowdhury on 28 June 1999, Justice Kazi Ebadul Haque on 19 January 
2000 and Justice Mainur Reza Chowdhury on 28 November 2000 as judges of the Appellate 
Division ofthe Supreme Court.399 
It seems that both Justice Md. Mozammel Haque and Justice Kazi Shafiuddin were cut down 
to size for their decisions in certain sensitive cases. In November 2000, Justice Md. 
Mozammel Hoque held the preventive detention orders of four leaders of the opposition 
Political party, Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) as illegal and ordered the Awami League 
Government to pay BD Taka four lac (four hundred thousand) as fine to them for 
398;: ----------
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unnecessarily keeping them in preventive custody.400 The same Judge, Justice Mozammel 
Hoque in the contempt case of the Mainul Hose in y Sheikh Has ina Wazecf01 (the Prime 
Minister of the Country) held that: 
We are disposing of three applications for drawing of proceedings of contempt of Court 
against the Honourable Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina with a note of d~sire that the 
Honourable Prime Minister shall be more careful and respectful in making any statement or 
comment with regard to the Judiciary or the judges or the courts o(Bangladesh in future. 402 
. ' 
The oth~r judge, Justice Shafiuddin had to pay a heavy price for giving a decision in 1 995 in 
the Case of Anwar Hossain Khan v Speaker of Bangladesh Sangsad Bhabon and Others403 in 
Which boycotting of eight sessions of the Parliament by the opposition ·members (elected 
from the Awami League) for one hundred and one days from February 1 994 to July 1995 was 
challenged during the regime of the BNP Government (199 1-1 996). Justice Qazi Shafiuddin 
gave direction to the aforesaid abstaining members to attend the Parliament in order to 
Perform and discharge their constitutional functions and obligation respectively. He further 
observed: 
We declare that the salary, emoluments, allowances and other benefits so received by the 
respondents are illegal and unauthorised. The aforesaid illegal and unauthorised receipts of 
salaries, emoluments and allowances by the absentee members of the Parliament without 
leave of the Parliament are recoverable by appropriate authority upon the processes oflaw.404 
Although, Justice Md. Mozammel Hoque preferred to go on quite retirement or, 1 December 
2000, Justice Qazi Shafiuddin, who was supposed to retire on 1 November 2001, preferred to 
resign on 9 November 2000 as a mark of protest against his supersession on three occasions. 
400 • 
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In an interview with one of the national dailies, Justice Shafiuddin claimed that he might had 
been superseded for his decision given against the A~ami League in the Anwar Hossain 's 
Case in 1995 terming their boycotting oft~e sessions of Parliament as illegai.405 
However, President Justice Shahbuddin Ahmed forthe fourth time violated the convention of 
seniority on 10 January 2001 when he appointed Justice 'Rabbani in preference to his senior 
Justice K.M. Hasan and Justice Ruhul Am in: bypassing his senior colleague in the High Comt 
Division, Justice J.R. Mudassir, as the judges of the Appellate Division 6fth0 Supreme Court 
by not a?cepting the then Chief Justice's recommendation that seniority should be respected. 
The appointment of two judges from the second and fourth position oL the list of 
recommendation of four judges406 'disregarding time-honoured and established practice' led 
to an unprecedented protest by mostly the Supreme Court Lawyers belonging to the main 
opposition political party (Bangladesh Nationalist Party (B.N.P)) and 13 senior lawyers ofthe 
Supreme Court. A meeting of senior lawyers and former presidents and secretaries of the 
Supreme Court Bar Association (SCBA) was held at its office on 10 January 2001 with its 
President Barrister Moinul Hosein in the Chair to discuss the situation. It was decided in the 
rneeting to form a new forum - Supreme Council of Lawyers- with Barrister Ishtiaqu Ahmed 
as its Convenor and Dr. Kamal Hossain, Barrister Moinul Hosein, Abdul Malek as well as 
Dr. M. Zahir as its members to 'unite all lawyers to protect the judiciary from interference 
and keep its independence. •407 It was further agreed that the remaining two judges- Justice 
k.M. Hasan and Justice Syed Modassir- of the 'list of senior judges' submitted by the Chief 
Justice be appointed to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. The five member 
Committee headed by a very distinguished and reputed lawyer, Barrister lshtiaque Ahmad, 
405 
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Was given the task of pursuing the matter with the relevant authorities. Accordingly, the 
Committee met President Shahbuddin Ahmed on 13. January 2001 and requested him to 
elevate also the superseded two High C~urt Judges, Justice K.M. Hasan and Justice J. R. 
Mucfassir, to the Appellate Division of the Sup~eme. Court. The President told the five 
lawyers of the Committee that 'the proposal. should have .been given due consideration but he 
has constitutional limitations as he acts on the recommendation of the Prime Minister. •408 But 
the then Prime Minister refused to meet the members of the Committee showing firmness in 
her stand. On 15 January 2001, the then Minister of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs 
. 
made a st~tement before the Parliament stating that the appointment of Judges to the 
Appellate Division ~as not a matter of promotion and, as such, seniority was not the only 
criterion for making the appointment. In appointing judges to the Appellate Division 
competence, knowledge of law and commitment to rule of law were also to be taken into 
account. 
However, the Chief Justice was urged by a group of the Supreme Court lawyers (considered 
as 'pro-opposition' lawyers) not to administer oath to Justice Golam Rabbani and Justice 
Ruhul Amin, elevated to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court from the High Court 
Division superseding two senior Judges. But Chief Justice Latifur Rahman went ahead with 
the scheduled oath taking ceremony which was attended by all the judges of the Supreme 
Court. The ceremony took place on 10 January 2001 at his Chamber instead of the Judges 
Lounge due to the agitation. The judges were confined there for more than two hours by the 
agitating Jawyers. 409 They forced suspension of the Supreme Court's functioning on 1l 
January 2001. A case was filed against 16 'Pro-Opposition' Lawyers including B.N.P law-
408 
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makers Barrister Nazmul Huda, Khandaker Mahbub Uddin Ahmed under the Public Safety 
Act for their involvement on 10 January 's incident at t~e Supreme Court.4 10 
It is _believed that Justice Ruhul Amin wa rewarded for his verdict (although split one) in the 
Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Murder Case as a member of the Death- Reference 
Bench of the High Court Division, while Justice K.M. Hasan, the senior most judge of the 
Bigh Court Division,. was victimised for feeling embarrassed to act as a member of the 
Death-Reference Bench. But the real motive in not elevating Justice K.M. Hasan to the 
Appella!e J?ivision of the Supreme Court was his previous connection with the opposition 
Party (B.N.P) as divulged by the then Prime Minister herself in an address in a public meeting 
at Sitakunda on 17 January 2001 in which she said that the B.N.P. had wanted to appoint their 
former party leader, International Affairs Secretary, and ex-Ambassador, to the Appeilate 
Division and, as such, to politicise the Supreme Court, which have duly been frustrated. 4 11 
Bowever, the appointment of Justice Md. Gholam Rabbani and Justice Md. Ruhul Amin as 
Judges of the Appellate Division in supersession of two oftheir senior colleagues in the High 
Court Division (namely Justice K.M. Hasan and Justice Syed JR Mudassir Hossain) was 
challenged for the first time (by a junior advocate of the Supreme Court and the Secretary 
General of an NGO, the Bangladesh Human Rights Commission) before the High Court 
Division in the Case of SN Goswami, Advocate v Bangladesh.412 Justice Syed Amirul Islam, 
Who delivered the judgment on 3 June 2001 declared the said appointment as lawful. As he 
observed: 
Question of supersession can only arise in a case of promotion to a higher post. In the present 
case we are not concerned with the promotion ofthejudges ofthe High Court Division, to the 
Appellate Division. It is rather the appointment of two new judges in the Appellate Division 
41;:0 ----------
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which is in dispute. An appointment of a judge to the Appellate Division from amongst the 
judges of the High Court Division is not a promot.ion, it is a fresh appointment made by the 
President under Article 95(1) of the Constitution from amongst the qualified persons as 
contained in Sub Article (2) of Article .95 of the Constitution .... The actions of the President in 
the matter of appointment of judges of either Division of this Court are not unfettered in that 
in appointing a person in the judgeship of either Division the precedent condition as laid 
down in Article 95(2) has to be complied with. Once the requirements as laid down in Article 
95(2) are fulfilled and the President acts on the advice of the Prime Minister, this Court 
~~ot cause an inquiry as to the reason of appointing that person as a Judge. It is the absolute 
prerogative of the Executive under the existing provisions of the Constitution though prior to 
th4thA dm h .. th. 4 13 e men ent t e pos1t10n was o erw1se. 
'It is noticeable that the learned Justice himself held that the qualification requirements as laid 
down in Article 95 of the Constitution are equally applicable to both the High Court and 
Appellate Divisions Judges. Thus the Constitution itself has not provided for any specific 
criteria such as number of cases disposed of as the High Court Division Judges demonstrating 
merits and qualities, handling of complex cases particularly involving constitutional issues, 
analytical ability and professional standard which are in higher demand for an Appellate 
Division Judge than a High Court Division Judge. Furthermore, there is no provision for the 
advertisement of vacant posts in the Appellate Division and selection of candidates by a 
judicial committee consisting of majority members from the apex court of the land. 
Therefore, the appointment of judges to the Appellate Division from amongst the High Court 
Division Judges appears to be in essence promotion rather than appointment. 
With regard to the recommendation of the then Chief Justice that all the relevant four judges 
of the High Court Division were equally competent and that seniority should be respected, 
the learned Justice held: 
413'~----------
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Be that as it may, if all the judges were equally competent, the Executive did not commit any 
illegality in choosing any two from the equal four inasmuch as there is no law or 
constitutional provision or convention, requiring the seniors to be appointed.414 
Thu~ it is. evident that the convention of consulting the Chief Justice since 1978, as mentioned 
ea~~ier, was unknown to learned Justice Syed Amirul .Islam. However, he expressed his 
opinion by way of guidance as to the matters to be taken into consideration in appointing a . 
judge ofth~ High Court Division to the Appellate Division thus: 
We _are aware of the opinion that if a judge of this Division is elevated to the Appellate 
Division it should not be on the basis of seniority· alone, rather it should be on the basis of 
seniority-cum-merit. The hard reality is that the quality of the judges of this Division, though 
are of a satisfactory level, all are not equal. Some are more brilliant than others. Thus, if 
seniority be the sole criterion for elevation then the most brilliant may be left behind and the 
less competent may be elevated to the Appellate Division simply because he was appointed a 
judge of this Division at an earlier point of time than the others. This will have the following 
effect on the highest judiciary; firstly, the most brilliant judges may be left behind though 
they could make better contribution to the judiciary. Secondly, if seniority-cum-merit 
becomes the criterion then right after the appointment of a judge in this Division he will do 
his best to improve the quality of his judgment and his overall performance as a judge and 
there will be a sense of competitiveness among the judges in performing their judicial duties. 
This will immensely benefit the nation as a whole and the judiciary in particular and the most 
meritorious will move ahead the less meritorious. The judges of this Division will then leave 
no stone unturned to devote themselves whole-heartedly to the job- day in and day out during 
the tenure of their office.415 
41 4::-------------
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It is very difficult to agree with the above observations of the learned judges. For 
manifestation of merit and its objective assessment .are very difficult to ascertain. If the 
President is to decide the matters, then i~ can be said in the words of Justice Syed Amirul 
Islam who in State v Chief Editor, Manabjamin416 observed that: 
Can the Government, namely, the major litigant, be ju tified in enjoying absolute authority in 
nominating and appointing its arbitrators? The · answer would be in the negative. The 
executive tannot be allowed to enjoy the absolute primacy in the matter of appointment of 
' 
judges as its "royal privilege". ff such a process is allowed to continue, the independence of 
judi~iary will never be attained.417 
Then if the Chief Justice alone is given the task of judging the merits of the judges of the 
Bigh Court Division, again there is the possibility of particularly as apprehended by the same 
judge in the aforesaid case: 
... after all the Chief Justice is a man with all the failings, all the sentiments and all the 
prejudices which we as common people have and therefore we think that the matter should 
not be left in the hands of the learned Chief Justice alone and a better result would be derived 
if the opinion is formed in the matter of appointment of judges in the Full Court Meeting of 
the Supreme Court.418 
Bowever, during the pendency of the SN Goswami Case and 17 days before the 
Pronouncement of the Judgment, on 15 May 2001, Justice Md. Fazlul Karim, who gave 
decision in Bangabandhu Murder Case as the third member of the Death Reference Bench of 
the High Court Division, as mentioned earlier, was elevated to the Appellate Division in 
supersession of three senior judges- Justice K.M. Hasan, Justice Syed JR Mudassir Hossain 
and Justice Abu Sayeed Ahmed- by President Shahabuddin. 
4 16 __________ _ 
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Thus the convention of seniority in appointing judges of the Appellate Division from 
amongst the High Court Division Judges was vi?lated on five occasions during the 
Government of the Awami League and J~stice K.M. Hasan and Justice JR Mudassir became 
the victim of the violation for two times. 
A..2.J 0. Contravention of the Convention of Seniority in Appointing Judges of the Appellate 
Division During the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (B.NP) Regime (2001-2006) 
The B.N.P. Government, which came into power in October 2001 and remained in power till 
October· 2006, adhered to the convention of following seniority in elevating judges to the 
Appellate Division from amongst the High Court Division Judges for about two years. Justice 
K.M. Hasan, who had been superseded twice, was elevated t? the Appellate Division on 20 
January 2002. About two months later, on 5 March 2002, Justice Syed JR Mudassir Hossain 
(Who had also been superseded twice) and Justice Abu Syed Ahmed (who had been bypassed 
once) were appointed to the Appellate Division. Justice Kazi A.T.M Monowaruddin, Justice 
Fazlul Hoque and Justice Md. Hamidul Hoque were also appointed to the Appellate Division 
on 25 June 2002, 17 July 2002 and 29 June 2003 respectively without deviating from the 
Principle of seniority. Therefore, it appears that the B.N.P. regime stood by the convention of 
seniority five times in appointing Appellate Division Judges.41 9 
But the B.N.P. regime departed from the convention of following seniority for the first time 
on 13 July 2003 when Justice MM Ruhul Amin was appointed to the Appellate Division in 
supersession of Justice Syed Amirul Islam who had given judgment in the SN Goswami's 
Case against the seniority rule of elevating judges to the Appellate Division. Justice Syed 
Arnirul Islam was again superseded (for the second time) next month, on 27 August 2003, 
When Justice Md. Tofazzal Islam was appointed as a Judge of the Appellate Division. He was 
41;:9 ----------
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superseded for the third and fourth time while appointing Justice M. A. Aziz and Justice 
Amirul Kabir Chowdhury to the Appellate Division o~ 7 January 2004 and 26 February 2004 
respectively. When Justice M.A. Aziz o~ the Appellate Division was appointed as the Chief 
Election Commissioner on 23 May 2005429, Justice Md. Joynul Abedin succeeded him to the 
Appellate Division superseding his three senior colle~gues- Justice Syed Amirul Islam 
, 
J . 42 1 Ust1ce Md. Hassan Ameen, and Justice A.K. Badrul Hoque. 
Thus it appears that Justice Syed Amirul Islam, who in SN Goswami 's ,Case upheld the 
instanc~ o~ supersession in appointing judges to the Appellate Division ' in the absence of 
constitutional provision or convention [sic]' and maintained that appointment should be made 
on the basis of 'seniority-cum-merit ' which would instil a sense of competitiveness among 
the judges right after their appointments ' in per performing their judicial duties ' , failed to 
make an impression upon the President during the B.N.P. regime on five occasions as (to use 
his own words) ' the most meritorious' judge ' to move ahead the less meritorious' and paid 
back, indeed, in his own coin which might make him realise belatedly that in most cases of 
supersession, appointments of judges to the Appellate Division have been made on political 
considerations or affiliations rather than on merit. 
A.2.JJ. Convention of Seniority in Appointing Judges of the Appellate Division During the 
Present Awami League Regime (January 2009- To Date, 2010) 
The Supreme Judicial Commission in its first meeting held on 16 October 2008, as mentioned 
earlier, recommended four senior most judges of the High Court Division- Justi e Shah Abu 
Nayeem Mominur Rahman, Justice Md. Abdul Quddus, Justice Md. Abdul Aziz and Justice 
Bijan Kumar Das- for filling two vacant posts of judge in the Appellate Division of the 
420 
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Supreme Court. The then Supreme Judicial Commission Member and Supreme Court Bar 
Association's President, presently the Minister for La~, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs of 
the Awami League Government, criticise~ on 17 December 2008 the delay of two months for 
not -appointing judges to posts lying vacant since July 2008. He termed the delay as 
' unfortunate' and liable for non-setting up of two ben_ches of the Appellate Division for 
hearing pending cases resulting in the increase of backlog of cases only to aggravate the 
sufferings of the litigants.422 The same person, after assuming the office of the Minister for 
Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, took another two months to get three, out of the four 
. 
Previously ·recommended High Court Division Judges (as in the meantime on 14 January 
2009 Justice Quddus retired from the service), appointed on 4 March 2009 as the judges of 
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court.423 After increasing the number of posts of 
judges in the Appellate Division of Supreme Court from seven to 1 1 (on 9 July 2009), 
President Zillur Rahman appointed on 14 July 2009 four senior most judges of the High 
Court Division- Justice Bijan Kumar Das, Justice ABM Khairul Haque, Justice Md 
Muzzammel Hossain and Justice Surendra Kumar Sinha- as the judges of the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court.424 
Thus the present regime of the Awami League, which have had the previous track record of 
Violating the convention of seniority in appointing the Chief Justice of Bangladesh and 
Judges of the Appellate Division on numerous occasions, have so far complied with the 
convention of seniority in appointing judges form the High Court Division to the Appellate 
4~~ Ashutosh sarkar, 'Appellate Division running with fewer judges for long', The Daily Star (Dhaka), 18 
December 2008 1 
::; StaffCorres~on.dent, ' SC Appellate Division gets 2 new j~dges ' : The Dai/!' Star (Dhaka), 5 March 2009, I. 
Staff Correspondent, 'SC Appellate Division gets 4 more JUdges ' The Dmly Star (Dhaka), I 5 July 2009, I. 
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Division, perhaps, keeping in mind the present Supreme Court Bar Association's persistent 
and assiduous demand to conform to the principle of se~iority in the 'promotion process. •425 
A.3. Appointment of Judges of the High Court Division . 
The Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972 provides for the appointment of two types of judges-
regular or permanent and additional judges to the High Court Division of the Supreme Court. 
Since the coming into force of the Constitution in December 1972, judges are initially 
appointed to the High Court Division as additional judges for a period of two years and then 
generally th~y are appointed as regular or permanent judges of the High Court Division.426 
Thus additio~al jud.gship has become a gateway for entering the cadre of permanent 
judgeship; in the words of Justice Desai 'Additional Judgeship became an entry door for 
becoming a Judge '427 of the High Court Division although it is not aimed at ' to form a 
training base for recruiting [permanent] judges from the training base to the permanent 
cadre. ' 428 Since an additional judge is appointed initially for a period of two years (which can 
be extended for 'a further period ' and the judge concerned can be appointed as a regular 
judge) on the satisfaction of the President that the number of judges should ' be for the time 
being increased', it cannot be said that he is appointed on probation 'for trying out if he is fit 
to be a permanent judge. •429 Unlike a probationer, who can be sent out any time during the 
Period of probation, the service of an additional judge cannot ordinarily be terminated before 
the expiration of his term. It was the British Government in India, which governed the Indo-
Pak-Bangladesh Subcontinent nearly two hundred years until August 1947, for the first time 
introduced the system of appointing additional judges in the High Courts in the subcontinent 
::: Ashutosh Sarkar, ' SC may get new judges next month ', The Daily Star (Dhaka), 23 December 2010, I. 
4n Article 98, the Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972. 
428 In S.P. Gupta v Union af India, 1981 Supp SC 87 at P· 618. 
429 Justice Fazal Ali, ibid at p. 471. 
Justice Gupta, ibid at p. 347. 
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under the Indian High Courts Act, 1911 430, the Government of India Act, 1915431 , and the 
Government ofindia Act, 1935.432 Although the Consti.tution ofindia, 1949 did not originally 
contain any provision regarding the appoi~tment of additional judges as on the expiration of 
seat on the bench for short period they would have to go back to the bar which would give· 
'them a pre-eminence over their colleagues and embarrasses the subordinate Judges who 
Were at one time under their control and thus instead of helping justice they act as a hindrance 
to free justice, '433 the Constit~tion (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956 incorporated into the 
Constit~tion the p~ovisions concerning the appointment of additional judges.434 In the 1956 
Constitutio~ of Pakista~ (the first Constitution of the Country), there was no provision 
concerning appointment of additional judges in the High Courts and, as such, judges in the 
High Courts initially were appointed permanently. But the I 962 and I 973 Constitutions of 
Pakistan provided for the appointment of additional judges even against the permanent 
Vacancies. 435 
It may be recalled here the original provisions of Article 95(1) of the I 972 Constitution of 
Bangladesh concerning the appointment of judges of the Supreme Court which provided that 
430 
. Section 3 of the Indian High Courts Act, 1911 empowered the Governor-General-in-Council to appoint from 
tlrne to time persons to act as Additional Judges of any High Court for such period not exceeding two years as 
rnay be required 431 • 
Clause (i) of the proviso to subsection (2) of Section 101 of the Government of India Act, 1915 authorised 
the Governor-General-in-Council to appoint persons to act as additional judges of any High Court for such 
Period not exceeding two years as may be required. ~ . h . Section 222(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935 prov1ded fort e appomtment of Additional Judges 
~hus: 'If by reason of any temporary increase in the business of any High Court or by reason of arrears of work 
In any such Court, it appears to the Governor-General that the number of the Judges of the Court should be for 
the tirne being increased, the Governor-General (in his discretion) may, subject to the foregoing provisions of 
this chapter with respect to the maximum number of Judges, appoint persons duly qualified for appointment 
as Judges of the Court for such period not exceeding two years as he may specify.' 433 
Tej Bahadur Sapru said in Indian Constituent Assembly. Quoted in 1981 Supp SCC 87 at 235. 04 fb f . Arnended Article 224 (substituted) provides that '(1) I y reason o any temporary mcrease in the business 
?fa High Court or by reason of arrears of work therein, it appears to .the President that the number of the 
Judges of that Court should be for the time being increased, the President may appoint duly qualified person 
to be Additional Judges of the Court for such period not exceeding two years as he may specify.' s 435 
Article 96 of the 1962 Constitution of Pakistan provided that an Additional Judge could be appointed 
against a permanent vacancy or when a High Court Judge was absent or was unable to perform the functio 
f . h ns o his office due to any other cause or for any reason it is necessary to mcrease t e number of judges of a Hi h 
Court for a period not exceeding two years. These provisions have been reproduced in Article 197 of the 197~ 
Constitution of Pakistan. 
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the other judges of the Supreme Court 'shall be appointed by the President after consultation 
With the Chief Justice.' Thus Article 95(1) deals . with the appointment of regular or 
Permanent judges to both the High Court ~ivision and the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court after consultation between the two very high dignitaries, namely, the President and the 
Chief Justice of Bangladesh. On the other hand, Article 98 ofthe Constitution deals with the 
appointment of the additional judges to the High Court Division and ad hoc judges to the 
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. As Article 98 provides that: 
:~otwithstanding the provisions of Article 94, if the President is satisfied, after consultation 
with the Chief Justice436, that the number of the judges of a division of the Supreme Court 
shOuld be for the time being increased, the President may appoint one or more duly qualified 
persons to be additional judges of that division for such period not exceeding two years as he 
may specify, or if he thinks fit, may require a judge of the High Court Division to sit in the 
Appellate Division for any temporary period: 
Provided that nothing in this article shall prevent a person appointed as an additional judge 
from being appointed as a judge under article 95 or as an additional judge for a further period 
under this article. 
Thus unlike the Indian Constitution as amended in 1956, which provides for two specified 
situations-(i) temporary increase in the business of a High Court and i i) temporary increase in 
arrears of work therein- in which the power of appointing the additional judges by the 
President can be exercised and if neither of the situation is present there can be no question of 
exercising the power437' the Constitution of Bangladesh does not spell out any specific reason 
for the appointment of additional judges to the High Court Division of the Supreme Court; it 
has left the matter on the subjective satisfaction of the President, of course, after mandatory 
436 
The words 'after consultation with the Chief Justice' have been added to Article 98 in pursuance of a 
Proposal moved by a Member of the Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly Debate, vol. 2 (issue 1_ ~~)(Dhaka: Assistant Controller of Publications, 1972), at PP 601-2. 
Supra note 434. 
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consultation with Chief Justice, to the effect that the number of the judges of a division of the 
Supreme Court should be for the time being increased. 
Although the words 'for the time being' -clearly indicate that the increase in the number. of 
. 
judges by appointing additional judges ~ould be for a short period or to deal with a 
temporary situation, the provision for appointment of an additional judge as a regular judge 
or his extension 'for a further period, as contained (unlike the 1949 Indian and 1973 Pakistan 
Constitutions) in proviso to Article 98, may · generate in him the hop~ and legitimate 
expecta!ion while accepting the offer that he would not have to go back on the expiration ,of 
his term; he 'would either get a berth as a permanent judge or reappointed as an additional 
judge for · a further period. Furthermore, this expectation generated in · the minds of an 
additional judge by reason of such a practice, save in rare cases, followed for almost 38 years. 
Since the qualification requirements for the appointment of both the permanent and additional 
judges, as mentioned earlier, are the same and their status (except that an additional judge can 
hold office for the period specified in the warrant of his appointment) as well as functions are 
the same, it seems unjustified to appoint additional judges when there is need to appoint 
Permanent judges and the practice of treating Article 98 as a gateway through which every 
High Court Division judge is required to pass before being appointed as a permanent judge. 
For, an additional judge appointed for two years can hardly be expected to deal with cases, 
Particularly in which the executive is involved, as independently and fearlessly as a 
Permanent judge can be expected; pronouncement of a fair and fearless judgment against the 
executive, which is the largest single litigant before the High Court Division, may cost him 
either appointment as a regular judge or 'for a further period.' Furthermore, a litigant's 
confidence in the impartiality and independence of an additional judge, whose continuance in 
office after the specified period is subject to the will of the executive, is bound to suffer 
thinking that the judge is likely to be biased. Therefore, the system of appointment of 
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additional judges, to use the words of the Montreal Declaration on the Independence of 
Justice, 1983, as pointed out earlier, 'is inconsistent wi.th judicial independence ' and, as such, 
caiJs for phasing out gradually where such appointments exist.438 
However, both Articles 95(1) and 98 of th~ 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh, which provide 
for the general . rules regarding appointments of regular judges and additional judges 
respectively, stipulated the consultation with the Chief Justice of Bangladesh as a 
constitutional imperative in the matter of appointment of judges by the ,President to the 
Suprem~ Court. For, the Chief Justice is best suited and .equipped to know the advocates and 
the judicial officers intimately and assess objectively their legal expertise, soundness, legal 
experience, professional attainment, ability to handle cases, ability to analyse and articulate 
' 
Personal integrity, judicial temperament and firmness in order to select the most suitable 
amongst the best avai lable candidates for appointment as judges of superior court. Sir 
Winston Churchill, former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, aptly said in the House of 
Commons on 23 March 1954 that: 'Perhaps only those who have led the life of a Judge can 
know the lonely responsibility which rests upon him. ' 439 It is the Chief Justice who is 
eminently suited to weigh and evaluate the legal ability, potential capacity, quick thinking, 
integrity, reputation of the person under consideration in legal profession or judicial service 
and, as such, to select 'Daniel to sit in the Solomon 's chair,' the outstanding and meritorious 
judge, in the words of Shakespeare, 'A Daniel come to judgment! yea, a Daniel. ' 440 
During the British rule in the Indian Subcontinent, appointment of judges of the Federal 
Court and the High Courts were in the absolute discretion of the Crown, there was no specific 
Provision in any Jaw for consultation with the Chief Justice in the appointment process. The 
Indian Constitution of 1949 which, as mentioned earlier, after the UK envisaged a scheme of 
:::Article 2.20, the Montreal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, 1983. 
440 Parliamentary (House of Commons) Debates (Hansard), Vol. 525 (1954), at para 1061. 
William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice (london: I.R. for Thomas Heyes), act 4, sc. 1, 1. at pp. 223_4. 
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consultation by the executive with the constitutional functionaries including the Chief Justice 
of India, who are ex hypothesi well qualified to give .expert opinion for appointing the best 
available candidates for appointment as judges of the superior courts. The 1956 and 1962 
Constitutions of Pakistan accepted the Indian scheme of consultation except consultation with 
such of the judges of the Supreme Court and of the High .Courts in the States as the President 
may deem necessary. The 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh accepted consultation with only 
one constitutional functionary- the Chief Justice of Bangladesh~ i!) appointing by the 
President the judges of the High Court Division and Appellate Division of the Supreme 
. 
Court. But it did neither concede primacy to the views of the Chief Justice of Bangladesh nor 
Were . his _views binding on the executive. Furthermore, the framers of tbe Constitution of 
Bangladesh did not discuss and debate the word ' consultation ' in the Constituent Assembly 
from 12 October to 4 November 1972 in connection with the appointment of judges of the 
apex court and the fixing of its parameter.441 
A. 3.1. Lexicon Meaning of Consultation 
In common parlance, consultation, which is used in connection with lawyers or with the 
Physician, or with engineer etc., means seeking opinion or advice or aid or instruction or 
Views of a person by another person on any given topic through correspondence or sitting 
across the table. The dictionary meanings of consultation are: 
1. The action of consulting or taking counsel together .. .. 2. a conference in which the parties 
e.g. lawyers or medical practitioners, consult and deliberate. 442 
. . d . . 443 
.... a meeting for deliberation, dtscusswn or ectswn. 
I. .th I 444 Act of consulting .. .. patient with doctor; c tent wt awyer ... 
~ ~ 
442 The Constituent Assembly Debate, supra note 436, at PP 595- · 
44 Shorter Oxford English Dictionary. . 
3 Webster's Encyclopedia Unabridged Dictionary of the English Language. 
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consult means to seek opinion or advice of another, ... to deliberate together .... to take 
counsel to bring about.445 
In Cmpus Juris Secundum, the word 'consultation' has been defined thus: 
generally as meaning the act of consulting; deliberation with a view to decision; and j udicially 
. 
as meaning the deliberation of two or more persons on some matter; also a council or 
conference to consider a special case. In particular connections, the word has been defined as 
meaning a conference between the counsel engaged in a case, to discuss ,its question or to 
~ange the method of conducting it, the accepting of the services of a physician, advising him 
f ' d . . "d fr h" 446 o one s symptoms, an rece1vmg a1 om 1m. 
A.3.2. Judicially Inte1preted Meaning of Consultation 
However, the word ' consultation ' has been judicially interpreted in various cases in different 
jurisdictions. Justice K. Subba Rao of the Madras High Court interpreted the word 'consult' 
in general and specific (i.e. in the public authority context) senses in R. Pushpam v State of 
Madras. 447 As he observed: 
The word 'consult' implies a conference of two or more persons or an impact of two or more 
minds in respect of a topic in order to enable them to evolve a correct, or at least, a 
satisfactory solution. Such a consultation may take place at a conference table or through 
correspondence .. .. It is necessary that the consultation shall be directed to the essential points 
and to the core of the subject involved in the discussions .. .. A consultation may be between an 
uninformed persons and an expert or between two experts. A patient consults a doctor; a 
client consults his lawyer; two lawyers or two doctors may hold consultations between 
themselves. In either cases the fmal decision is with the consultor, but he will not generally 
ignore the advice except for good reasons. So too in the case of a pubic authority. Many 
444 
445 Black's Law Dictionary. 
446 Words and Phrases- Permanent Edition. 
Corpus Juris Secundum Vol 16-A, at p. 1243. 447 ' . 
AIR 1953 Mad 392 . 
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instances may be found in statutes when an authority entrusted with a duty is directed to 
perform the same in consultation with another authority which is qualified to give advice in 
respect of that duty. It is true that the final order is made and the ultimate responsibility rests 
• with the former authority. But it wil) not, and cannot be, a performance of duty if no 
consultation is made, and even if made, is only in formal compliance with the provisions. In 
either case the order is not made in compliance with the provision of the Act.448 
Thus the essence of Justice K Subba Rao contention is that in cases of consultation between 
' 
an unin~ormed pe~son and an expert or between two experts or between a public authority 
and another ·authority, the final decision will lie with the consultor although it is expected that 
he will not generally ignore the consultee's advice except for good reasons. 
In the same vein, Justice Ahmadi of the Indian Supreme Court defined consultation in 
Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Asso~iation v Union of India449 thus: 
The word "consult" as understood in ordinary parlance means to ask or seek advice or the 
views of a person on any given subject i.e. to take counsel from another, but it does not 
convey that the consultant is bound by the advice. In certain situations an expert in the field 
may be consulted but it is only to help the consultant take a final decision. But consulting 
even an expert the consultant does not mortgage his decision, the advice given is only an 
input among the various factors which enter decision making. He may consult one or more 
experts and he may accept the advice he considers most acceptable or rational but he is 
always free to reach his own conclusion. It is ultimately his responsibility to reach a sound 
decision and he is accountable for the same.450 
448 
Ibid. 
449 (1993) 4 sec 441 450 . 
Ibid., at p. 622. 
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But in Port Louis Corpn v Attorney-General, Mauritius451 , the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council observed: ' consultation .... is not a one ~ay process but a two way process .... 
The requirement of consultation is never :o be taken perfunctorily or as a mere formality. ,452 
Similarly Justice Webster in R. V Secretary of State for Social Service, ex parte Association 
of Metropolitan Authorities453 observed: ' ..... the essence <?f consultation is the communication 
of a genuine invitation [with sufficient information] to give [helpful] advice and a genuine 
consideration of that advice .... ' 454 
A.3.3. :Judicial Interpretation of Conventional Consultation with the Chief Justice in 
Bangladesh 
The Supreme Court of Bangladesh did not have any occasion to interpret the word 
'consultation' with the Chief Justice by the President so long it was mentioned in Article 
95(1) in connection with the appointment of puisne judges ofthe Supreme Court (comprising 
of the High Court Division and Appellate Division) and in Article 98 in the context of 
appointment of additional judges in the High Court Division. In January 1975, the 
Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, which is considered as a draconian amendment as it 
introduced basic and crucial changes in the Constitution, deleted the provision of consultation 
With the Chief Justice by the President from the aforesaid Articles in appointing judges to the 
Supreme Court; the amended provision read: 'The .... Judges shall be appointed by the 
President. •455 Thus this amended method became completely identical with that of the 
method of appointment provided for by the Government of India Act, 1935 regarding the 
appointment of Federal Court judges during the British Raj in India. As it was provided that: 
'every Judge of the Federal Court shall be appointed by His Majesty by warrant under the 
451 
45 1965 AC 1111 (PC). 2
1bid. 
453 
45 (1986) 1 All ER 164. 
45: Ibid., at p. 167. , . 
Amended Article 95(1), the Constitution of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, 1972. 
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Royal Sign Manual. '456 Thus like the Crown during the British Raj in India, the President of 
Bangladesh was given absolute discretion to make judicial appointment without any kind of 
limitation. As to the implication of this sort of arrangement Dr. B. R. Ambedkar said in the 
Indian Constituent Assembly that it is 'dangerous to leave the appointments to be made by 
the President, without any kind of reservation or limit~tion, that is to say, merely on the 
advice of the executive of the day. ' 457 For, neither the President can generally be e 'pected to 
have knowledge about the professional attainment, legal acumen, integrity, temperament and 
suitability of those advocates/judicial. officers functioning within the judicial sphere from 
. 
Whom he c·an select the right person for appointment as judges nor can it be ensured that in 
assessing their worth and fitness, political bias or personal favouritism play any part in the 
appointment of judges. It should also be stressed here that th~ provision of consultation with 
the Chief Justice by the President in appointing additional judges to the High Court Division, 
Was also done away with from Article 98 by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1 975 
and, as such, he has been given unrestricted authority to appoint additional judges on the 
advice of the Prime Minister. However, the constitutional provisions of consulting the Chief 
Justice by the President in appointing judges of the Supreme Court, dispensed with by the 
civilian regime ofthe Awami League, was restored by the Martial Law regime (1975-1979) 
on 28 May 1976. But prior consultation with the Chief Justice by the President as an essential 
Prerequisite lasted only one and a half year as in November 1977 the appointment of judges 
of the Supreme Court in Bangladesh was again made a matter of pleasure vested in the 
President liberating him from mandatory obligation of consulting the Chief Justice. 
But the convention of consulting the Chief Justice in appointing judges of the Supreme Court 
' 
as mentioned earlier, was established in 1978 by the then President and Chief Martial Law 
Administrator Major-General Ziaur Rahman. Later on, this convention of consulting the 
456 
Section 200(2) the Government of India Act, 1935. 
457 ' 
Quoted in (1993) 4 sec 441, at p. 563. 
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Chief Justice was later on observed although the matter was not reflected in the Bangladesh 
Gazette Extraordinary relating to the appointment of ~udges of the Supreme Court. But it is 
difficult to accept the mere assertion of l~arned Justice Md. Abdul Matin (without showing 
any -authority) who in Bangladesh and Justice Syed Md Dastagir Hossain v Md Idrisur 
Rahman, Advocate458, held that: 'This convention was h?wever breached by the executive in 
1994 when 9 Additional Judges were appointed to the High Court Division without 
consultation with the Chief Justice. ' 459 For, the 1982 (i.e. Second) Martial Law Regime of Lt. 
' 
Genera.! J:Iussain M. Ershad could hardly be expected to observe the convention of cons~lting 
. 
the Chief J~stice in appointing the judges of the Supreme Court as he (Ershad), unlike the 
1975 Martial Law Regime, suspended the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh460, assumed as 
the Chief Martial Law Administrator not only the legislative but also the executive authority 
(Which should have · been given to the President) including the power to appoint the Chief 
Justice, permanent judges and additional judges 'from among Advocates of the Supreme 
Court or judicial officers' 461 irrespective of their length of experience (contrary to the 
Constitutional requirement of the Supreme Court advocates having at least 10 years standing 
Practice or judicial officers having not less than 10 years experience) and to remove the 
Supreme Court judges 'without assigning any reason ' 462 (contrary to constitutional provision 
for removal by the President on the recommendation ofthe Supreme: Judicial Council on the 
grounds of proved misbehaviour or incapacity). Furthermore, unlike Chief Justice 
Kemaluddin Hussain (appointed as the Chief Justice by the First Martial Law Regime headed 
by Major General Ziaur Rahman in February 1978), who disclosed in Ibrahim Memorial 
Lecture in 1984 about the establishment of convention of consultation, Chief Justice F. K. M. 
A. Munim, who replaced Justice Kemaluddin Hussain on 1 1 April 1982 in pursuance of the 
458 
459 38 CLC (AD) 2009. 
460 Ibid., at para 182. 
The Proclamation of Martial law, 24 March 1982. 461 
The Proclamation (First Amendment) Order, 11 April1982. 
462 lb' I d. 
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enactment of a new provision fixing the tenure of the Chief Justice at three years irrespective 
of attaining or not attaining the retirement age of 65 ~ears463, never said anything about the 
continuance of the convention of consul.ting the Chief Justice in appointing judges of the 
Supreme Court by the Chief Martial L~w Administrator. It is very pertinent to mention here 
that it is the same Chief Martial Administrator H. M. _Ershad who on II December 983 
Inally replaced his appointee Justice A. F. M. Ahsanuddin Chowdhury as the President of the 
Country, the Chief Martial La Administrator was substituted for the President as the 
appoin.ting anti removal authority of the judges of the Supreme Court.464 
However, it is striking that the non-observance of the convention of consulting the Chief 
j Istice in appointing additional j udges to the High Court Division on 2 February 1994 by the 
hesident was ti)r the first time made a contentious issue by the then Chief Justice 
Shahabuddin Ahmed himself in the Annual Conference of the Bar Council, held on 3 
February 1994, when he apprised the gathering in his inaugural address tha. he had been ' Mr. 
Nobody' in the matter of appointment of the said nine judges of the Supreme Court. The 
Conference adopted a resolution unanimously disapproving the appointment of these judges 
and demanded the cancellation of the relevant gazette notification. Furthermore, the Chief 
Justice was requested not to administer oath to the newly appointed Judges.465 Moreover, 'on 
----------------------463 Ibid. 
464 
H.M. Ershad as the Chief Martial Law Administrator appointed from January to July 1983 four additional 
judges to the High Court Division ofthe Supreme Court (of which one was Joint Secretary of the Ministry of 
Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs and another three were Advocates of the Supreme Court) for a term of 
two years. (The Bangladesh Gazette Extraordinary, 17 January 1983 No. JIV/1H-1/83/50), 20 July 1983 (No. 
4351G)). After assuming the office of Presidem, he in ~ec~m~er 1983 appointed three Deputy Attorney-
Generals, one advocate ofthe Supreme Court and one d1stnct JUdge, altogether five, as the additional judges of 
the High Court Division for a period of two years. (Ibid., 29 December 1983). In May 1984, he appointed three 
additional judges (of which one District Judge, one advocate of the Supreme Court and o~e Deputy Attorney-
General) [Ibid., 29 May 1984.], in July 1985 one (an advocate ofthe s.uprem~ Court) and m December 1985 two (one district judge and one advocate of the Supreme .court) as the addJ.tJOnal Judge~ ?~the High Court Division 
?fthe Supreme Court. It seems that the decentralisatJOn of the (one) H1gh Court D1v1s1on and establishment of 
Its new seven permanent benches [Notification No. s .. R. 0 175-L/82, ~June 1982, Notifications of 7 July 1983, 3 August 1983 and 27 December 1983] outside the cap1tal Dhaka to b.nng the apex ~ourt to the door-step of the 
~ommon men for obtaining prompt justice at lesser expenses necessitated the appomtment of 15 additional 
Judges. 
465 
The Daily Star (Dhaka), 5 February 1994. 
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3rd ofFebruary, a Full Court Meeting consisting of all the judges of both the Divisions ofthis 
Court [the Supreme Court] unanimously resolved .authorising the Chief Justice not to 
administer oath to the newly appointed. judges. '466 Accordingly, the Chief Justice, after 
consultation with all other judges of the Supreme Court, deferred the swearing to the newly 
appointed nine Judges for two days so that the Preside!lt and the Prime Minister could .be 
approached to resolve the matter. A delegation of senior and prominent members of the 
Supreme Court Bar met the then · President Abdur Rahman Biswas, and Prime Minister 
' 
Begum. Khaleda Zia and requested them not to violate the convention of consulting the Chief 
Justice in the matter of appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court established by their late 
leader President Ziaur Rah~an. They responded by cancelling the earlier Gazette Notification 
regarding the appointment of the nine judges. On 9 February. 1994, the President appointed 
nine additional judges of the High Court Division after consulting the Chief Justice, dropping 
two of the original nine names (one of them was the then Law Secretary who hailed from the 
Village of the Chief Justice) and replacing them with two new names (Md. Hamidul Haque 
and MM Ruhul Amin). The new notification for the flTst time, as an official recognition of 
the convention of consultation with the Chief Justice, spoke about the appointment of the 
j udges to the High Court Division by the President in consultation with the Chief Justice.467 
In June 2001, the nature, binding force and primacy of constitutional consultation was for the 
first time examined by Justice Syed Amirul Islam in S. N Goswami, Advocate v 
Bangladesh. 468 As he held that: 
466 Justice Amirul Islam in State v Chief Editor, Manabjamin, 3 I CLC (HCD) (2002), Part 2, para 222 
http://c 1 cbd.org/j udgm ents/ l8-crim i na l-Jaw /3 806-state-vs-chief-edi tor-mana ~j am in-and-others-2002-3 1 -cJ c-
hcdpart-two. htmJ (accessed on 10 December 2010). 
467 Notification S/R.O. No. 54- Law/94, Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs (People's Republic of 
~:ngladesh), Justice Section-4, 9 February 1994. 
Supra note 412. 
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In making appointment of a Judge of the Supreme Court the President is under no obligation, 
legal or constitutional, to consult Chief Justice.... after the 4th Amendment of the 
Constitution .... [The] conventional consultation ... has no binding force, for it is not a rule of 
law. This sort of consultation cannot have primacy.469 
B t h h ''Ed Lr b . . 470 h" h u · t e same Justice · in 2002 State v C ie1 J itor, lVla_na yamm , w tc was a Criminal 
Miscellaneous Contempt Case (of 2000) concerning a news item published in the newspaper 
as to whether that undermined the authority of the Supreme Court, entered into an uncalled .. 
' 
for aca_dymic discussion as to the importance of consulting the Chief Justice in appointing 
judges .to the_ Supreme Court. As he observed that 
The concept of lndependence of j udiciary cannot be ensured unless the exclusion of the final 
say of the Executive in the matter of appointment of judges is done away .... and to find out 
the suitable persons for such appointments the expertise for that purpose is only available 
with the judiciary .... the process of consulting the Judiciary is to enable the appointments to 
be made of persons not merely qualified to be Judges, but also those who would be the most 
appropriate to be appointed, then the said purpose would be defeated if the appointing 
authority is left free to take its "our final" decision by ignoring the advice of the judiciary .. .. 47J 
Then in defining the nature and binding effect of consultation, Justice Amirul Islam used the 
Words which are exact reproduction (without acknowledging the author) of the obstrvations 
of Justice Kuldip Singh in Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v Union of 
India. 472 As tie held: ' The "consultation", therefore, is between a layman (the Executive) and 
a specialist (the judiciary). It goes without saying that the advice of the specialist has a 
469 lb' Jd. 
470 
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binding effect. '
473 
He further laid down the manner in which the Chief Justice should form 
his opinion which shall have primacy: 
we are of the firm conviction that in .the matter of appointment of judges of the High Court 
Division of this Court a prior consultation with the Full Court ["Meeting of all the Judges of 
the s 'upreme Court"] is a· must and their opinion must have· a primacy and be finding on the 
Executive ... . Therefore the consultation with the judiciary is not only mandatory but the 
Executive is bound by the advice given in the process of consultation b y the Chief Justice on 
recommendation of the Full Court.474 
Justice Amirul Isl~rri summarised his views regarding the matter of consultation w ith the 
Chief Justice in the matter of appointment of judges of the Supreme Court thus: 
In conclw;ion we wouJd like to say our social needs dictate: 
Like the Pope, enjoying supremacy in the ecclesiastical and temporal affairs, the resolution of 
the Full Court being the highest judicial opinion, has a Tight of primacy, if not supremacy to 
be recorded, affairs concerning the highest judiciary .... a right step .... that... alone will ensure 
optimum benefits to the society by ensuring rule of law. 475 
This like the majority view in the case of the Supreme Court Advocates-on Record 
Association v Union of Jndia476, Justice Amirul Islam held that the opinion of the Chief 
Justice must have a primacy. But unlike the majority view in that case, in which the Chief 
Justice was required to form his opinion in consultation with two senior most judges of the 
(Indian) Supreme Court477, he observed that the Chief Justice, who according to him (in fact, 
the words are of Dr. B. R. Ambedkar who said in a debate on the judiciary in the Constituent 
Assembly), ' is a man with all the failings, all the sentiments and all the prejudices which we 
473 
474 See for comparison ibid. at p. 165 and supra note 471. 
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as common people have and therefore we think that the matter should not be left in the hands 
of the learned Chief Justice alone. '478 The Chief Justi~e is required to form his opinion in the 
matter of appointment of judges in the Fu~l Court Meeting of the Supreme Court- the meeting 
of a-ll the judges of the High Court Division and Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. 
The learned Justice failed to appreciate . that, unlike . the Indian Constitution, the word 
'consultation ' has deliberately be~n omitted twice from Articles 95(1) and 98 of the 
Bangladesh . Constitution. Therefore, to interpret the· conventional consultation to mean that 
the Chief Justice's opinion in the matter of appointing judges of the Supre~e Court is to be 
formed . in ·the full meeting of the. Supreme Court and the opinion thus formed must have 
Primacy tantamount to rewriting these two Articles. It seems that to indulge in interpreting an 
important constitutional issue out of the way and collaterally.is a sheer judicial activism. As 
the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in Kudrat-E-Elahi Panir v Bangladesh479 observed: 
the ... decision .... made on hypothetical facts .. . as a rule, the Courts always abhor. The Court 
does not answer merely academic question but confines itself only to the point/points which 
are strictly necessary to be decided for the disposal of the matter before it. This should be 
more so when Constitutional questions are involved and the Court should be ever discreet in 
such matters. Unlike a civil suit, the practice in Constitutional cases has always been that if 
the matter can be decided by deciding one issue only no other point need be decided.48o 
To the same effect, Thomas M. Cooley more forcefully said: 
the courts ... . will not go out of their way to find such topics [i.e. constitutional questions]. 
They will not seek to draw in such weighty matters collaterally nor on trivial occasions. It is 
both more proper and more respectable to a coordinate department to discuss constitutional 
questions only when that is very lis mota. Thus presented and determined, the decision carries 
478 
479 Supra note 472. 
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a weight.... In any case, therefore, where a constitutional question is raised, though it may be 
legitimately presented by the record, yet if the record also presents some other and clear 
ground upon which the court may rest its judgment, and thereby render the constitutional 
. . 
question immaterial to the case, the .court will take that course and leave the question of 
constitutional power to be passed upon when a case arises which cannot be otherwise 
disposed of, and which consequently renders a decision upon such question necessary.48J 
However, ulti.r,nately in March 2009, Justice Md. Joynul Abedin of the Appellate Division of 
the Supreme Court in Bangladesh and Justice Syed Md Dastagir Hossain v Md Idrisur 
Rahmah, Advocates and others482 the observatio~ of Justice Syed Amirul Islam, that in the 
matter ofappointment of judges to the superior judiciary the opinion of the judiciary 
expressed through the Chief Justice of Bangladesh has pri~acy, terming it as a.n unsound 
Proposition of Jaw.483 
In Md Idrisur Rahman, .Advocate and others v Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and 
Parliamentary Affairs, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh484 the non-
appointment of ten additional judges by the President as permanent judges to the High Court 
Division of the Supreme Court despite favourable recommendation of the Chief Justice was 
challenged. Justice Md. Abdur Rashid of the Special Bench (consisting of three learned 
Judges) while issuing direction on 17 July 2008 to the Government to appoint them (ten 
additional judges), as permanent judges (later on appeal, it was overruled), observed that: 
'Absence or omission of the requirement for consultation with the Chief Justice could not be 
pleaded as a defence of any arbitrary exercise of power of appointment.... of Judges in the 
481 
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Supreme Court' 485 and, that, 'Existence of guidel ines or norms of general application 
excludes any arbitrary exercise of discretionary powers. '486 Therefore, Justice Md. Abdur 
Rashid arrived at 12 conclusions as to the norms and process for appointment and non-
appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court of which six are relating to consultation with the 
Chief Justice of Bangladesh by the President in the matte: of appointment of regular judges to 
the High Court Division and Appellate Division, and four are concerning consultation in the 
context of appointment or non-appointment of an additional judge to the High Court Division 
of the Supreme Court. The six guidelines as to the import and scope of con~ultation with the 
Chief J~siice in the matter of appointment of regular judges of the Supreme Court are: 
(ii) the opinion of the Chief Justice of Bangladesh in the matter of appointment of Judges to 
the Supreme Court is entitled to have the primacy; 
(iii) in case of appointment to the High Court Division, the Chief Justice shall consult with 
two senior most Judges of the Appellate Division and equal number of Judges of the High 
Court Division to form his opinion and he shall also consult senior members of the Supreme 
Court Bar and the Attorney-General; and in the case of appointment of Judges to the 
Appellate Division, he shall consult with thre~ senior-most Judges of the Appellate Division 
to form his opinion; 
(iv) the President or the Government shall have no right to directly initiate the process for 
appointment of Judges to the Supreme Court bypassing the Chief Justice of Bangladesh b·Jt 
the President/ Government shall have the right of suggesting the names of suitable candidates 
for consideration of the Chief Justice for appointment to the Supreme Court; 
(v) the non-appointment of anyone recommended, on the ground of unsuitability, must be for 
good reasons, disclosed and conveyed to the Chief Justice with the reasons, materials and 
485 
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information to enable him to reconsider and withdraw his recommendation. If the Chief 
Justice after consultation with the above Judges in respect of particular appointments in the 
Division concerned, does not fmd it necessary to withdraw and again recommended, then the 
President must adhere to such recommendation; 
(vi) the President as a rule shall accept the reco_mmendation of the Chief Justice for 
appointment of Judges. If the recommendation of the Chief Justice for appointment or non-
appointment of any person as a Judge either to the High Court or the Appellate Division could 
not be accepted by the Government, it carmot outright, reject such recom'mendation and· go 
ahead with app.ointment of persons of its own choice. The Government in such case shall send 
the recommendation back to the Chief Justice for reconsideration on the reasons supported by 
materials and information conveyed by the Government; 
(vii) after consideration of the reasons of the Government along with the materials and the 
information conveyed, the Chief Justice may withdraw his recommendation. But if he again 
recommends the same recommendation after consultation with the aforesaid senior-most 
Judges of the Appellate Division for appointment, the Government shall be obliged to 
f . t 487 complete the process o appomtmen . 
The following four norms deal with the import of consultation in the frame of reference to 
appointment or liOn-appointment of an additional judge: 
487 
(viii) appointment or non-appointment of an Additional Judge as Judge under Article 95 of 
the Constitution by the executive disregarding the recommendation of the Chief Justice 
violates the Constitution; 
(ix) when the executive may not accept such recommendation of the Chief Justice for reasons 
to be recorded, it may request the Chief Justice for reconsideration on the materials and 
information conveyed; 
Ibid., at para 152. 
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(x) the Chief Justice shall then reconsider the case on the materials and information furnished 
' 
and if after such reconsideration, he again recommends for appointment or non-appointment 
' 
the executive would be left with no choice but to complete the process of appointment of such 
an Additional Judge on the basis of such recommendation; 
(xi) after successful conclusion of the period under ~cle 98, an Additional Judge acquires 
legitimate expectation and ·he becomes entitled to be considered for appointment under 
Article 95 of the Constitution in the absence of positive valid reason(s) to be recorded by the 
Executive. 488 
Thus Justice Abdur Rashid accorded primacy to the opinion of the Chief Justice of 
Bangladesh in the matter of appointment of judges to the Supreme Court, w hich seems to be 
tricky as there are no other constitutional functionaries menti6ned in Articles 95(1) and 98 of 
the Constitution over whose opinions the opinion of the Chief Justice shall have primacy. In 
fact, he might have meant that the President would be bound by the opinion of the Chief 
Justice. Thus the exclusive power ofthe President to appoint judges of the Supreme Court as 
' royal privilege' has virtually been taken away to maintain the cardinal feature of 
independence of judiciary so that no appointee judge bears a particular stamp for the purpose 
of changing the cause of decisions 'bowing to the dictate of his appointing authority.' The 
Chief Justice was required to form his opinion by stifling his individual voice, in case of 
appointment to the High Court Division consultation not only with two senior most judges of 
the Appellate Division and two judges of the High Court Division but also with senior 
members of the Supreme Court Bar and the Attorney General. Thus the element of plurality 
in the formation of opinion of the Chief Justice is to be achieved not only by obtaining the 
views of two senior most judges of each of the two Divisions of the Supreme Court but also 
With one or more from the ' broad band ' of members of the Supreme Court Bar and the 
488 
Ibid. 
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principal law officer of the Government, the Attorney General. In neither of the Indian 
Supreme Court 's decision in the Supreme Court Advocates-on Record Assn v Union of 
lndia
489(the Second Judges 'Case) and Specia/Re/ erence No. I of 199g490(the Third Judges' 
Case), to which Justice Abdur Rashid adhered to in formulating his norms, the Chief Justice 
Wa,s required to travel beyond the four corners of the Supreme Court, i.e. fellow judges of the 
Court, in the. formation of his opi.nion ·as an ' inbuilt check against his likelihood of 
arbitrariness or bias, even subconsciously.' However, in case of appointment of judges to the 
Appellate Division, the zone of consultees has not been so stretched out; th~ Chief Justice in 
forming his opinion was required only to consult three senior most judges of the Appellate 
Division. Thus it is evident that the Special Bench of three judges did not ~eep in mind that 
the right conferred on the Chief Justice by Article 95(1) and 98 of the Constitution of 
Bangladesh to be consulted in the matter of appointment of judges of the Supreme Court by 
the President has deliberately been dispensed with twice- first on 25 January 1975 and after 
its restoration in May 1976 again on 27 November 1977 and even in the original Articles 
there was no provision for plurality of consultation by the Chief Justice in the formation of 
his opinion. Thus, there is hardly any scope of giving such a wide the connotation to ex gratia 
or conventional consultation with the Chief Justice in appointing judges of the apex court. 
Unlike the Indian and Pakistani Supreme Courts, which interpreted constitutional 
consultation (mentioned in Articles 124(2) and 217(2) of the 1949 Indian Constitution and 
Articles 177 and 193 of the 1973 Pakistani Constitution) in SP. Gupta v Union of lndia49 l, 
Supreme Court Advocates-on Record Assn v Union of lndia492, Special Reforence No. 1 of 
1998493 and Al-Jihad Trust v Federation of Pakistan494 respectively, the Supreme Court of 
489 
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Bangladesh has interpreted consultation which is no longer a star of the Constitution of 
Bangladesh. Accordingly, on appeal in Bangladesh and Justice Syed Md Dastagir Hossain v 
Md Idrisur Rahman, Advocates and others495, Justice Joynul Abedin of the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh has rightly struck down those norms as they 
have not been deduced on construction of the provisions of Articles 95 and 98 of the 
Constitution. As he observed that: 
The learned Judges ofthe Special Bench have laid down as many as .l2 norms or guideli.nes 
' 
. describing them as conclusions for appointment and non-appointment of Judges to the 
Supreme Court. These are guidelines in the guise of norms intended to be followed as legal 
principles by the Government for making appointment. But these norms or guidelines cannot 
partake the character of Jaw as they are not discernj?Je within the parameter of the 
Constitution. It would therefore be hazardous to lay down any such guidelines in this behalf 
as they are rut by Article 65 of the Constitution inasmuch as these guidelines are not deduced 
on construction of the relevant provisions of the Constitution, namely Articles 95 and 98. lt 
would also not be wise to attempt laying down guidelines on one's impressions about the 
working of the selection and appointment process. These norms are therefore disapproved and 
struck-down as erratic and illegal being contrary to the scheme of the Constitution.496 
Another Judge, Justice Abdul Matin, who delivered the main judgment of the Court, also did 
not approve norms (i) and (iii) to (xi) (relating to the procedure of appointment of judges), 
Norm (ii), which provided that 'the opinion of the Chief Justice of Bangladesh in the matter 
of appointment of judges to the Supreme Court is entitled to have primacy', was approved 
'with modification that the opinion of the executive will have dominance in the matter of 
495 
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antecedent of the candidate only. '497 The short order of the Court (passed on 2 March 2009) 
elaborates the matter thus: 
In the matter of selection ofthe Judg~s the opinion of the Chief Justice should be dominant in 
he area of legal acumen and suitability for the appointment and in the area of antecedents the 
opinion of the executive should be dominant. Toget~er, the two should function to md out 
the most suitable candidates available for appointment through a transparent process of 
consultation. 498 
Maintaining that the convention of consultation with the Chief Justice for appointment of 
judges in the superior judiciary 'has been faidy en·grained in Articles 95 and 98 of the 
Bangladesh Constitution'499, and 'should be taken to be imperative ' 500 Justice Md. Joynul 
Abedin shed futher light on the nature, significance and object of consultation with the Chief 
Justice thus: 
.... the President.... and the Cruef Justice of Bangladesh shall have full and conclusive 
deliberation as to the qualification of a candidate for judgesrup to the superior Judiciary .... they 
may consult each other by correspondence or by sitting across the table .... The Chief Justice is 
the most competent person to evaluate the merit and efficiency of a person recommended for 
the judgesrup. The President namely the executive is the proper authority who through the 
executive agency available to him may be able to report about the local position of the person 
proposed for judgesrup, his character and integrity, his affiliations and the like which have a 
considerable bearing on the working of a person proposed for appointment as a Judge. It 
cannot be said that the Chief Justice has been given any position of primacy or supremacy 
between him and the President. Though the opinion of the Chief Justice as pateifamilias, head 
497 
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of the Judiciary, is entitled to great respect and weight the President is not bound by the 
opinion of the Chief Justice. 501 
Thus the short order of the Supreme Cou~ and the observation of Justice Md. Joynul Abed in 
hav~ given the conventional courtesy of consultation with the Chief Justice an appropriate 
and apposite interpretation following the decision of the _Pakistan Supreme Court in Al-Jihad 
Trust's Case502; the President is not bound to act according to the views ofthe Chief Justice. 
That does not mean his opinion, articulated as the 'most competent and well equipped' 
Person, can be brushed aside as a hollow formality. The Chief Justice's opinion is entitled to 
carry great weight. As the Supreme Court's short order of 2 March 2009 given in the case of 
Bangladesh and Justice Syed Md Dastagir Hossain v Md ldrisur Rahman, Advocates and 
others
503
, speaks of according the opinion of the Chief Justice due wcightage in the area of 
legal acumen and suitability and of the President in the area of antecedents. Thus a consensus 
oriented decision is to be arrived at so that 'the most suitable candidates available' could be 
found for appointment as Judges of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. This interpretation of 
consultation, by not replacing it with 'concurrence ' or 'consent', can be considered as a fair 
and balanced interpretation of the word in view of the fact that the words 'concurrence' and 
'consent' were known to the Constitution-makers when they deliberately preferred to use the 
Word ' consultation' to them in original Article 95(1) and 98 of the 1972 Constitution of 
Bangladesh. For, they did not intend to vest in the Chief Justice of Bangladesh the power of 
having the final say regarding the matter of judicial appointment. 
As to Norm iii which deals with the formation of opinion by the ChiefJustice of Bangladesh 
regarding the matter of appointment of judges of the Supreme Court in consultation with a 
'collegium', Chief Justice M.M. Ruhul Am in rightly disagreed with such a concept thus: 
SOl 
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We did not agree with the learned Judges of the High Court Division that there should be a 
collegium of Judges and the Chief Justice of Bangladesh will consult with them when he 
recommends the candidates for appointment as Judges .. .. [But] there is also no bar for the 
Chief Justice to discuss with his colleagues who are best persons to adjudge the legal acumen 
of the persons for appointment as Judges and in fact the Chief Justice discusses with his 
colle~gues before he recommends the .names of the candidates for appointment as Judges_so4 
But Justice Matin took a pragmatic and realistic approach in disapproving the concept of 
collegium by making reference to its non-existence in the Constitution or convention and to 
the . ~on~satisfactory functioning of the ~olle~ium system in India established through a 
Supreme Court's opinion proffered in Special Reference No. 1 of 1998505(the Third Judges ' 
•. . 
Case). As he held: 
.... the concept of collegium is neither in our Constitution nor it has developed as a 
convention. If there is really any wisdom in the concept of collegium, that can be provided for 
only b Constitutional reform and not otherwise. Foreign system can advise but cannot 
command. 506 
Moreover this system is not working in India which is evident from the report of the Law 
Commission of India .... (Report No. 214 dated 21.11.2008). 507 
Thus the Supreme Court of Bangladesh followed the footmark of the Pakistani Supreme 
Court which in At-Jihad Trust's Case508did not hold that the opinion of the Chief Justice in 
the matter of appointment of judges to the Supreme Court could not be merely his individual 
opinion rather it was to be formed in consultation with the collegium of certain number of 
senior most judges of the Court. Nevertheless, although the President of Bangladesh, as a 
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Constitutional head under the existing parliamentary form of democracy, is required under 
Article 48(3) of the Constitution to perform his functions 'in accordance with the advice of 
the Prime Minister' and (unlike India) under Article 55(2) of the Constitution the executive 
Power of the Republic is vested in the Prime· Minister, it has been held in Bangladesh and 
Justice Sye.d Md Dastagir Hossain v Md Idrisur Rahman, Advocates and others509 that the 
. ' 
Prirne Minister cannot advice the President contrary to the opinion of the Chief Justice in the 
matter of appointment of judges to the Supreme Court (as the independence of Judiciary is a 
basic structure of the Constitution). As Justice Matin observed: 
We find no · existing provision of the Constitution either in Articles 98 or 95 of the 
Constitution or any other provision which prohibits consultation with the Chief Justice. 
Therefore consultation with the Chief Justice and primacy i in no way in conflict with Article 
48(3) of the constitution. The Prime Minister in view of Article 48(3) and 55(2) cannot advice 
contrary to the basic feature of the constitution so as to destroy or demolish the independence 
of judiciary. Therefore the advice of the Prime Minister is subject to the other provision of the 
Constitution that is Articles 95, 98, 1 16 of the constitution. 510 
Chief Justice M.M. Ruhul Amin and Justice Md. Tafazzul Islam almost echoed the views of 
Justice Abdul Matin; as both of them observed that the Prime Minister cannot advice contrary 
to the basic feature of the Constitution.511 Thus unlike the case of Supreme Court Advocates-
509 
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su As Chief Justice M.M. Ruhul A min observed: 'Sin~e in. Articles _98 or ?5 or other provisions of the 
Constitution, there is no prohibition in respect of consul~atlon With t_h~ Chief Jus_tlce, and such consultation with 
the Chief Justice and its primacy being not in contrast w1th the prov1srons of Art1cles 48(3) and 55(2) the Pr' 
f h C . . Th ' 1me ~inister cannot advice contrary to the basic feature o t _e . onst1tut1on. . er~fore it appears that the 
rndependence of Judiciary being a basic structure ?four Con~t1tutron, consu_Jtat1on With the Chief Justice in the 
matter of appointment of Judges with its primacy IS an essential part of the mdependence of Judiciary., Ibid. at 
Para 9. 
Justice Md. Tafazzul Islam held that ' accordingly the_ Prime Minister, on th~ b~sis of Articles 48 (3) and 55(2) 
of the Constitution, cannot advice contrary to the b~slc f~ature of t?e Con~tltutl?n so. as to destroy or demolish 
the independence of judiciary and as such consultation w1th the Ch1ef Just1ce w1th prrmacy of his opinion is an 
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on Record Association v Union of India512, in which it was observed that the President in 
appointing judges ofthe Superior Courts is not required to act on the advice of the Council of 
Minister (Justice Tandian)/513 the Council of Minister would be bound by the opinion of the 
Chief Justice ofindia (Justice Vermai 14, ~he above three Judges of the Bangladesh Supreme 
Court have placed limitation on the exercise of the Prime Minister's- on whom, not on the 
President, the executive power of the Republic is vested- exclusive and unfettered power of 
advising the President regarding the appointment of regular judges and additional judges to 
the Supreme Court. It is difficult to agree with Justice Matin's assertion that ' the advice of 
the Pri~e Minister is subject to the other provision of the Constitution that is Articles 95 98 
' ' 
116 of the Constitution', when there is no such explicit or implicit provision in the 
Constitution. It i_s clear why the learned Justice has referred to Article 116, after Articles 95 
and 98, which speaks of the President's power to control and discipline the subordinate 
judicial officers and magistrates exercising judicial functions in consultation with the 
Supreme Court, not with the President's power of appointing judges to the Supreme Court. 
However, to deprive the Prime Minister from the right of advising the President contrary to 
the opinion of the Chief Justice concerning suitability of candidates for judgeship does not at 
all fit in with the present constitutional scheme particularly when there is no mention of 
consultation with the Chief Justice in amended Articles 95 and 98 of the Constitution in the 
context of appointing regular and additional judges of the Supreme Court. The consultation 
With the Chief Justice in the matter of appointment of judges under Articles 95 and 98 of the 
Constitution is presently a mere convention, to use the language of Justice Abdul Matin, 
'matured into a rule of Jaw having been recognized and acted upon by all the "actors" in the 
integral part of independence of judiciary which is !ngrained in the very concept of the independence of 
judiciary embedded in the principle of Rule of Law.' Ibrd. at para 34. 
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matter. '
51 5 
It is pertinent to mention here that, if the opinion given by the Appellate Division 
of the Supreme Court ' after such hearing as it thinks fit' on a question of law having public 
importance under Article 106 of the Constitution of Bangladesh does not have binding force 
on the President, it can strongly be argued that the individual opinion given by the Chief 
Justice in pursuance of conventional consultation with him regarding the fitness of candidates 
for appointing as judges to the Supreme Court cannot have primacy in the sense that the 
· Prime Minister cannot advise contrary to his (the Chief Justice's opinion) opinion. 
Therefore, it may respectfully be submitted that however convincing it may sound about the 
nec;essity of an independent judiciary, a basic structure of the 1972 Constitution of 
Bangladesh, manned by right type of persons who would dispense justice without fear or 
favour, ill will or affection, the imposition of limitation on the Prime Minister' s power of 
advising the President under Article 48(3) regarding appointment of judges by way of judicial 
construction cannot be accepted as a just and fair interpretation. For, neither the Chief Justice 
nor the Supreme Court has been empowered by the Constitution to appoint judges of the apex 
court or to advise the President in the exercise of his power. In the interpretation of the 
conventional consultation with the Chief Justice by the President vis-a-vis the Prime 
Minister's power (under Article 48(3)) of advising the President, the judges should have been 
more careful, restrain and objective in observing that the Prime Minister cannot advise the 
President contrary to the Chief Justice's opinion in the matter of appointments to the Supreme 
Court. It is widely believed that many things which are not written in the Constitution or 
deliberately deleted from the Constitution can be interpreted to read into it by means of 
convenient judicial construction particularly if the matter relates to the powers of the 
judiciary as the judges have the sole power to interpret the constitution; no formal 
515 
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amendment of the Constitution is required. Thus what judges have wrought is a coup d'etat, 
slow-moving and genteel, but a coup d'etat nonetheless. In this context, the timeless and 
unfading remarks of the US Supreme Court Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo are worth quoting: 
Judges have, of course, the power, though not the right, to ignore the mandate of a statute, and 
render judgment in despite of it. They have the power, though not the right, to travel beyond 
the walls of the interstices, the bounds set to judicial innovation by precedent and custom. 
None the. less, by the abuse of power, they violate the law. 51 6 
Howev~r, keeping in mind the manner in which the Constitutional head IS required to 
exercise his powers conferred on him either by the Constitution or law, only Justice Joynul 
Abedin kept himself within constitutional bounds and exercised judicial restraint when he 
held that the President is required to exercise his power of appointment of judges to the 
Supreme Court under Articles 95 and 98 of the Constitution on the advice of the Prime 
Minister (under Article 48(3)) after a full and effective consultation with the Chief Justice 
but the President is not bound by his (the Chief Justice) opinion. As he held: 
The power or the act of an appointment of a Judge to the Supreme Court under Articles 95 
and 98 of the Constitution is an executive power or act vesting in the President. The President 
is bound to act in this regard on the aid and advice of the Prime Minister or for that matter the 
Council of Ministers. In other words, the President shall exercise this power of appointment 
under Articles 95 and 98 subject to Article 48(3) of the Constitution. The appointment of 
Judges to the Supreme Court is made by the President in consultation with the Chief Justice 
subject to the aid and advice of the Prime Minister making the appointment as one with the 
sanction of the people inasmuch as the Council of Ministers represent the people in a 
516 
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' 
Parliamentary form of Government. To hold otherwise would amount to rewriting the 
Constitution and is therefore not acceptable. 5 17 
Justice Joynul Abedin further added that: 
There should not be any apprehension that merely because the power of appointment is with 
the President meaning the executive, the independence of judiciary would become impaired. 
The true principle is that after such appointment the executive should have no scope for 
· interference with the work of the Judge or for that matter judiciary.5 18 . 
B. Supr,eme Judicial Commission of Bangladesh 
B.J. Background 
The 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh provided that the judge of the Supreme Court 'shall be 
appointed by the President, in consultation with the Chief Justice. ' For, the Chief Justice of 
Bangladesh was in a better position to know about the competence, legal practice, seniority 
and integrity of the members of the bar and bench. The consultation with the Chief Justice in 
the selection of other judges was, indeed, a major safeguard against political and expedient 
appointments. The Chief Justice could reasonably be expected not to be guided by any 
parochial considerations and, as such, would nominate objectively names of such advocates 
or judicial officers who would be most su itable for appointment as judges of the Supreme 
Court. But the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, passed on 25 January 1975, dispensed 
With President ' s obligation to consult the Chief Justice in appointing puisne judges of the 
Supreme Court. This left the door wide open for the President to measure fitness in terms of 
political eminence rather than judicial quality. But the first Martial Law Regime of 
Bangladesh restored on 28 May I 976 the Constitutional provision of consultation with the 
Chief Justice by the President in making appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court. 
517 
Ibid. at para 76. 
518 
Ibid. at para 77. 
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The President's obligation to consult the Chief Justice in appointing the judges of the 
Supreme Court was again dispensed with on 27 November 1977 by the new President and 
Chief Martial Law Administrator Major General Ziaur Rahman. However, it is claimed that 
he himself developed the convention of consulting the Chief Justice of Bangladesh in 
appointing the puisne judges of the Supreme Court.51 9 ~hus the power to appoint the j udges 
of the Supreme Court is an executive power vested in the President who is duty bound, as a 
constitutional head, to exercise this power under Article 48(3) 'in ac.cordance with the advice 
of the Prime Minister' after consulting the Chief Justice of Bangladesh. 
Since the number of judges to be appointed in the High Court Division and Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh has been kept indeterminate520, it is to be 
determined by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. Although the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court has the strength of judges determined by the President from 
time to time, there is no such strength for the High Court Division fixed by the President. 
Thus the number of judges varies at the pleasure of the executive. Ifthe President is satisfied 
that the number of judges of a Division should for the time being be increased then the 
President may under Article 98 of the Constitution appoint Additional Judges to the said 
Division for a period of two years. The successive governments have taken advantage of this 
lacuna to pack the Supreme Court with judges of political allegiance with the hope that they 
Would support their action, omission and legislation if challenged. When the Government of 
Awami League succeeded the Bangladesh Nationalist Party Governn ent in 1996, there were 
37 judges in the High Court Division and five judges in the Appellate Division including the 
Chief Justice of Bangladesh. During their five year rule, the number of judges in the High 
Court Division was increased from 37 to 56 although the number of judges in the Appellate 
519 
Supra note 381. 
52o As Article 94(2) of the Constitution of Bangladesh provides that the Supreme Court shall consist of the Chief 
Justice, to be known as the Chief Justic~ ?: Bangladesh, and such number of other Judges as the President may 
deem it necessary to appoint to each diVISion. 
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Division remained the same. The Awami League Government altogether appointed 40 
additional judges to the High Court Division.52 1 In October 2001 , the Bangladesh Nationalist 
Party came to power and next year it raised the number of judges ·n the Appellate Division 
from five to seven (on 9 July 2009, Presipent Zillur Rahman raised the number of posts of 
Judges in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court ~om seven to 11 under Article 94(2) 
of the Constitution522). When the BNP Government relinquished power in October 2006 the 
number of judges in the High Court Division was 72 and it appointed altogether 45 judges.s23 
In order to prevent politically motivated appointments that took place allegedly during the 
previou's tWo regimes and 'to select and recommend competent persons tor appointment as 
judges ofthe Supreme Court'524, the President Iajuddin Ahmad on 16 March 2008 issued the 
Supreme Judicial Commission Ordinance providing for th~ establishment of a Supreme 
Judicial Commission for selection and recommendation of names to the President for 
appointment as additional judges and regular judges ofthe High Court Division and judges of 
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. The Ordinance was issued during the regime of 
the Non-Party Care-taker Government (consisting of the Chief Advisor and ten other 
nominated Advisors) which is an interim government established within 15 days of 
dissolution ofthe Parliament525 that have only the mandate to carry on ordinarily the routine 
functions ofthe government and is destined to 'give to Election Commission all possible aid 
521 
Staff Correspondent, 'HC verdict on judges' appointment stayed for three weeks', New Age, 30 July 2008 < http: //newagebd.con/2008(jul/30/front.htmi#J2> (accessed on 10 December 2010). 
522 Ashutosh Sarkar, 'Appellate Division: Number of posts of judges raised to II ', The Daily Star, 10 July 2009 
< http://www.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=96265> (accessed on 10 December 2010). 
523 
Staff Correspondent, '10 new HC judges to be appointed', 31 October 2008 < 
http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-~etails.php!~id=6~184> (accesse~ on 10 December 2010). 
After 2004, the B.N.P Government did not appomt any addrtronal JUdges to the Hrgh Court Division. 524 
First preambular paragraph to the Supreme Judicial Commission Ordinance, 2008. 
525 
Article 58C(2), the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 1972. 
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and assistance for holding the general elections of members of parliament peacefully, fairly 
and impartially. •526 
B.2. Composition of the Supreme Judicial Commission 
The original Supreme Judicial Commission Ordinance, 2008, issued in March (2008) 
. 
provided that the Commission would consist of nine members with the Chief Justice as its 
. . 
Chairman and the Minister ofLaw, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, two senior most judges 
of the Appellate Division, Attorney General, two Members of Parliament- one should be 
nominated. by the Leader of the House and the. other by the Leader of the Opposition in 
Parliament-, President of the Supreme Court Bar Association and Secretary, Ministry of Law, 
Justice and Parliamentary Affairs as the members of the Commission.52 7 Thus among the 
members of the Commission three were judicial members (including the Chief Justice) while 
the non-judicial members, six in number, made up the majority. Since the Commission was 
established for a cautious, informed, professional and non-political search for the best persons 
for the judgeship of the Supreme Court, based on first-hand professional knowledge of each 
of the candidate's knowledge of law, balanced mind, integrity and suitability of character and 
temperament as an advocate and a judicial officer, the provisions for inclusion into it two 
members of a political body like the Parliament, and Minister (a politician) and Secretary (a 
loyal civil servant) of the Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs as its members 
could hardly serve the purpose of selecting and recommending for appointment as judges of 
the Supreme Court the best potential candidate for maintaining the quality of the Bench. 
Although both the President of the Supreme Court Bar Association and the Attorney General 
(principal and Constitutional Law Officer of the Government) are preeminently suited to 
evaluate the advocates of the Supreme Court for appointment as judges, their inclusion into 
52 s A . I 
rt1c e 580 (2), ibid. 
527 
Section 3(2), the Supreme Judicial Commission Ordinance, 2008. 
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the Commission might not be conducive to check patronage appointment. For, they are under 
the distressing influence of either party in power or opposition political parties and, as such, 
are highly politically charged. Furthermore, out ofthe nine members ofthe Commission, the 
provision for including on ly three judges of the Supreme Court- the Chief Justice and two 
~enior most judges of the .Appellate Division- into the Commission evinced the domination of 
six non-judicial members i~ the selection process. Since the predominance of the judicial 
members in the ~omposltion ofthe Supreme Judicial Commissio_n was diluted, the purpose .of 
establishing the Commission for selecting and recommending the most qualified and 
- . 
appropriate p'ersons for appointment as judges of the Supreme · Court was cJestined to be 
frustrated. 
But only three months after the promulgation of the Ordinance, on 16 June 2008, the 
Supreme Judicial Commission (Amendment) Ordinance, 2008 was issued to introduce 
changes in the composition of the Commission by which the provision of appointing two 
members of Parliament (one from the ruling party and other from the opposition) and the 
Secretary of the Ministry of Law as the Commission ' s members were deleted and provision 
was made to include two senior most judges ofthe High Court Division of the Supreme Court 
as the members of the Comm ission. Thus under the new amendment, the Commission would 
cvnsist of the Chief Justice as its ex-officio Chairman and the Min ister of Law, three senior 
most judges ofthe Appellate Division (previously it was two), two senior most judges of the 
High Court Division, Attorney General and the President of the Supreme Court Bar 
Association, altogether eight, as ex-officio members. Thus unlike Malaysia, the Prime 
Minister or President of Bangladesh was not given any authority to appoint any imminent 
person, jurist or supreme court judge, close to the regime, as members of the Commission. It 
is noticeable that the majority of the members of the Commission- six out of nine- are ex-
officio members of the Commission from the Judges of the High Court Division and 
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Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. Thus the majority judicial members having expert 
knowledge about the candidate ' s acumen and suitability dominate the selection process of 
judges for appointment to the highest judicial office. The other three members- the Law 
Minister, Attorney General and President of the Supreme Court Bar Association (if the Bar 
President has political allegiance to the party in power)- could make an abortive attempt in 
the meeting of the Commission in deference to the wishes ofthe Prime Minister/President for 
filling in the vacancies iri the Supreme Court. However, the inclusi_on of the two senior most 
judges of the High Court Divi"sion into the Supreme Judicial Commission may be considered 
as a positive development in the sense that the large number of lawyers appear eefore them 
and only a small fraction of the lawyers having a good length of practice and better reputation 
and standing (generally· not interested to become a judge) appear before the Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court. 
Unlike the Judicial Appointments Act of Malaysia, 2009, there is no provision m the 
Supreme Judicial Commission Ordinance, 2008 to fill in casual vacancies as all the members 
ofthe Commission were ex-officio members. 
B.3. Selection Process 
Unlike the Judicial Appointments Commission of Malaysia, the Supreme Judicial 
Commission of Bangladesh was not given any discretion to advertise in the Commission ' s 
website or in any other medium the Commission deems appropriate to fill in any vacancy in 
the office of a judge of the Supreme Court. Thus any citizen having the experience of 
practising before the Supreme Court for a period not less than 10 years or a judicial officer 
having not less than ten years experience could not apply directly for selection as a judge of 
the High Court Division of the Supreme Court. The Commission was required to consider the 
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names of the candidates proposed by the Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Ministry.528 
The Law Ministry could propose minimum three and maximum five names for each vacancy 
to the Commission for its consideration to recommend for appointment by the President as 
additional judges and judges of the High Court Division and the judges of the Appellate 
Division.529 It is obvious that candidates sharing ideological views of the party in power 
would have better prospects of getting nomination from the Law, Justice and Parliamentary 
Affairs Ministry for the consideration of the Supreme Judicial Commission of Bangladesh. 
However, if the Commissio~ considered it necessary to take into' account the names of the 
additional candidates, it could make such a request to the Law, Justice and .Parliamentary 
Affairs Ministry or it could select any competent person outside the names proposed by the 
Law, Justice and Parliamentary Ministry.530 Such a candidate, if selected and recommended, 
would have the least chance of getting appointment for not having political patronage. Thus 
non-recognition of plurality of sources of proposing candidates from outside the Ministry of 
Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs for judicial appointment was a serious drawback of 
the system. However, the Supreme Judicial Commission was allowed to follow a transparent 
process in selecting the candidates by taking interviews of the candidates at its discretion531 
as against the previous system of appointing judges of the Supreme Court which was cloaked 
with secrecy and devoid of any transparency. But unlike the Malaysian Judicial 
Appointments Commission Act, the Supreme Judicial Commission Ordinance of Bangladesh 
did not contain any provision as to screening of the antecedents of the candidates by the 
Independent Anti-Corruption Commission, Police Forces or Tax Ombudsman of Bangladesh 
in respect of their educational qualification, tax payment record, credit history as to arrest and 
conviction, integrity etc. 
528 Section 6{1), ibid. 
529 Section 6{2), ibid. 
530 Section 6(3), ibid. 
531 Section 5(7), ibid. 
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B.4. Functions and Selection Criteria 
The authority of the Commission was confined only to select and recommend candidates for 
appointment as regular and additional judges of the High Court Division and of regular 
judges of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. But unlike the Judicial Appointments 
Commission of Malaysia, it was not given the jurisdiction to recommend candidates for 
appointment as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh. It was also not giv n any authority to discuss · 
about the disposal of cases and improving the performance of the Supreme Court Judges. The 
Supreme Judicial Commission Ordinance has provided for different sets of criteria for the 
consideration of candidate's by the Commission for the appointment of additional judges· in 
the High Court Division and Judges in the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. The 
Commission was required to consider the candidates educational qualifications, pwfessional 
·skills (efficiency), seniority, honesty and reputation (along with other ancillary matters) in 
recommending for the appointment as additional judges of the High Court Division.532 On 
other hand, for recommending any judge of the High Court Division of the Supreme Court 
for appointment to the Appellate Division, his seniority, judicial skill, integrity and reputation 
(along with other subsidiary matters) were to be taken into account by the Commission.533 
B.S. Selection Meeting of the Commission 
The Supreme Judicial Commission of Bangladesh was required to sit at least once in six 
months.534 But the Chairman of the Supreme Judicial Commission, the Chief Justice, would 
immediately convene the meeting of the Commission if he was requested to do so for 
selecting and recommending the names by the President or by the competent authority (i.e. 
Ministry of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs under the Rules of Business) for the 
532 Section 5(6), ibid. 
533 Section 5(5), ibid. 
534 Section 4(5), ibid. 
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appointment of judges of the Supreme Court.535 It was stressed that the Commission first 
would strive at to take a unanimous decision, perhaps taking into account the importance of 
appointing the most quarfied and suitable persons as judges, for maintaining the quality of 
the Bench. If that was not possible the decision was ~o be taken by a majority of the members 
present.536 Thepresence of five members out of nine~ would constitute quorum ofthe meeting 
and a decision to recommend names for appointment could be taken by a rpajority of the 
members present which implied that a decision of the Commiss}on might be taken by the 
support ofthree members if only five members attended the meeting.537 Unlike the Malaysian 
Judicial Appointments Commission, it did not say that the quorum would - include the 
Chairman. But like the Malaysian Judicial Appointments Commission, it was provided that 
when there was an equalit of votes, the Chairman of the Commission or the person presiding 
over the meeting could exercise a casting vote.538 It is to be stressed here that the three non-
judicial members of the Commission (the Law Minister, Attorney General and President of 
the Supreme Court Bar Association) were allowed to attend its meeting as members of the 
Commission for selecting and recommending the High Court Division judges for 
appointment to the vacant posts in the Appellate Division. But the senior most judges of the 
High Court n·vision as the Members of the Commission were precluded from taking part in 
its meeting without assigning any reason whatsoever (for example, if he was being 
considered for selection).539 However, the Commission was required to select and 
ecommend two candidates for each vacancy of the Supreme Court judge (that was the usual 
practice) witho>Jt the requirement of any mention of the order of preference. 540 
535 Section 4(6), ibid. 
536 Section 4(7), ibid. 
537 Proviso to sub-section (4) to Section 4, ibid. 
538 Supra note 535. 
539 Section 4(9), ibid. Added by the Supreme Judicial Commission (Amendment) Ordinance, 2008. 
540 Section 5(2), ibid. 
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B. 6. Consideration of Report by the President 
The Supreme Judicial Commission of Bangladesh was required to send its recommendation 
to the Ministry Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs for forwarding it to the President.541 
Ordinarily the President would appoint the judges of the Supreme Court in accordance ith 
the recommendation of the Commission.542 In case of differing with the recommendation of 
the Commission, the President would send the recommendation back to the Commission for 
its rcconsideration.543 After receipt of any request from the President for reviewing any 
recommendation, the Commission would promptly reconsider the recommendation and 
would send either its modified recommendation or earlier recommendation with recorded 
reasonable grounds to the President.544 The President was given the right to ignore and reject 
the recommendation of the Commission by recording appropriate reasons. 54' 
Thus the power of the President to accept and reject the candidates recommended by the 
Commission at his pleasure defeated the very objective of establishing the Commission for 
appointing persons of highest caliber, character, professional skill and integrity as judges (i.e. 
right type of judges) to the Supreme Court. 
B. 7. Whether the Supreme Judicial Commission Ordinance was a Valid Piece of 
Legislation? 
The Ordinance making power of the President of Bangladesh, conferred on him by Article 93 
ofthe Constitution as a legislative function, is a relic ofthe Government of India Act, 1935546 
which is of the nature of an emergency power, to meet 'circumstances' that 'render 
541 Section 7, ibid . 
542 Section 9(1), ibid. 
543 Section 9(2), ibid. 
544 Section 9(3), ibid . 
545 Section 9(4), ibid. 
546 Section 42, the Government of India Act, 1935. 
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immediate action necessary' when 'Parliament stands dissolved or is not in session'547 to 
secure the enactment of necessary legislation instantly. Apart from time and circumstances, 
there are other limitations on the ordinance making power of the President who is the sole 
judge of the necessity of issuing an ordinance (as Article 93 contains the words 'if the 
President is satisfied'); he cannot promulgate an ordinance making any provision i) which 
could not lawfully be made under this [the Bangladesh] Constitution by Act of Parliament; ii) 
for altering or repealing any provision of this Constitution.548 Alth.ough the ordinance making 
power of the President should be exercised sparingly, there has always been a tendency on 
the part of the successive Governments to resort to such a power frequent! than seems 
necessary and desirable. However, the Supreme Judicial Commission Ordinance was issued 
in March 2008 during the regime of the third Non-Party Care-taker Government established 
after the dissolution of the Parliament in 2007 as a stopgap arrangement for holding free and 
fair General Elections. This Government was required to discharge its function as an interim 
government and, as such, to carry on routine day to day works of the Government in addition 
to their main function of assisting and aiding the Election Commission. Hence it could not 
make any policy decision except in the case of necessity for the discharge of such routine 
functions. 549 The promulgation of the Supreme Judicial Commission Ordinance cannot be 
accepted as a valid piece of legislation within the framework of the Constitution due to the 
following grounds: 
Unlike Article 115 oftheConstitution of Bangladesh, which empowers the President to make 
rules in accordance with which he is required to exercise his power of appointing subordinate 
judicial officers and magistrates exercising judicial functions, Articles 95(1) and 98 (which 
deal with appointment of regular and additional judges of the Supreme Court respectively) do 
547 Article 93(1), the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 1972. 
548 Proviso to Article 93(1), ibid. 
549 Article 580 (1), ibid. 
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not at all provide for the enactment of any law setting up a mechanism like the Supreme 
Judicial Commission for selecting candidates in the matter of appointment of judges to the 
Supreme Court by the President. Unlike the Constitutions of Algeria, France, Italy, Namibia, 
Sudan and Rwanda,550 the Constitution ofBangladesh even does not empower the legislative 
authorities to enact law/promulgate ordinance regulating the organisation, powers and 
functioning of the Commission. Article 95(2)( c) of the Constitution of Bangladesh empowers 
the Parliament orily to pass law providing for an alternative requisite qualification (e.g. a 
distinguished jurist) for the appo!ntment of judges to the Supreme Court and, as such, an 
ordinance if at all necessary, could only be promulgated in this .regard. Instead, the ·Supreme 
· Judicial Commission Ordinance, apart from providing for detailed provisions concerning the .· 
composition, functions and procedure of the Commission, laid down different . selection 
criteria (educational qualification, professional skill, seniority, honesty and reputation for 
High Court Division judgeship and seniority, judicial skill, integrity and reputation for 
Appellate Division judgeship) for the appointment of the High Court Division as well as the 
Appellate Division Judges. Therefore, it can be argued that the Supreme Judicial Commission 
Ordinance, 2008, providing for the establishment of a Supreme Judicial Commission, was not 
proml!lgated ·within the parameters of Articles 95, 98 and 65551 of the Constitution of 
Bangladesh and, as such, is ultra vires ofthe Constitution ofBangladesh. 
-----------------------
550 Article I 55 of the Constitution of Algeria, I989, provides that 'The High Council Magistracy decide ·, within 
the conditions defined by the law, the appointment, transfer and the progress of the magistrate' s careers.' Article 
65 of the Constitution of France states that ' An institutional Act shall determine the member in which this article 
[dealing with the jurisdiction and powers of the High Council of the Judiciary concerning appointment and 
disciplining the judges and public prosecutors] is to be implemented. ' Article I 05 of the Constitution of Italy, 
1947, lays down that 'The superior council of the judiciary, as defined by organizational law, has the exclusive 
competence to appoint, assign, move, promote and discipline members of the judiciary.' Article I 02(2) of the 
Constitution of Sudan, I998, provides that 'The Judiciary shall have a council to be known as the ''the Supreme 
Council of the Judiciary", its composition and functions shall be prescribed by law.' Article I 58 of the 
Constitution of Rwanda, 2003 stipulates that ' An organic law shall determine the organization, powers and 
functioning of the Supreme Council of the Judiciary.' 
551 Article 65(1) provides that 'There shall be a Parliament for Bangladesh (to be known as the House of the 
Nation) in which subject to the provisions of this Constitution, shall be vested the legislative powers of the 
Republic.' 
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B. 8. Functioning of the Supreme Judicial Commission 
However, for the first time in the history of Bangladesh the President on 12 November 2008 
appointed the seven new additional judges to the High Court Division for two years on the 
recommendation of the Supreme Judicial Commissio~552 of~hich one regretted to accept the . 
offer of judgeship du~ t~ his ill-health. The Commission also recommended in its first 
meeting, held on 16 October 2008, four senior most judges of the High Court Division for the 
. . . . . ' . 553 
two vacant posts of the Appe_llate Division. 
B.9. Natural Deat!t of the Supreme Judicial Commissfon 
.• . 
It is ironical that Ba_ngladesh Awami Lawyers Association, a platform ofpro-Awami League. 
lawyers, demanded on ·26 July 2008 the repeal of the Supreme Judicial Commission 
Ordinance, 2008.554 After coming to power by obtaining a landslide victory in the General 
Elections, held on 29 December 2008, the Awami League placed 54 out of 122 Ordinances 
promulgated by the Non- Party Caretaker Government for the approval of the Parliament. 
But, as expected, the Supreme Judicial Commission Ordinance was not placed before the 
newly elected House of the Nation (the Parliament) for its passing into law. Therefore it met 
a natural death555 as the life of an ordinance is always subject to the approval of the 
Parliament. Since it is the same political party which deleted from the Constitution on 25 
January 1975 the provision concerning consultation with the Chief Justice by the President in 
appointing judges ofthe Supreme Court and, as such, it is quite natural that it cannot afford to 
552 Ashutosh Sarkar, 'Appellate Division running with few· judges for long', The Daily Star, 18 December 2008, 1. 
553 Ibid. 
ss
4 Staff Correspondent, 'No UZ elections before JS polls: AL A~ami Ainjibi Parishad to form human chains 
Aug 7' , The Daily Star, 27 July 2008 < http :/iw,vw.thedailystar.net/story.php?nid=47643> (accessed on 10 
December 2010). 
sss Rakib Hasnet Suman, ' Public interest ignored in picking CG's ordinances', The Daily Star, 24 February 
2009, I. 
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experience the luxury of seeing the embargo of following a detailed and time-consuming 
procedure by the executive in the appointment of judges of the highest court ofthe land. 
A comparative study of the methods of appointment of judges of the superior courts in 
Malaysia and Bangladesh, which is the ultimate aim and objective of the present Dissertation, 
shall be carried out in the next chapter . . 
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Chapter IV: 
Comparative Study of the Methods of Appointment of Superior Court Judges in 
Malaysia and Bangladesh 
' ' 
As common law countries, both Malaysia and Bangladesh have adopted the method of 
appointing judges of superior courts by the Heads of the State, following the ~ritish practice 
obtaining prior to the enactment of the Constitution Reform Act, 2005, with striking 
variations regarding consulting and recommending entities in order to minimise intrusion of 
politics in the appointment process. There is no dispute about the fact that the appointment of 
judges as contemplated in the Constitutions ofboth the countries is an executive act. For, the 
final order of appointment is passed in the name of the Head of the State and consequently 
notification is to be issued under the law and Rules of Business. However, on the basis of 
discussion made in Chapters II and III, the following comparison can be drawn between the 
methods of appointment of superior court judges in Malaysia and Bangladesh: 
A. Method of Appointment of the Chief Justice 
The Constitution of the Federation of Malaya, 1957 empowered the Head of the State- the 
Constitutional Monarch Yang di-Pertuan Agong- to appoint in his discretion the Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court only after consulting the Conference of Rulers (consisting of nine 
Rulers-monarchial heads of the component States of the Federation of Malaysia and four 
Governors) and considering the advice of the Prime Minister. But the Constitution 
Amendment Act, 1960, passed within three years of the coming into effect of the 
Constitution, took away the discretionary power ofthe Yang di-Pertuan Agong to appoint the 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court after consulting the Conference of Rulers and considering 
the advice of the Prime Minister. Under the new arrangement, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
was required to act on the advice of the Prime Minister (thus the real authority passed from 
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the Head of the State to the Head of the Government) in appointing the Chief Justice after 
consulting the Conference of Rulers. The Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1963, as amended 
in 1965 and 1994, retained the same method of appointing the Chief Justice of Malaysia, the 
head ofthe Federal Court and paterfamilias ofthejudicial fraternity. The ChiefJustice ofthe 
Federal Court shall be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 'acting on the advice of the 
Prime Minister, after consulting the Conference of Rulers. '556 The Judicial· Appointments 
Commission Act, 2009, which provides for the establishment Qf a Judicial Appointments 
Commission as a step forward to 'improve the process ofappointingjudges' , empowers the 
Commission, inter alia, to evaluate and vet right candidates for recommending to the Prime 
Minister for consulting the Conference of Rulers before. putting forward their names to the 
Yang di-Perttian Agong for appointment as the ChiefJustice ofMalaysa. 
·On the other hand, the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh originally empowered the President 
to appoint the Chief Justice of Bangladesh without consulting any other designated 
Constitutional functionary except to act under Article 48(3) as a Constitutional Head, 'in 
accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister.' But unlike Malaysia, the Constitution 
(Twelfth Amendment) Act, 1991, passed unanimously by the Parliament of Bangladesh (an 
unprecedented event in the history of Bangladesh) for referring the matter to the referendum, 
freed the President even from the obligation of consulting the Prime Minister in appointing 
the Chief Justice of Bangladesh. Furthermore, unlike the Malaysian Judicial Appointments 
Commission, the Supreme Judicial Commission of Bangladesh established in March 2008 
556 But the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, 1963 provides for further consultation with other functionaries by 
the Prime Minister in giving advice to the Head of the State for the appointment of the heads of the two other 
superior courts- the President of the Court of Appeal and the two Chief Judges of the High Courts. The Prime 
Minister is additionally required to consult the Chief Justice of the Federal Court before tendering his advice to 
the Yang di-Pertuan Agong for appointing a Federal Court Judge to the post of the President of the Court of 
Appeal. In appointing the Chief Justice of the High Court of Malaya, he is, in addition, needed not only to 
consult the Chief Justice of the Federal Court but also to consult the Chief Judge of Sa bah and Sarawak and 
vice versa. But if the appointment is for the post of the Chief Judge of Sabah and Sarawak, the Prime Minister 
is also obligated to consult the Chief Minister of each of the States of Sa bah and Sarawak. 
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under a Presidential Ordinance and met natural death in early 2009 as it was not placed 
before the Parliament for its approval, was not empowered to select and recommend 
candidates to the President for appointment as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh. Thus the 
President enjoys unfettered discretion to appoint the Chief Justice of Bangladesh, involving 
the great risk of intrusion of political consideration into the appointment process. 
B. Method of Appointment of the Puisne Judges 
The Constitution of the Fed~ration of Malaya, 1957 empowered the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
· to act, after consulting the Conference of Rulers and considering the advice· .9f the Prime 
Minister, on the recommendation ofthe Judicial and Legal Service Commission in appointing 
the other judg~s of the Supreme Court. Although the principles on the independence 6f 
judiciary (adopted by various international and regional organisations in the 1980s) favour 
the appointment of judges of superior courts, on the recommendation, proposal or advice of 
with a representative judicial bodl57 which has thereafter been accepted by many 
constitutions of the world558, the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya, as baek as in 
1957, used the more weighty word of recommendation (instead of consultation) of the body 
dominated by the judicial members-the Judicial and Legal Service Commission559 in order to 
ensure the appointment of the most suitable candidates as judges of the Supreme Court. But 
this provision was abolished three years later on 31 May 1960 when the Constitution 
(Amendment) Act, 1960 was passed. Under the new arrangement, the Yang di-Pertuan 
Agong was obligated to act on the advice of the Prime Minister in appointing other judges of 
557 See Article 3, the Text of the Lagos Conference of the International Commission of Jurists, 1961, Article 
I 0( d), the Principles and Conclusions on the Independence of the Judiciary in the LAW ASIA Region, 1982, 
Article 3(a), the International Bar Association's Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence, 1982, Article 
2.14(b), the Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, 1983, Article 10, the UN Basic Principles on 
the Independence of the Judiciary, 1985, Article 14, Beijing Statement of Principles on the Independence ofthe 
Judiciary in LA WASIA Region, 1995 and Article II( I), the Latimer House Guidelines for Parliamentary 
Supremacy and Judicial Independence in the Commonwealth, 1998. 
558 Ibid. 
559 The majority of (at least) five members of the Judicial and Legal Service Commission were from the Judges 
of the Supreme Court including the Chief Justice. 
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the Supreme Court after consulting the Conference of Rulers and considering the advice of 
the Chief Justice. Thus the new element of considering the advice of the Chief Justice was 
introduced replacing the previous arrangement of acting on the recommendation of the 
Judicial and Legal Service Commission headed by the Chief Justice of Malaysia. But the 
Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1 963 as amended in 1965 and 1994560 provides that the other 
judges of the Federal Court, the Court of Appeal and the High Courts shall be appointed by 
the Yang di Pertuan, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, after consulting the 
Conference of Rulers. But the Prime Minister is always obligated to consult the Chief Justice 
ofthe Federal Court before tendering his advice to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong regarding the 
appointment of all the judges of the three superior courts- the Federal Court, the Court of 
Appeal and the two High Courts (the High Court of Malaya and the High Court of Sabah and 
Sarawak). The Prime Minister has an additional constitutional duty to consult the President of 
the Court of Appeal in respect of the appointment of the judges to the Court of Appeal before 
tendering his advice to the Head of the State. He is also enjoined to consult the Chief Judge 
of the High Court concerned before presenting his advice to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong 
regarding the appointment of judges to the High Court. Thus after obtaining the opinion of 
the designated constitutional functionaries, the Prime Minister transmits his advice to the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong for the appointment of judges of the three superior courts and the 
Constitutional Head has no choice but to accept and act on his advice. 
On the other hand, like Malaysia, where since 1960 consultation with the Chief Justice of 
Malaysia has been in existence in respect of the appointment of the puisne judges of the apex 
court (the Supreme Court/Federal Court), in Bangladesh the 1972 Constitution originally 
provided for (in Article 95(1)) consultation with the Chief Justice by the President in 
appointing puisne judges of the High Court Division and Appellate Division of the Supreme 
560 The Constitution Amendment Act, 1994 renamed the Supreme Court as the Federal Court and the High 
Courts- the lowest tier of the three tier superior courts. 
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Court. But the Constitutional provision of consulting the Chief Justice as an essential 
prerequisite in appointing judges of the Supreme Court was first omitted in January 1975 and 
then it was restored on 28 May 1976 by the fist Martial Law regime (1975-1979). But after 
only one and a half year, on 27 November 1977, the appointment of judges of the Supreme 
Court in Bangladesh was again made a matter of pleasure vested in the President freeing him 
from Constitutional obligation of consulting the Chief Justice. Thus unlike Malaysia, there is 
no limitation or restriction in Bangladesh on the power of the Head of the State to appoint the 
judges of the apex court. · However, the convention of consulting the Chief Justice in 
appointing judges of the Supreme Court by the President, as established in 1978" by the then 
President and Chief Martial Law Administrator Ziaru Rahman, has been in vogue. 
C. Judicial Interpretation of Consultation 
In Malaysia, the word (Constitutional) 'consultation' was given literal/lexicon meaning in 
2002 in Re Dato ' Seri Anwar lbrahim561, the first case in which the Court of Appeal 
examined in 2002 the Constitutional provisions concerning appointment. As Lamtn PCA 
observed: 'To consult means to refer a matter for advice, opinion or views .... To "consult" 
does not mean to "consent" .... He [the consultant] may consider the advice or opinion given 
but he is not bound by it. ' 562 
Unlike Malaysia, in Bangladesh conventional consultation with the Chief Justice in 
appointing judges of the Supreme Court by the President was given to some extent an 
extended meaning in Bangladesh and Justice ::,yed Md. Dastagir Hossain v Md Idrisur 
Rahman, Advocate. 563 As it was held that 'In the matter of selection of the Judges, the 
opinion of the Chief Justice should be dominant in the area of legal acumen and suitability for 
561 [2000] 2 CLJ 570. 
562 Ibid., at p. 571-b, d, f. 
563 38 CLC (AD) 2009. 
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the appointment and in the area of antecedents the opinion of the executive should be 
dominant. ' 564 
D. Establishment of an Independent Body for Selection and Recommendation of 
Candidates for Appointment of Judges in the Superior Courts 
Keeping the Constitutional selection procedure of appointing judges ofthe Fe?eral Court, the 
Court of Appeal and the High Courts untouched, the Parliament of Malaysia passed in . 
December 2008 the Judicial· Appointments Commission Act providing for the establishment 
of a Judicial Appointments Commission. The Commission is comprised of four ex-officio 
judicial members and five non ex-officio members to be appointed by the Prime Minister, for 
. ~ - . 
selecting candidates for the consideration of the Prime Minister in the matter of the 
appointment of judges including heads of the superior courts. 
Unlike Malaysia, the President of Bangladesh, during the regime of third 'Non-Party Care-
taker Government set up as an interim Government for about four months mainly to assist the 
Election Commission in conducting the General Elections in a free, fair and impartial 
manner, promulgated the Supreme Judicial Commission Ordinance, 2008 providing for the 
establishment of a Supreme Judicial Commission. Unlike the Malaysian Judicial 
Appointments Commission, which is nine-member Commission where the non ex-officio 
members appointed by the Prime Minister are in a majority (i.e. five in number), the Supreme 
Judicial Commission of Bangladesh was entirely composed of nine ex-officio members and 
among the ex-officio members six were from the judiciary- the Chief Justice of Bangladesh, 
the three senior most judges of the Appellate Division and two senior most judges ofthe High 
Court Division of the Supreme Court- who did constitute the majority. This domination of the 
Commission by the judicial members was more conducive to select and recommend 
564 Ibid . at para 270. 
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candidates objectively keeping in mind the needs of the office in view. Although the Supreme 
Judicial Commission was able to recommend the best candidates to the President for 
appointment of judges of the Supreme Court, unlike the Judicial Appointments Commission 
of Malaysia ·it was not empowered to recommend candidates for appointment as the Chief 
Justice of Bangladesh. However, the recommendations of both the Commissions were not 
given binding force on the executive taking into account the scheme of the Constitutions and 
the establishment~ of th~ Commissions in both the countries were provided for neither in 
pursuance of any provision. of the Constitutions . rior by amending the~ (the Constitutions). 
Nevertheless, the · Supreme Judicial Commission of Bangladesh has been defunct since 
February 2009 as the newly 'elected Government of the Awami League did not place it before 
the first session ofthe newly constituted Parliament for its approval.565 
·E. Method of Appointment of Additional Judges and Judicial Commissioners 
The Federal Constitution of Malaysia speaks of the appointment of additional judges only in 
the Federal Court by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong acting solely on the advice of the Chief 
Justice of Malaysia566 (without requiring to follow the normal procedure of appointing 
regular judges in the Federal Court i.e. to act on the advice of the Prime Minister after 
consulting the Conference of Rulers) 'for such purposes or for such period of time as' the 
Head of the State 'may specify.' However, no additional judge has yet been appointed to the 
Federal Court of Malaysia. 
The Federal Constitution of Malaysia, as amended in 1963, provided for the first time the 
provision for the appointment of judicial commissioners in the High Court of Malaya and the 
High Court in Sabah and Sarawak. Under the amended method of appointment of judicial 
565 Rakib Hasnet Suman, 'Public interest ignored in picking CO's ordinances', The Daily Star, 24 February 
2009, 1. 
566Article 122(1A), the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, 1963. 
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commissioners, brought about 1994, the Yang di- Pertuan A gong, acting on the advice of the 
Prime Minister, after consulting the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, may appoint a judicial 
commissioner 'for such period or such purposes as may be specified in the order.567 Thus 
unlike the appointment of regular judges of the High Courts, the Prime Minister is neither 
required to consult the Conference of Rulers nor the Chief Judge of the High Court 
concerned, who is the most competent person to express his views as to the necessity of 
appointing judicial commissioners and the suitability of candidates for such an appointment, 
before tendering his advice to the appointment of judicial Commissioners. Since no express 
judicial ground (i.e. in order to facilitate the disposal of cases in the Court) is provided for the 
appointment of judicial commissioners, the arrangement can easily be used for political 
consideration, i.e. as a reward for those who have rendered services to the party in power. 
Until August 2010, 68 Judicial Commissioners have been appointed for an initial term of two 
years568, most of whom found berth as permanent judges of the High Courts.569 
On the other hand, unlike Malaysia, where exist a difference between the method of 
appointment of regular and additional judges to the Federal Court and between the method of 
appointment of regular and additional judges (i.e. judicial commissioners) to the High Courts, 
in Bangladesh the same method of appointment is followed in case of appointing regular and 
additional judges in the High Court Division of the Supreme Court. Unlike Malaysia, where 
the Chief Justice of the country is always to be consulted (apart from other constitutional 
functionaries) as a Constitutional imperative in appointing the judges of the Federal Court, 
the Court of Appeal and the High Courts, the requirement of consulting the Chief Justice in 
567 Article 122AB, the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. 
568 Appointments Summary of the Judicial Appointments Commission until 13 August 2010 < 
http://translate.google.eom.my/translate?h l=en&sl=ms&u=http://www .jac.gov .my/ &ei=nyz9TKL l K Y _ RrQfB5 
qmZCA&sa=X&oi=translate&ct=result&resnum= l&ved=OCBsQ7gEwAA&prev=/search%3Fq%3Dj udicial%2 
Bappointments%2Bcommission%2Bmalaysia%26hl%3Den%26safe%3Doff1>/o26prmd%3Div> (accessed on 20 
November 2010). 
569 Tun Dato' Seri Abdul Hamid Omar, The Judiciary in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Asia Pacific Publications 
Sdn Bhd, 1994) at p. 81 
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Bangladesh for the appointment of judges in the Supreme Court has been conventional since 
1978. Like the provision for the appointment of judicial commissioners in the two H igh 
Courts of Malaysia, the provision for appointment of additional judges in the High Court 
Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh has become a gateway to the cadre of 
permanent judgeship in the High Court Division under Article 95 of the Constitution as no 
judge till today has been appointed directly to this Court. Like Malaysia, where some of the 
judicial commissioners have not been appointed as regular judges of the High Courts, in 
Bangladesh seven out of 10 {additional judges570, appointed between 1978 and 1998 and 15 
additional judges out of 29571 , appointed .between 24 September 1999 and 23 August 2001, 
were not appointed as regular judges of the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of 
Bangladesh. Although non-appointment of judicial commissioners as regular judges of the 
High Courts in Malaysia has never been challenged in the superior courts, non-appointment 
of 10 additional judges as regular judges of the High Court Division under Article 95 of the 
Constitution was challenged in Bangladesh. In the Case of Bangladesh and Justice Syed Md. 
Dastagir Hossain v Md. ldrisur Rahman, Advocates and others572, Justice Md. Abdui Matin 
observed that the additional judges 'only have the right to be considered for appointment 
under Article 95(1) of the Constitution'573 and 'not beyond.' 574 In the same case, Justice Md. 
Joynul Abed in was more categorical about the right of an additional judge to be appointed as 
a permanent judge of the High Court Division ofthe Supreme Court when he held: 
.... the President appoints an Additional Judge for a period not exceeding two years and such 
appointment is not dependent on any purpose, such as to cope with any increased number of 
pending cases. ln other words, an Additional Judge is appointed without any kind of 
570 Md Jdrisur Rahman, Advocate and others v Secretmy, Minist1y of Law, Justice and Parliamentary Affairs, 
Government of the People 's Republic of Bangladesh, 37 CLC (HCD) 2008 at para 336. 
571 Ibid. at para 154. 
572 38 CLC (AD) 2009. 
573 Ibid. at para 269. 
574 Ibid. at para 238. 
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assurance or promise that on initial expiry of two years he will be reappointed for a further 
term or he will be afresh appointed as a permanent Judge. As in the case of initial 
appointment as Additional Judge under Article 98, o in the case of a fresh appointment after 
the initial tenure of two years expires, there is no legal right to be appointed nor does non-
appointment give rise to any legal or constitutional infirmity so as to be the subject of judicial 
review. 575 
Both the Judge of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court _of Bangladesh .approvingly 
referred to the views of the indian Supreme Court expressed in S.P'. Gupta v Union oflndia576 
which still holds the field in India. As Justice Bhagwati in that case held: 
the Additional Judges entered the High Court Judiciary with a legitimate expectation that they 
would not have to go back on the expiration of their term but they would be either 
reappointed as Additional Judges for a further term or in the meanwhile, a vacancy in the post 
of a permanent Judge became available, they would be confirmed as permanent Judges. This 
expectation which was generated in the minds of Additional Judges by reason of the peculiar 
manner in which clause (1) of Article 224 was operated, cannot now be ignored by the 
Government and the Government cannot be permitted to say that when the term of an 
Additional Judge expires, the Government can drop him at its sweet will. By reason of the 
expectation raised in his mind through a practice followed for almost over a quarter of a 
century, an Additional Judge is entitled to be considered for appointment as an Additional 
Judge for a further term on the expiration of his original term and if in the meantime, a 
vacancy in the post of a permanent Judge becomes available to him on the basis of seniority 
amongst the Additional Judges, he has a right to be considered for appointment as a 
permanent Judge in his High Court.577 
He further held: 
575 Ibid. at para 79. 
576 1981 Supp sec 87. 
577 Ibid. at p. 241 (para 38). 
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There can, therefore, be no doubt that an Additional Judge is not entitled as a matter of right 
to be appointed as Additional Judge for a further term on the expiration of his original term or 
as a permanent Judge. The only right he has is to be considered for such appointment and this 
right also belongs to him not because clause (1) of Article 224 confers such right upon him, 
but because of the peculiar manner in which clause (1) of Article 224 has been operated all 
these years. 578 
F. Strength of Judges of the Superior Courts 
The original Federal Constitution of Malaya, 1957, fixed the maximum number of puisne 
judges (i.e. 15) of the then Supreme Court and empowered the Parliament to increase the 
number of other judges.579 Ultimately the Parliament has been replaced with the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong as the authority to increase the number of judges of the Federal Court . (at 
· present the total of judges in the Federal Court is 15).580 When the Court of App~!al was 
established in 1994, the Constitution fixed the number of judges at 10 although the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong was empowered to increase the number of judges in the Court of Appeal (the 
present number of judges in the Court of Appeal is 32).581 The Federal Constitution of 
Malaysia, 1963 after specifying the maximum and minimum number of judges of the High 
Courts, empowered the Parliament to vary the number of judges to be appointed in the two 
High Courts. But in August 1976, this power of the Parliament was taken away and handed 
over to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong by introducing an amendment to the Constitution (the 
p1 esent strength of the judges of the High Court in Malaya is 60 and of the High Court in 
Sabah and Sarawak is 13). 
578 Ibid. at p. 243 (para 40). 
579 Original Article 122(1), the Federal Constitution of Malaya, 1957. 
580 The Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1976, (Act A 354), P.U.(A) 114/1982. 
581 Article 122A, the Federal Constitution of Malaysia. 
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Unlike the original provisions of the Federal Constitution of Malaya!Malaysia, the 
Constitution of Bangladesh, 1972 has neither fixed the maximum number of judges nor 
empowered the Parliament to fix or increase the number of judge ' to be appointed in the 
Supreme Court. Rather, the number of judges to be appointed in the Supreme Court has, in 
fact, been kept indeterminate. Like the amended provision of the Federal Constitution of 
Malaysia, the original Constitution of Bangladesh, 1 972 empowered the Head of the State, 
the President, to determinate the number of judges to be appoioted to each division of the 
Supreme Court (on the advice of the Prime Minister under Article 48(3) of the Constitution). 
For, Article 94(2) of the Constitution of Bangladesh provides that 'The Supreme Court shall 
consist of the Chief Justice .... and such number ofother Judges as the President may deem it 
. •. 
necessary to appoint to each division.' The successive governments have taken full advantage 
of this kind of stipulation. Although the number of judges in the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court was determined and increased from five to seven in 2002 and then from seven 
to 1 1 in 2010, the strength of judges of the High Court Division has never been fixed and, as 
such, nobody can exactly say what is the strength of judges ofthe High Court Division ofthe 
Supreme Court of Bangladesh. Both the Constitutions of Malaysia and Bangladesh do not 
contain any basis or ground whatsoever (e.g. increased number of cases, speedy disposal of 
cases etc) as justification for increasing the total number of judges of the Superior Court 
which involve the possibility of increasing the strength of judges to accommodate political or 
personal favourites to the. detriment of the quality justice. 
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Chapter V: Conclusion 
In this Chapter, an endeavour will be made to summarise the discussions carried out in the 
preceding four chapters and recommendations shall be put forward, inter alia to · introduce 
c~anges in the Constitutional process of appointment of judges of the higher judiciary in 
Malaysia and Bangladesh so that the executive's present power in the matter of appointment 
of judges as its 'royal privilege' is curtailed. For, to deprive the executive from exercising its 
power in the crucial matter _of appointment of judges to fashion a judiciary of its choice (i.e. 
who will share its policy or show affiliation to its political philosophy or exhibit affinity to its 
ideology) and then to secure the . appointment as judges those candidates who possess 
unimpeachable integrity, spotless character, judicial temperament, firmness, keen intellect, 
and ability to analyse facts. In a democratic society proclaiming the rule oflaw, there · 
cannot be anything of greater consequence than to keep the streams of justice clear and, 
pure .... [and] We expect our Judges to be almost superhuman in wisdom, in propriety, in 
decorum and in humanity. There must be no other group in society which must fulfil this 
standard of public expectation.582 
In the words of William Shakespeare 'Good name in man or woman ... is the immediate jewel 
of their souls and Judges share with you and me a taste for such treasures. ' 583 
A. Role of the Judiciary 
The judiciary has developed as a just and fair dispute-resolution mechanism to do justice 
between man and man, between the individuals and the state and ultimately stands between 
the people and the government as a bulwark against executive's exercise and misuse of 
power. To interpret law and constitution is the singular and unique province of the judiciary. 
582 Quoted in Gerald Gall, The Canadian Legal System (Toronto: Carswell Legal Publications, 1995). 
583 Quoted in Maurice Rosenberg, 'The Qualities of Justice- Are they Strainable?', (I966) 44 Texas Law Review 
I 063, at p. I 068. 
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The Constitution, which embodies in it the power of the people, has entrusted the judiciary 
with the vigilant task of keeping executive and legislative within its imperative limits and 
dictates through the process of judicial review under which it nullifies the unconstitutional 
acts of these two organs of the government. By checking the executive and the legislative 
from assuming excessive authority beyond the ken of the Constitution, the judiciary, in 
fulfilment of the pious trust reposed on it by the people, acts as the watchdog not only of the 
Constitution but also of democracy and shapes the life of the cammunity. Thus it is indeed 
the Jife'Qiood of constitutionalism, democracy and welfare of societies. 
B. Doctrine of the Separation of Powers and the Independence of the Judiciary 
The role of the judiciary as a resolver of disputes, interpreter of laws, watchdog of . 
democracy, guardian of the constitution, and lifeblood of constitutionalism necessitates· that it 
should completely be separated from the other two organs of the government- the executive 
and the legislative. It is rightly said that the concept of the independence of the judiciary is 
essentially a result of the 'Montesquian theory of division of power.' The tri-partition of the 
public decision-makers into the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary is based on the 
idea that each of these three acting parts should have certain independence in relation to each 
other.584 In countries where parliamentary system of government is in existence, the doctrine 
of the separation of powers has only been implemented or applied to secure the independence 
ofthejudiciary from the control ofthe executive and the legislative.585 The separation ofthe 
judiciary from the other two organs of the government is the lifeline of an independent 
judiciary that constitutes 'the foundation on which rests the edifice ... of democratic polity', a 
setup without which there can be no liberty. 
584 Supra note 11. 
585 Because the separation of powers between the executive and the legislative in the parliamentary 
democracy does not in practice exist; the ministers are not only members of the parliament but they are also 
accountable to it. 
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C. Traditional Meaning of Judicial Independence 
The most fundamental and long-established meaning of the independence of the judiciary is 
that the judges are free to perform their judicial functions without the interference of the 
executive and the legislative and from apprehensions for suffering personally because of the 
discharge of their judicial duties. In fact, this traditional meaning of the independence of the 
judiciary speaks ofthe personal independence ofjudges. 
D. Modern Four Meanings of Judicial Independence 
Apart from the traditional concept of personal independence, the concept of substantive 
independence of the judges, which means that the judges perform their judicial functions 
without submitting to no other authority but only to the dictates of law and the commands of 
their conscience, is also universally recognised by law (for example Article 76(3) of the 
Constitution of Japan, 1946) and legal scholars. The international norms developed specially 
in the 1980s and 1990s at the initiative of some international non-governmental organisations 
. 
(like the International Bar Association's Minimum Standards of Judicial Independence, 1982, 
Law Association of Asia and Western Pacific's Beijing Statement of the Principles of the 
Independence of Judiciary, 1995) and international conferences (like the First World 
Conference on the Independence of Justice held in Montreal, in which the instrument titled 
the Universal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, 1983 was adopted) have thickened 
and broadened the concept of judicial independence by including into it two other concepts of 
collective independence and internal independence. Collective independence, which means 
the institutional, administrative and financial independence of the judiciary as a whole vis-a-
vis the executive and the legislative branches of the government, and internal independence, 
meaning the independence of a judge from any kind of pressure or interference from his 
judicial superiors and colleagues in coming to decisions in individual cases, are considered as 
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two far-reaching new components added to the concept of the independence of judiciary. For, 
independence of individual judges, comprised of personal independence and substantive 
independence, is virtually ineffective and meaningless without the internal and institutional 
independence of the judiciary including the powers and facilities that are required to perform 
judicial functions according to law, without fear or favour, affection or ill-will. Thus the 
concept of' independence of judiciary' has currently four meanings or facets : 
I. personal independence; 
II. substantive independence; 
III. collective independence; and 
IV. internal independence. 
E. Importance of Judicial Independence in a Democratic State 
An independent and courageous judiciary, which is crucial in determining a nation's rank in 
political civilisation, provides the reason for its existence and continuance. It is sine qua non 
in a democratic society for securing pure and fair justice as strictly defined by law so that the 
'lamp of justice' does not go 'out in darkness' and public confidence in the administration of 
justice also remains unshaken and unaffected. Therefore, in a democratic state, the necessity 
of an independent judiciary is keenly felt to i) uphold the rule of law, ii) to ensure fair justice, 
iii) to defend constitutional guarantees of fundamental rights/liberties and iv) to maintain and 
enhance public confidence in judicial impartiality. The judiciary, which is entrusted with the 
sole authority to decide over life, liberty, freedom, rights, duties and properties of the 
citizens, to expound and define the true meaning of law and constitution and to keep 
executive and legislative organs of the government within the limits of the constitution, can 
perform its proper role as a sentinel on the qui vive only if its independence is completely 
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ensured and institutional immunity as well as autonomy are guaranteed by constitution and 
law. 
F. Judicial Independence as Enshrined in the Federal Constitution of Malaysia 
Unlike the Constitution of Bangladesh, the Federal Constitution of Malaysia does not contain 
a preamble to incorporate into it the aspiration of justice and speak in the text of the 
separation of judiciary from the executive organ of the State. Furthermore, unlike the 
Constitution of Bangladesh; neither the Constitution of Malaysia. provide that the judges of 
. superior courts and subordinate courts shall be independent in the exercise of_their judicial 
functions, nor oath to be taken by the judges of the superior courts under the Sixth Schedule 
containing a promise 'to do right to all manner of people according to law, without fear or 
favour, affection or ill-will'- the core principle ofthe independence ofthejudiciary. Although 
the absence of any explicit provision concerning the principle of the independence of 
judiciary in the Malaysian Constitution will go against the assertion that judicial 
independence is a basic pillar or structure of the Constitution, it contains several provisions to 
secure and safeguard the independence of the judiciary. These include a) method of 
appointment, b) security of tenure, c) restriction against alteration of conditions of service to 
the detriment of the judges after their appointment, d) salaries being charged on the 
Consolidated Fund, e) restriction on discussion of judges' conduct in the Parliament and f) 
power of the judges to punish for contempt of court. 
G. Judicial Independence as Epitomised in the Constitution of Bangladesh 
The concept of the independence of the judiciary has been given the place of a cornerstone in 
the scheme ofthe Constitution of Bangladesh; it is one of the central values and basic pillars 
on which the Constitution is based. The Constitution has embraced the principle of judicial 
independence by providing for the performance of the judicial functions by the judges 
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independently and requiring the judges to swear to ' faithfully discharge the duties of . . . [their] 
office according to law' and to hold the scale of justice even between the humblest citizen 
and an. all powerful executive, without fear or favour- regardless of the consequences to 
themselves. Every accused person has a fundamental right to have a 'speedy and public trial ' 
by not only an independent judiciary bu't also by an impartial judiciary.586 Therefore, the 
judicial independence has been given teeth through a range of guarantees enshrined in our 
Constitution, namely, a) method of appointment, b) fixation .and security of tenure, c) 
prohibiti~n ori ·altering th~ remuneration, privileges and other' terms and conditions of 
services of judges to their disadvantages during their term of office, d) salaries being charged 
on the Consolidated Fund, and e) power of the judges of superior courts to punish any 
contempt for maintaining their dignity and authority. But unlike the Constitution of Malaysia, 
the Constitution of Bangladesh does not conta.itl ·procedural safeguards to prevent unexpected 
discussion of the conduct of judges in the Parliament although the rules of procedure of the 
Parliament provide for such a provision. 
H. Substantive Independence, Method of Appointment and the Present Study 
Substantive independence, which means the freedom of judges to decide matters before them 
in accordance with the command of their conscience without submitting to any kind of 
improper pressures, inducements or influences from any quarter- be it executive and 
legislative, pressure group, individual or even another judge- is considered as the kernel of 
judicial independence. Since substantive independence refers to a neutrality of mind of 
judges in the exercise of their judicial functions, the method of appointment has a great deal 
of bearing in securing the appointment of right judges who will be men of independent 
character, keen intellect, high legal knowledge and acumen, professional ability, equanimity, 
dignity and judicial temperament. In the words of Socrates ( 469 BC-399 BC), fair judges are 
586 Article 35(3), the Constitution of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, 1972. 
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required to do four things, namely ' to hear courteously, to answer wisely, to consider soberly, 
and to decide impartially.' 587 An erroneous appointment of an unsuitable person of doubtful 
competence as a judge on the basis of political or personal favouritism is bound to produce 
irreparable damage not only to the fair administration of justice but also to the public faith in 
the administration of justice. Litigant public come to the courts of law to have their disputes 
adjudicated with the expectation that judges are impartial and ind~pendent and they will 
administer justice according to Jaw without taking into account any extraneous or . irrelevant 
-
considerations. This kind of faith and trust will fade away if judges are appointed on 
considerations other than the merit. 
Although Pr~f: Shimon Shetreet maintains that 'politics should be neither a shortcut to nor <;~,n 
impediment in the appointment [of a qualified person] to ajudicial office' 588 which has been 
· endorsed by Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah of the Pakistan Supr~mc Court when he observed 
that the ' political affiliation of a candidate for judgeship may not be a disqualification 
provided he is a person of integrity and has active practice as [an] advocate .. .. and h~s sound 
knowledge of law.'589 It can hardly be expected that as soon as a judge appointed on the 
consideration of political allegiance 'takes oath, there is a sudden transformation and he 
forgets his past connections and turns a new leaf of life.' Justice Pandian in Supreme Court 
Advocates-on-Record Association v Union of India590, rightly observed that if the appointee 
bears a particular stamp for the purpose of changing the cause of decisions bowing to the 
diktat of his appointing authority then the independence of judiciary cannot be secured 
587 Dictionary of Familiar Quotations (London: Tophi Books, 1988) at p. 75. 
588 Shimon Shetreet, Judges on Trial: A Study of the Appointment and Accountability of the English Judiciary 
(Amsterdam, New York, Oxford: North Holland Publishing Co., 1976) at p. 75. 
589 Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah in AI-Jehad Trust v Federation of Pakistan, PLD 1996 SC 324. 
590 ( 1993) 4 sec 441. 
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notwithstanding the guaranteed tenure of office, rights and privileges, safeguards, conditions 
f . d. . 591 o servtce an tmmumty. 
However, since substantive independence (also known as decisional independence) is the 
core of judicial independence, and method of appointment is the means to select and appoint 
persons with requisite qualifications and qualities as judges, the present study . is undertaken 
to examine the constitutional process of the appointments of judges to superior courts in 
Malaysia and Bangladesh. 
I. Methods of Appointment of Superior Court Judges in Malaysia and Bangladesh 
. . -
Both Malaysia and Bangladesh have adopted in their Constitutions the method of 
appointment in which the executives have been . given a pre-eminent role to play with striking 
diversities regarding prior mandatory consultation with the constitutional entities. 
l I . Appointment of Chief Justice 
Under the existing (as of 2011) arrangement of the Federal Constitution of Malaysia, the 
Chief Justice, who is the head of the Federal Court, is appointed by the Constitutional 
Monarch (the Yang di-Pertuan Agong) 'acting on the advice of the Prime Minister after 
consulting the Conference of Rulers.' The Judicial Appointments Commission, constituted 
first in February 2009 comprising of nine members ofwhich the majority- five non ex-officio 
members- are appointed by the Prime Minister, has been empowered to select and 
recommend suitably qualified persons for the Prime Minister's consideration to advice the 
Head of the State for appointment as the Chief Justice of Malaysia. But the Prime Minister is 
not bound to recommend to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong after consulting the Conference of 
Rulers from among those candidates shortlisted by the Commission for appointment in the 
vacant post of the Chief Justice. Thus the system of plurality of consultees in the formation of 
591 Ibid. at p. 525 . 
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opinion by the Prime Minister to advice the Yang di-Pertuan Agong does not serve as an 
inbuilt check against the likelihood of appointing the head of the Malaysian Judiciary taking 
into account political or extraneous considerations . 
.. 
Bu't ~nlike Malaysia, the Constitutional Head of the State of Bangladesh under the 1972 
Constitution, as amended in 1991 , enjoys unfettered discretion to appoint the ChiefJustice of 
Bangladesh without consulting any constitutional entity, even not required under the 
amended Article 48(3) to act in accordance with the advice of tne Prime Minister. Similarly, 
unlike the Judicial Appointments Commission of Malaysia, the Supreme Judicial 
Commission of Bangladesh592 was not given the authority to select and recommend 
candidates to the. President for appointment as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh. The 
established convention of seniority in appointing the senior most judge of the Appellate 
. Division as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh has been violated on five occasions between 
2003 and to-date (as of 2011 ).593 This phenomenon of violating the convention of seniority in 
appointing the Chief Justice of Bangladesh gained ground after adding to the Constitution in 
1996 the new provisions of heading the Non-Party Care-taker Government by the immediate 
past Chief Justice, to be constituted within 15 days of the dissolution of Parliament as an 
interim government with the special mandate 'to give to the Election Commission all possible 
aid and assistance for holding the general election of members of Parliament peacefully, 
fairly and impartially. ' The appointment of the Chief Justice on the ground of political 
allegiance ignoring the convention of seniority not only shatters the legitimate expectation of 
the superseded judges but also has the disastrous impact of making the highly dignified and 
prestigious office of the Chief Justice controversial and of lowering the public faith, 
confidence and trust in the impartiality of the judges of the highest court of the land. 
592 The Supreme Judicial Commission of Bangladesh was set up in March 2008 under a Presidential Ordinance 
and ceased to exist since February 2009. 
593 The present Awami League Government within a period of two years breached the principle of seniority on 
two occasions, first in December 2009 and then in September 2010. 
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1.2. Appointment of the Puisne Judges 
The Federal Constitution of Malaysia, as amended in 1963, 1965 and 1994, empowers the 
Yang di-Pertuan Agong to appoint the other judges ofthe Federal Court, the Courtof Appeal. 
and the High Courts . acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, after consulting the 
Conference of Rulers. But it has also been made a Constitutional imperative for the Prime 
Minister to consult the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, who is best equipped to know and 
assess the worth of the candidates and their suitability for judicial appointment by reason of 
· his long tenure on the bench, before tendering his advice to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong for 
appointing puisne judges to the Federal Court, the Court of Appeal and the two High Courts .. 
Furthermore, in appointing judges to the Court of Appeal and the two High Courts (the High 
Court of Malaya and the High Court of Sabah and Sarawak), the Prime Minister is 
. constitutionally obligated to consult the President of the Court of Appeal and the Chief Judge 
of the concerning High Courts respectively so that every relevant particular about the 
candidate is known and duly weighed as expert advices by him before presenting his advice 
to the Head of the Sate for the appointment of judges to these courts. The Prime Minister has 
an additional duty to consult the Chief Minister of each of the two States of Sabah and 
Sarawak before handing over his advice to the Constitutional Monarch in appointing judges 
to the High Court in Sabah and Sarawak. Thus the appointment process of judges of the 
superior courts in Malaysia is participatory and certain constitutional functionaries are 
designed to act in trust as collective repositories for the purpose of selecting the best and most 
suitable candidates from among those available for appointment as judges of the superior 
courts. Furthermore, the Judicial Appointments Commission, established in 2009 under an 
ordinary Act of Parliament consisting of, inter alia, the Chief Justice of the Federal Court, the 
President of the Court of Appeal, the Chief Judges of the two High Courts as its ex-officio 
members, has been empowered to recommend to the Prime Minister for tendering his advice 
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to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong three candidates for the appointment as judges in the High 
Courts and ultimately four candidates for the appointment as judges in the Federal Court and 
the Court of Appeal. This has given rise to the over-lapping process of exercising powers in 
'· . 
the matter of appointment of judges in superior courts. For, the Prime Minister is required 
under the Constitution after receiving the names of the candidates from the Commission, to 
consult again the Chief Justice of the Federal Court before tendering his advice to the Head of 
. ' 
the State for the appointments of all the judges of the superior courts, consult the President of 
the Court of Appeal for the ~ppointment of judges to the Court of Appeal and consult each of 
the Chief Judges of the two High Courts for appointing puisne judges to the High Court 
concerned. This enabled the heads of the superior courts to express their personal views about 
the suitability of the candidates for the second time. and, as such, enable them to have a 
'second bite at the cherry', ifthey disagreed earlier with the Commission's decision taken in 
the selection meeting. It should be stressed here that the Prime Minister is free to accept or 
reject, after consulting the Conference of Rulers, the recommendation of the Commission for 
appointment in the vacant posts of judges to the superior courts which in essence makes the 
Commission ' a toothless tiger.' In fact, the selection and appointment of judges in superior 
courts of Malaysia is still virtually a power of the Prime Minister as the Constitutional 
Monarch, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, has no choice but to accept and act on his (the Prime 
Minister's) advice in the matter of appointment of judges of the Federal Court, the Court of 
Appeal and the two High Courts. 
Unlike Malaysia, where there are now several constitutional and legal entities to consult with 
in appointing judges of superior courts, in Bangladesh the 1972 Constitution made it 
imperative for the President to consult only with the Chief Justice of Bangladesh- the single 
consultee- in appointing regular and additional judges of the High Court Division under 
Articles 95(1) and 98 and judges of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court as per 
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Article 95(1) of the Constitution of Bangladesh. The Chief Justice, who was best suited and 
had the best opportunity to adjudge the professional experience, knowledge of law, ability, 
firmness and integrity of the members of the Supreme Court Bar and senior judicial officers 
(district judges) for appointment as judges, could reasonably be expected to look at the matter 
of appointment of judges objectively and impartially so that undesirable and unfit persons did 
not get a berth on the bench. It was tantamount to negate this premise when the Constitutional 
provision concerning consultation with the Chief Justice was first omitted in January 1975 
and then after its restoratio~ in May 1976 for a brief period, the President was again freed 
from the constitutional obligation of consulting the Chief Justice ih appointing 'udges of the 
Supreme Court. Thus the unfettered and unrestrained power of appointing judges was vested 
in the President- the Lord of Lords' in a Presidential form of Government (1975-1979)-
leaving the door wide open for intruding political consideration and arbitrariness into the 
appointment process. However, ultimately in 1978, the convention of consulting the Chief 
Justice in appointing judges of the Supreme Court was established by President Ziaur 
Rahman which is still in existence. Ultimately the Supreme Judicial Commission was 
established under an Ordinance in March 2008, which lasted for less than a year, as a 
recommendatory authority to select and recommend two candidates for each vacancy 
(incorporating into law the usual practice) of the Supreme Court. But the President was given 
the right to accept and reject the candidates recommended by the Commission at his pleasure 
which defeated the very objective of establishing this nine member-body (which was 
dominated by six ex-officio members from the Supreme Court) for a cautious, informed, 
professional and non-political search for the most competent persons for the judgeship of the 
Supreme Court. Like the Judicial Appointments Commission of Malaysia, Supreme Judicial 
Commission of Bangladesh was also established neither in pursuance of any provision of the 
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Constitution nor by introducing any amendment into the Constitution and, as such, can 
strongly be argued that both the Commissions are unconstitutional. 
1.3. Appointment of Judicial Commissioners and Additional Judges 
The Federal Constitution of Malaysia, as amended in 1963 provided for the first time the 
provision for the appointment of judicial commissioners in the High Court of Malaya and the 
. . 
High Court in Sabah and Sarawak. Under the new method of appointment introduced in 
1994, the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, acting on the advice of .the Prime Minister, after 
consulting the Chief Justice of the Federal Court may appoint a judicial com,!llissioner for 
unspecified period or purposes. This is different from the method of appointing regular 
judges to the High Courts in which the Prime Minister is also required to consult the 
Conference of Rulers and the Chief Judge of the High Court concerned. Thus the Chief 
Judges of the High Courts, who are the most competent persons to express their views as to 
the necessity of appointing judicial commissioners and the suitability of candidates for such 
an appointment, have deliberately been excluded from the appointment process of. judicial 
commissioners so that the method can easily be used to appoint those persons as judicial 
commissioners who have rendered valuable services to the government or strongly believe in 
the philosophy of the government. It seems that keeping this in mind, the Judicial 
Appointments Commission of Malaysia has not been given the jurisdiction to select suitably 
qualified persons, who merit appointment as judicial commissioners in the High Courts, for 
the consideration of the Prime Minister.594 But the judicial commissioners have been given 
the right to apply to the Judicial Appointments Commission for the selection and 
recommendation for appointment as judges of the High Courts.595 
594 See Section 21, the Judicial Appointments Commission Act, 2009. 
595 Sections 23(3) and 29, ibid. 
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Like the provision for the appointment of judicial commissioners (in fact additional judges) 
in the two High Courts of Malaysia, the provision for appointment of additional judges in the 
High Court Division ofthe Supreme Court of Bangladesh has become a gateway to the cadre 
of permanent judgeship in the High Court Division. But unlike Malaysia, where exists a 
difference between the method of appointment of regular judges and the judicial 
commiss i~ners to the High Courts, the same method of appointment ·is followed in 
Bangladesh in appointing regular and additional judges to the High Court Division of the 
Supreme Court. Unlike th~ Judicial Appointments Commission of Malaysia, the defunct 
Supreme Judicii Commission of Bangladesh was e~powered to select and recommend 
suitable candidates for appointment as additional judges of the High Court Division. Unlike 
Malaysia, where non-appointment of judicial commissioners as regular judges of the High 
Courts has never been challenged in superior courts, in Bangladesh non-appointment of 
certain additional judges as regular judges of the High Court Division was challenged in 
which the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in 2009 held that the additional judges 
only have the right to be considered for appointment as permanent judges in the High Court 
Division and not beyond. Unlike Malaysia, where consulting the Chief Justice of Malaysia in 
appointing judicial commissioners to the High Courts is constitutional, the requirement of 
consulting the Chief Justice of Bangladesh for the appointment of additional judges in the 
High Court Division of the Supreme Court has been conventional since 1978.596 Unlike 
Malaysia, where in Re Dato' Seri Anwar Ibrahim ' s case597 constitutional consultation was 
given a literal meaning to the effect that consultation does not mean concurrence and the 
consultant may consider the advice or opinion given but he is not bound by it598, in 
Bangladesh the conventional consultation with the Chief Justice in appointing judges of the 
596 Supra notes 572 and 573. 
597 Supra note 561. 
598 Supra note 562 . 
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Supreme Court by the President was given, to some extent, an extended meaning in 
Bangladesh and Justice Syed Md Dastagir Hossain v Md Idrisur Rahman, Advocate.599 As it 
was held in this case that, 'In the matter of selection of the Judges, the opinion of the Chief 
Justice should be dominant in the area oflegal acumen and suitability for the appointment.'600 
Furthermore, in that case, it was observed that the Prime Minister, on whom (instead of the 
President) the executive power of the Republic is vested and under Article 48(3) the President 
is required to act in accordance with the advice of the Prime Minister in the exercise of his 
constitutional and legal po~ers, cannot advice the President contrary to the opinion of the 
Chief Justice regarding the appointment of regular judges and · additional judges to the 
Supreme Court.601 This is an unacceptable interpretation as there is no such explidt or 
implicit limitation·on Prime Minister's power of advising the President in Articles 95(1) and 
98 of the Constitution that deal with the appointment of judges of the Supreme Court. 
Referring to this observation, Chief Justice Md. Tafazzul Islam in the case of Khondker 
De/war Hossain & Others v Bangladesh Italian Marble Works Limitecl02 observed in 2010 
that 
m view of the declarations given in the Judges case ... declaring that convention of 
consultation being a Constitutional imperative, is binding upon everybody. Accordingly this 
retention of substituted Article 95 [in which consultation with the Chief Justice was omitted] 
will have no bearing on the matter of consultation.603 
It is true that the independence of judiciary is a basic pillar and cardinal feature of the 
Constitution of Bangladesh and judicial independence is inextricably linked and connected 
with the constitutional process of appointment of judges of the Supreme Court. But in 
599 Supra note 563. 
600 Supra note 564. 
601 Supra notes 510 and 511. 
602 Supra note 379. 
603 Ibid. at p. 179. 
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interpreting the provisions of amended Article 95(1) and 98 of the Constitution of 
Bangladesh, which no longer contain the words 'after consultation with the Chief Justice' in 
the context of appointing judges by the President, the Supreme Court does not have the right 
to go beyond the framework and the parameters of the provisions of Article 95(1) and 98 of 
the Constitution in interpreting these Articles. As Justice Bhagwati of the Indian Supreme 
Court rightly observed in S.P. Gupta v Union of India604 that: 
We have ... to rid our mind of any preconceived notions or ideas and interpret the Constitution 
as it is and not as we think it ought to be. We can always find some reason for bending the 
language of the Constitlition to our will, if we want, but that would be- rewriting the 
Constitution in the guise of interpretation.605 
J. Recommendation 
The following recommendations can be put forward regarding a) additional judges/j udicial 
commissioners, b) strength of judges and c) method of appointment. 
a) Abolition of the System of Appointment of Additional Judges/Judicial Commissioners 
The system of appointing additional judges/judicial commissioners as a gateway 
through which they are required to pass before being appointed as regular/permanent 
judges in the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh and in the 
High Courts in Malaysia should be abolished on the following grounds: 
In the first place, since the tenure of judicial commissioners/additional judges is 
generally two years they can hardly be expected to hold the scale of justice as 
independently and courageously as a permanent judge in cases, particularly in which 
the executive- the largest single litigant before the High Courts- is involved. 
604 AIR 1982 SC 149. 
605 Ibid. 
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Secondly, ifthey pronounce a fair and fearless judgment against the executive it may 
cost them either appointment as a regular judge or 'for a further period. ' 
Thirdly, a litigant' s confidence in the independence and impartiality of judicial 
commissioners/additional judges, whose continuance in office after the specified 
period is subject to the pleasure of the executive, is bound to suffer from the thought 
that they Gudicial commissioners/additional judges) are likely to be biased. 
Fourthly, taking into account the adverse impact of appointing additional 
judges/j~dicial com~issioners on their independence and Impartiality, only very few 
constitutions of the world, e.g. the Constitution of India, 1949, as amended in 1956, 
the Constitution of Singapore, 1963, the Constitution of Pakistan, 1973 and the 
Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1978 provide for the appointment of such judges. 
Fifth and finally, international standards on the independence of judiciary disapprove 
the system of appointing temporary judges like judicial commissioners and additional 
judges. As the Montreal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, 1983 provides 
that the appointment of temporary judges is inconsistent with judicial independence 
and calls for phasing out gradually where such appointments exist.606 
b) Strength of Judges 
Since there is the scope of taking decision by the executive to increase the number of 
judges of superior courts on political considerations (like finding berths on the bench 
as rewards for th0se favourites who have 'delivered' as law officers, as party men and 
judges), rather than judicial considerations (e.g. increased number of cases, speedy 
disposal of cases), the power of increasing the number of judges of the superior courts 
in Malaysia and Bangladesh should be given to the Head of the State either on the 
recommendation of a Judicial Service Commission as it is to be found in Article 79(1) 
606 Article 2.20, the Montreal Declaration on the Independence of Justice, 1983. 
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of the Constitution of Namibia, 1990 or upon the request of the Federal Court/ 
Supreme Court as provided for by Article 3 of the Constitution of Puerto Rico, 1952. 
c) Establishment of a New Forum for Judicial Appointment 
It seems. that the present method for selection and appointment of judges to the 
superior .courts in Malaysia and Bangladesh should be given a 'decent buriaP for 
excluding patronage appointment of judgeship or appointment · on extraneous 
consideration. In order to strengthen the independence and impartiality of the 
judiciary, an indepe~dent, effective and meaningful judicial commission, representing 
. various interests with pre-eminent position in favour of the judiciary with the power 
of selecting and recommending best candidates to the Head of the State for judicial 
appointment, is the demand of modem times. For, the principles on the independence 
of the judiciary, formulated and adopted by various international and regional 
organisations, particularly in the 1 980s and thereafter, favour the appointment of 
judges of superior courts by, on the recommendation, proposal/advice of, or after 
consultation with an appropriately constituted and representative judicial body.607 
Furthermore, the Constitutions of Guyana, Algeria, Croatia, Namibia, Fiji, Nepal, 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Rwanda, Poland, Albania, Nigeria and Iraq, adopted in 
the 1980s and thereafter, provided for the establishment of a nominating or 
recommendatory judicial body enjoying high degree of independence from the 
political process.608 In very recent times, the Constitution of some of the countries of 
the world, e.g. the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan as amended in 2010 (provides for the 
establishment of a Judicial Commission) and the Constitution Reform Act, 2005 of 
the UK (provides for the establishment of a Judicial Appointments Commission), 
have been amended to provide for the establishment of an independent body for 
607 Supra note 284. 
608 Supra note 285. 
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selection and recommendation of duly qualified persons for appointment as judges in 
the superior courts in order to ensure that neither political bias nor personal 
favouriti sm and animosity play any part in judicial appointment. In order to bring in 
greater transparency and accountability in judicial appointments, the Government of 
India, introduced two Bills, the Constitution (Sixty-Seventh Amendment) Bill, 1990 
and the Constitution (Ninety-Eighth Amendment) Bill, 2002, in the Lower House of 
the Parliament, but both the Bills lapsed.609 
In Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v Union of India610, Justice Kuldip 
Singh of the Indian .Supreme Court in giving the words ' consultation ~ith the Chief Justice of 
India' a wide connotation (i.e. that the Chief Justice ' s opinion was binding on the Executive), 
observed: ' We have come to the conclusion that the exclusion of the final say of the 
. executive in the matter of appointment of judges is the only way to maintain the 
independence of judiciary.' Such an objective of maintaining the independence of judiciary 
should be achieved neither by way of judicial activism (as the Supreme Court of Bangladesh 
also followed the foot-step of the Indian Supreme Court) nor by passing any Act (as Malaysia 
did in 2009) or by promulgating any Ordinance (as Bangladesh did in 2008). In order to 
ensure that the matter of appointment in the superior courts of Malaysia and Bangladesh does 
not result in politically biased judges or judges who are or feel beholden to the appointing 
authority, an independent Judicial Appointments Commission/ Supreme Judicial Commission 
is to be set up through constitutional amendments. The power of appointment of judges of the 
superior courts by the Head of the State is to be exercised on the recommendation of such a 
commission. The recommendation of the Commission should be binding upon the 
Constitutional Head but it shall be open to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong/President to refer the 
recommendation back to the Commission in any given case along with the information in his 
609 Supra notes 288 and 289. 
610 (1993) 4 sec 441. 
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possession regarding the suitability of the cand idates. If, however, after reconsideration the 
Commission reiterates its recommendation, then the President/Yang di-Pertuan Agong shall 
be bound to make the appointment. Preferably the Judicial Appointments 
Commission/Supreme Judicial Commission should consist of ex-officio members from the 
higher judiciary (e.g. the Chief Justice and the five senior most judges), last retired Chief 
Justice or Judge and Professor of Law on the basis of seniority from public· universities by 
rotation. In this context, it is very pertinent to remind the immortal words offormer Chief 
-
Justice of Australia, Sir Harry Gibbs who said in 1987: 
Judicial Commissions, advisory Committees and procedures for consultation [with the .Chief 
justice] will .be useless unless there exists, among the politicians of all parties, a realization 
that the inter~st of the community requires that neither political nor personal patronage nor a 
desire to placate any section of a society, should play any part in making judicial 
. t 611 appomtmen s. 
He further added that 'no procedure will be effective if the will to appoint only the best is lacking. In 
the end, we must depend on the statesmanship of those in all political parties. ' 612 Chief Justice Harry 
Gibbs's requisite 'statesmanship' of political leadership is to be found in former British Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown who, even after enacting Constitutional Reforms Act, 2005 which 
radically changed the way in which judges are appointed by investing the whole process of 
selection in the hands of the independent Judicial Appointments Commission, said on 3 July 
2007: 
For centuries, they [the Executive] have exercised authority in the name of the monarchy 
without the people and their elected representatives being consulted. So I now propose that in 
12 important areas of our national life, the Prime Minister and the Executive should surrender 
or limit their powers, the exclusive exercise of which by the Government of the day should 
611 Harry Gibbs, 'The Appointment of Judges' , (1987) 6I Australian Law Journa/7, II. 
612 Ibid. 
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have no place in a modem democracy ... and I purpose that the Government should consider 
relinquishing its residual role in the appointment of judges.6 13 
It is our earnest and sincere expectation that in near future we shall be able to hear from any 
Malaysian or Bangladeshi leading personality echoing the words of the first Chairman of the 
Judicial Appointments Commission of the UK, who in her first speech in November 2006 
said·: ' For the · first time in its 1,000-year history, the Judiciary is fully' and officially · 
independent of the government. This has been described as the mnst significant change since 
Magna Carta in 1215.'6 14 
613 Quoted in Ministry of Justice, The Governance of Britain: Judicial Appointments (Consultation Paper Code 
No CP 25/07, 25 October 2007) at p. 5. 
6 14 Speech by Baroness Prashar, Chairman of the Judicial Appointments Commission, at the Society of 
Construction Law, 22 November 2006 < 
http://www.judicialappointments.gov.uk!static/documents/JAC Speech Society of Construction Law 221106 
.pdf> (accessed on I December 2010). - - - - - -
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